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I.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY CRITICISM.¹

The problems which challenge contemporary attention are very numerous in almost every department of human thought. In many instances the pressure of those problems and the solutions of them suggested by scholars occasion disquietude of mind and compel the revision of notions whose soundness was once thought to be unassailable. Instead of deploring such a situation, as some do, it may be regarded, in my judgment, one of the gratifying and reassuring characteristics of present-day life. Investigation and change invariably attend periods of

¹ *Literature:* Articles on the Gospels in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible and the Encyclopædia Biblica; Askwith's Historical Value of the Fourth Gospel; Burkitt's The Gospel History and Its Transmission; Bacon's The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate; Scott's The Fourth Gospel, Its Purpose and Theology; Lightfoot's Biblical Essays; Parts 8, 10 and 12 of the Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher; Forsyth's The Person and Place of Jesus Christ; Gardner's Exploratio Evangelica; Westcott's Introduction to the Study of the Gospels; Inge's Sermons, Clemen's Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources.

intellectual vitality and progress—their absence often indicates mental stupor or listless indifference.

Among the problems which have to do with biblical and doctrinal considerations, that of the Fourth Gospel is one of outstanding and far-reaching importance. As long as twenty years ago, Bishop Lightfoot, the greatest English scholar of his generation, pointed out its vital character, and insisted that its significance was of central moment in the study of Christianity. To-day we are in a position to see this much more clearly. On account of the issues, generally recognized by those acquainted with the nature and bearings of the problem as necessarily involved in its solution—issues which must wield a potent influence in determining the Church's ultimate decision for or against certain controverted conceptions of our Religion and its Founder—the problem for ages has been and continues to be one of commanding and absorbing interest to the leaders of both traditional and progressive tendencies in religious and theological inquiry.

This explains why for a long while past, our literary seas have been, why they still are crowded with craft carrying biblical critics' discussions of the so-called Johannine Question. Not a few of their contributions to the large and constantly growing body of the literature on the subject bear the marks of competent scholarship, of painstaking exhaustive investigation, and of undoubting confidence in the validity of their contentions and the trustworthiness of their conclusions. And were it not for our added knowledge of the different angles from which they approach, and of the differing prepossessions with which they pursue the study of the problem, the radically variant and utterly unharmonizable attitude of biblical students toward the controverted doctrinal views alluded to, we might despair of ever finding a satisfying answer to the question.

With all this in mind, namely, the importance of the problem, the significance of the issues involved in its solution, the well-equipped character of those who have attempted to solve it,

and the widely divergent nature of their published conclusions, it were nothing less than a stroke of temerity for me to undertake a paper on the present topic with either a view of adding even a little to the sum of knowledge regarding it already available, or under the supposition that my personal alignment with one or the other side of the contending parties could be of any weight or importance to the learned readers of this REVIEW. My purpose is far less ambitious, much more modest. I mean simply to note in a more or less disconnected and superficial way, certain features of the problem, which, in the course of the survey of it I have made for myself, have particularly impressed me; to refer to the part which recent biblical criticism has had in its discussion; to justify, if possible, the application of critical principles and methods to the study of Scripture; and, incidentally, to indicate the direction in which according to my opinion we may look for the truth on our problem in the newer light. This program, I am well aware, is much too large for detailed and satisfactory treatment within the limits of space at my command, but a few of its more significant points may be at least lightly touched and their purport briefly noticed.

1. To begin with, we may remind ourselves, in the first place, that under some of its aspects, the problem of the Fourth Gospel is not at all new. From the time of the formation of the New Testament Canon—indeed at a considerably earlier period—it was recognized by students of the several Evangelical documents that the Fourth Gospel stands in a category of its own, that what it contains is in very important respects distinct from the Synoptic accounts of our Lord's life and teaching. The writers of the latter, simple-hearted and unsophisticated Hebrews, were intent upon setting forth, broadly speaking, the life and words of Jesus, in strict accord with what some of them may have remembered, or with what was authentically reported to them by oral tradition or earlier writings. Their controlling purpose was to make their records faithful transcripts of the historic facts and incidents of the

Master's life. And, barring some later accretions, their narratives exhibit a consistent historical situation, true to the conditions of the time of their appearance as known to us from other reliable sources.

The author of the Fourth Gospel, one of the profoundest philosophical thinkers and greatest theologians known to Christianity, represents a mental type widely different from that of the Synoptists. His distinguished and unmistakable individuality is stamped from beginning to end upon his document. His self-avowed purpose is not a strictly historical one. His mind was evidently steeped in that mixture of philosophical and religious thought which had come to prevail about the end of the first century among educated Jews who had been brought in contact with Greek and Roman culture. In his thought the origin of Jesus is pressed into a region which lies beyond the horizon of history altogether. He begins his Gospel in the uncalculable heights of pre-creation times, and declares that ere the universe began to be, in the unbegun life of the Eternal Deity, lived the conscious and luminous One who was manifest among men as Jesus of Nazareth. His account of Christ's earthly career certainly accepts and incorporates some important and probably authentic traditions of certain events in his life, but this traditional historical material, whether taken from Synoptic or independent sources, is somewhat freely handled, often subordinated to the author's specific purpose, and constantly overlaid by a remarkable doctrinal and philosophical construction.

These differences between the Synoptists and their writings on the one hand, and the Fourth Evangelist and his production on the other hand, which, as already intimated, raised questions in earlier ages regarding the historical nature of Fourth Gospel and its authentic apostolic origin, have in our age been brought into much clearer and fuller perspective and so thoroughly established as to be no longer a matter of dispute among informed persons. For bringing about this altered situation, credit belongs to modern methods of studying historical prob-

lems and to the application of literary tests to ancient documents with a view of ascertaining the comparative value of their respective representations when at variance. These methods and tests have been gradually making their way during the last fifty or seventy-five years, and have given us a conception of history quite different from that which before had prevailed. To my mind this new conception of history and of historical study marks a long step forward in the path of intellectual progress, and leaves little room for one to doubt that the critical methods, of which it is the result, must have had their origin in a divinely given impulse.

In the application of these critical principles and literary tests to the study of the historical questions underlying the Gospels, no less than to those of history in general, the scientific inquirer of to-day, if he wishes the results of his study to receive approbation, must lay aside the advocate and assume the judge. He must divest himself of personal prepossessions and idiosyncrasies in order to pursue his quest in the whitest light attainable. Moreover, to prosecute his studies in an accurate, unbiased and judicial manner, he must possess the historical imagination, be clothed with the rare quality of impartiality, and have respect for and open-minded willingness to accept any proved fact. And in addition, he must have adequate insight to trace the origin, the true relation and succession of events in the history of human thought and life, and to discover whether or not the writer of a particular document was actuated by a desire to make it a naturalistic transcript from actual life or an idealized, purposive picture of speculative theories. It should require no argument to show that for the ascertaining of whatever solid historic facts may be hidden in the fabric of writings constructed with a purpose, that purpose with all that rests upon it must first be eliminated. And when we are assured, as we are, by a learned German historian, that "none of the ancient writers intended simply to describe real life or actualities, that that would have been a breach of the laws of art as then understood, and that even historians, including those who

have made contributions to the New Testament, did not deem it essential to chronicle merely outward occurrences, but allowed themselves much wider scope in order to produce desired effects upon their readers' minds," the modern method of subjecting the Evangelical writings to critical analysis and comparison seems to be fully warranted.

This contention is now more generally sanctioned than it once was. Some years ago the great University President who has done more for the advancement of education in this country than any other individual, aroused bitter protest by his earnest advocacy of absolute freedom in biblical and theological inquiry, and was maligned for commending the application of the scientific spirit as needful to overcome "the terrible stress of temptation to intellectual dishonesty which has always beset the clerical profession." To-day large numbers of men gratefully own as essential and supremely valuable, the spirit on which he so courageously insisted—"the spirit which seeks only the fact without the slightest regard to consequences. Any twisting or obscuring of the fact to accommodate it to a pre-conceived theory, hope, or wish, any tampering with the actual result of investigation, is the unpardonable sin. It is a spirit at once humble and dauntless, patient of details, passionless but energetic, venturing into pathless wastes to bring back a fact, caring only for the truth, candid as a still lake, expectant, unfettered, and tireless." One of the most conservative of the Anglican Bishops, even, is willing to refer questions about the Scriptures to the tribunal of historians with this spirit. In an excellent discussion of the subject Bishop Talbott declares students of the Bible should be "quite ready to leave scientific scholars and historians to test and try all questions about the making of its several Books and find out for us to the best of their power what the truth is about them and their contents." That is exactly what biblical critics insist upon as their right and purpose of doing. And are there not special reasons why, in our times, this right should be readily accorded them? The traditional method of supporting the

statements of Scripture on the ground of the inspiration and consequent inerrancy of their authors is now widely discredited. It is hardly more satisfactory than are dogmas established simply by a majority vote of ecclesiastical councils. The only appeal that at present counts, is an appeal to facts, the nature and value of which are immediately accessible and interpretable. In other words, pre-conceived theories of inspiration, traditional conceptions regarding that which is historically valid, no matter how hoary with age or well fortified by an array of names, serve no longer to answer satisfactorily the questions raised by the statements of the Fourth Gospel which are at variance with those of the earlier Evangelists. Without allowing any doctrinal prepossessions or traditional theories to influence them, scientific critics address themselves in searching for the truth to the study of the available documents themselves. They analyze and compare their respective contents. They weigh the trustworthiness of their respective statements when in conflict, and assume the responsibility of pointing out on which side the preponderating evidence of the truth in their judgment is found. It goes without saying that such a method of dealing with the first four Books of the New Testament must prove in its results somewhat disconcerting to minds that have always supposed them to be inerrantly perfect, and their contents harmonizable. It is a method that is destructive—the opprobrious epithet often flung against it—but it is destructive only of unsound views. It is constructive from the view-point of those who are interested in historical truth.

Investigations of the historic facts underlying the beginnings of Christianity and the production of the Gospels, in accordance with the scientific principles and critical methods just noticed, have yielded two results, which before passing to the more definite consideration of our problem, may be given preliminary mention. One of these results is that originally all the Gospels were valued not as narratives of facts but as props and proofs of doctrine. That is to say, the testimony

regarding the life of Jesus they contain, was accepted or rejected not on historical but on theological grounds. This finding of New Testament scholars of the scientific school could scarcely be more forcibly or concisely expressed, or receive more honorable endorsement, than that which the late Dr. Westcott puts into a single sentence in his Introduction to the Study of the Gospels. Without a word of qualification he affirms that "the Gospels were the results, not the foundation of the Apostolic preaching." The other result alluded to is that while theological or doctrinal bias is discoverable in every one of the Evangelical documents, its influence in the first three affects the form of our Lord's *teaching* rather than the *historic facts and incidents* of his life. That is, Matthew, Mark and Luke are, generally speaking, in accord with one another in their historic representations, and admittedly accurate in recording what really happened in the course of the Master's life. They give a realistic not an impressionist portrait of Jesus' life. The significance of these two achievements of critical inquiry will, if kept in mind, prove of service to us later in our discussion, and may possibly aid us in determining for ourselves what attitude to take toward our problem.

2. Up to this point in our study, attention has been directed principally to such of the surface characteristics of the Fourth Gospel as from the beginning or middle of the second century raised perplexing questions concerning it in Christian minds, and led to the recognition of its occupying a place distinctly apart. Availing ourselves of the light thrown on it by modern critical research, we must attempt now, in the second place, to penetrate beneath the surface of the Johannine Gospel with a view of accounting for its radical departure from the facts and traditions preserved by the Synoptists. At the time when our author wrote, and amid the new environment of a culture that was not native to Hebrew soil, he was forced to adjust his message so as to meet the requirements of a new situation. A wider, a universal, a cosmic significance had to be given to the Founder of Christianity, his simple parochial ethical and re-

ligious teaching, well adapted to Hebrew thought and life, had to be translated into timeless principles, if Christ and his Gospel were to make a successful appeal to cultured philosophical minds. Hence, he lifted Jesus out of his racially narrow relations and represented him in a universal aspect and transformed his teachings accordingly. This is the secret which unquestionably underlies the form and content of his document and constitutes the purpose he sought to accomplish. From the constructive material which was available to him, and among which were doubtless the Synoptic writings, his selections and rejections are all made in strict accordance with the ends he had in view. His production, which Luther calls a "spiritual Gospel," bears the marks throughout of its practical aims—aims which govern the writer's evident preference of serviceable ideas to merely cold and dry historical facts. All this is done in the interest of giving validity and strength to his interpretation of the personal nature, character and office of Jesus Christ as the Eternal Word which "became man, . . . and dwelt among us full of love and truth." These inner features of the Fourth Gospel, of course, interpenetrate and overlap one another, and in our examination of them no effort will be made to hold them apart.

The facts just mentioned bear directly upon the question regarding that feature of our problem which concerns the authorship of it. Without pausing to consider in detail this question—to the true solution of which perhaps the nearest approach may be found in Professor Reville's observation that "its authorship will remain unknown, because it was not intended to become known"—we may say that the acceptance of the critical findings mentioned with reference to the arbitrary departure from the historical Synoptic data, as disclosed by the author's selections and omissions, precludes the possibility of identifying him with St. John the son of Zebedee. Moreover, if the critical view on this point is valid, it is very improbable that even a disciple of St. John, recalling after the Apostle was gone what he had told him, can be credited with the

authorship. And, that such purposive choice and rejection of available historical material was deliberately made by the undiscoverable writer of the Fourth Gospel can be verified by simply examining the parallel columns of any of our so-called "Harmonies of the Gospels."

Even a cursory examination of such parallel columns must yield surprising disclosures to anyone that has not undertaken it. Let us instance several of them by way of illustration. In the Fourth Gospel we meet with Jesus in the halo of a philosophical and doctrinal conception of which there is not the faintest trace to be found in the narratives of the earlier Evangelists. In the Fourth Gospel alone reference is made to the water which at the marriage-feast in Cana is said to have been changed into wine. The interviews of Jesus with Nicodemus by night, with the Samaritan woman at the well, and with the Paralytic at the pool of Bethesda, are all peculiar to John. So also are the accounts of the miraculous draught of fishes, the raising of Lazarus from the dead, and the overpowering effect upon the incredulity of Thomas wrought by the sight of the wounded hands and the pierced side of the Risen Saviour. Every one of these selections is intentionally made for the purpose of showing that it reflects super-human power and glory, thus lending verifying support to the doctrine announced in the opening sentence of Book. And, what is hardly less striking, and really a more daring departure from the historical tradition than that of the purposive selections, is met with in the fact that whatever historic fact or incident reported by the Synoptists, which might be considered to discredit his conception, is prudently omitted. Nothing is said of the genealogy of Jesus, nothing of his Baptism by his kinsman, nothing of the temptation, and nothing of the Transfiguration. There is no mention of the institution of the Holy Communion, none of the Agony in the Garden, none of the prostration of Jesus under the burden of the cross which afterwards Simon of Cyrene was compelled to carry, and none of the despairing cry, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me!"

It would take us too far afield to undertake the examination of all these instanced omissions and selections in their bearings upon the problem under notice. For our present purpose this is not necessary. It will be sufficient to give attention to one of the omissions and to one of the selections mentioned. The Fourth Evangelist relates at length what according to his account took place in connection with the last meal of Jesus with his disciples in the Upper Room. He tells of features and discourses not found in the Synoptic records, but strangely omits mentioning the central fact incident to that meal, namely, the institution of the Memorial Rite. That an eye-witness of that unforgettable scene should in silence have passed over what our Lord himself desired to impress indelibly upon the memories of those present, is almost inconceivable. And yet, the writer of the Fourth Gospel does pass it over and substitutes for it the washing of the disciples' feet. The explanation of the omission must be sought in the facts furnished us by the lengthy discourse which Jesus is represented to have spoken after the feeding of the multitude which concludes with the words, "It is the Spirit which quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak, they are spirit and life," and with which, to his mind, a permanent sacramental rite could not be reconciled. Accordingly it is omitted. "This," says the author of *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, "is something more than historical inaccuracy. It is a deliberate sacrifice of historical truth."

A similar appraisal is put by critics upon what is, aside from the nature of the Prologue, the most striking peculiarity of John, namely, the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Not a few contemporary scholars are willing to take their stand on this single incident to maintain their position relative to the non-historical character of much that is found in the Johannine document. The Bethany incident is said by the Fourth Evangelist to have taken place in the full glare of publicity, and is represented by him to have been the immediate cause of the arrest, the trial, the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus.

In the account of Mark, whose historical trustworthiness we have already spoken of, the circumstances to which the tragic end of our Lord's career is ascribed, are totally different and irreconcilably in conflict with the representation found in John. How explain these remarkable divergencies? The fact that in the Fourth Gospel alone the Bethany miracle is mentioned would of itself suggest historical difficulties, and when in addition consequences are attributed to it in John which elsewhere are referred to other causes, the difficulties are vastly increased. How such a crucially significant event, one so directly fraught with a most momentous outcome, could have been passed over in silence by every one of the Synoptists, has taxed to the utmost many a man's confidence in the historical trustworthiness of the Johannine account regarding this event. Had Matthew and Mark no knowledge of it? Did Luke, who according to his own word was at pains to "trace accurately from the first the course of all things," fail to discover any reference to it in the various sources from which he gathered his material, or was the event which raised popular belief in Jesus and enthusiasm for his cause to the highest pitch, too insignificant to merit his notice? The theory that John was written to supplement the earlier accounts of Jesus' life, furnishes no adequate reply to such inquiries. The suggestion that the Synoptists, writing while Lazarus was still living, suppressed reference to him in the interest of his protection, and that the Fourth Evangelist, writing after Lazarus had died a second time, was free to chronicle it, to my mind, carries no weight. To explain the difficulty by regarding the episode as symbolical rather than historical is certainly a far easier and much more reasonable way of dealing with it.

This course is followed by some of the most competent biblical scholars of our age. The late Professor Salmon, for instance, who was a thoughtful and painstaking student of the New Testament, conservative to the very core in his theological instincts and religious practices, found himself compelled, after most careful investigation, to conclude with painful reluctance,

that the alleged miracle at Bethany had never happened, that the account of it was intended to symbolize a truth of faith rather than to record a fact of history. Practically the same conclusion is reached by Professor Scott, whose right to speak with some authority no one who has read his masterly treatise on the Fourth Gospel, *Its Purpose and Theology*, will feel disposed to question. "We cannot with any show of probability," he writes, "find room for this miracle in any intelligible scheme of the life of Christ." And, he continues, "it is inconceivable that a miracle of such magnitude, performed on the very eve of the last momentous week of our Lord's life, and in the presence of crowds of people in a suburb of Jerusalem—a miracle moreover which was the immediate cause, according to John, of the Crucifixion—should have been simply passed over by the other Evangelists. We are almost compelled to the conclusion that the narrative is in the main symbolical." Professor Burkitt, whom I have already quoted, is even more emphatic in declining to accept the event as historically reliable. "Where in the frame-work of history preserved by St. Mark," he asks, "are we to place the Raising of Lazarus? Can any answer be given, except 'There is no room'? If the events occurred as told in the Fourth Gospel, if they were as public as the Fourth Evangelist insists, so fraught with influence upon the actions of both friends and foes, they could not have been unknown to a well-informed personage like Mark, nor could he have had any reason for suppressing a narrative at once so public and so edifying. Is it possible that anyone who reads the continuous and detailed story of Mark from the Transfiguration to the Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem, can interpolate into it the tale of Lazarus and the notable sensation which we are assured it produced? Must not the answer be, 'Mark did not know of it'? And if Mark did not know of it, can we believe that, as a matter of fact, it ever occurred? For all its dramatic setting, it is, I am persuaded, impossible to regard the story of the Raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical events."

Coming as all these quoted statements do, not from distrusted skeptics chargeable with purposes hostile to Christianity or designed to overthrow religious faith, but from distinguished biblical scholars, honored occupants of professorial chairs, loyal churchmen, the weight and force of their conclusions are not to be brushed aside as baseless theories by the shrug of a shoulder or the wave of a hand. They compel us to give them attentive and respectful consideration. And if we can accompany them to their conclusions and surrender the historical nature of this crowning miracle, we shall be able to see why other statements of the Fourth Gospel purporting to be historically grounded, when not in harmony with the Synoptic representations, cannot be highly evaluated from the viewpoint of modern critics and in the light of their achievements.

3. When we turn now, as our time for doing is long overdue, from the examination of the Johannine selections and omissions, to the consideration, in the third place, of the nature and content of the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, we meet with a feature of our problem which is even more arresting than those regarding its authorship and its historicity. Indeed, were the questions concerning authorship and historicity our only ones, we might content ourselves perhaps with the thought that whoever the author, his exalted purpose to win men's belief in "Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God," to the end that so "believing they might have life in his name," justified him in departing from precise historic accuracy. In fact, such a theory has been advanced in explanation of the historical difficulties. If to know what is believed to have taken place is often more important for religion and more serviceable for salvation, than to know what actually has taken place, then, it has been argued, no serious exception should be taken to the use of symbolical or even fictitious instead of factual representation. A literary document produced by such a method and under the constraint of such a purpose does not necessarily involve designed historical imposture. On the contrary, it is a form of history, idealized subjective history,

the history of conceptions and experiences, which, as such, belongs to a diviner realm and embodies deeper truths than can be claimed for the history of facts as ordinarily understood, the contents of which are frequently poor and empty of religious meaning and spiritual value.

But whatever elements of truth there may be in this view, and whatever their value for the solution of the historical feature of our problem, they avail nothing in the way of explaining the unharmonizable divergence of the Fourth Gospel from the Synoptic narratives in regard to Christ's person and its doctrinal teaching. Too much space has already been taken to allow a survey of the entire field which this divergence opens. There is room only for reference to the content of the unique Prologue and to the Christology which consistent with the Prologue is elaborated by our author.

According to the Synoptic tradition the whole drama of our Lord's life is a real human drama in every essential feature of it. Jesus comes forward at the time when the Baptist's reform-movement is under way, and takes up his prophetic and humanitarian work along the lines of his fore-runner. He calls upon men to repent, and upon that condition invites them to become his followers. He desires them to learn of him. He becomes the friend of publicans and sinners, and champions the cause of the down-trodden and the oppressed. He assures those who respond to his call, of the Father's forgiveness and of His pleasure to give them the kingdom. He preaches the Kingdom of God, and points out what is required for entrance, and what is sure to exclude from it. He ministers graciously and sympathetically to the afflicted and distressed, and denounces the hypocrisy and wickedness of the ruling pharisaic classes. He cleanses the Temple, righteously indignant that "the House of Prayer" has been turned into "a den of thieves." By the latter act and rebuke the secret enmity of an over-bearing priesthood is aroused to open hostility which, according to the earliest Evangelist, results in his arrest at the instance of the priestly conspirators. He is delivered to the

Roman governor, charged as claiming equality with God and kingship among men, and crucified on that ground. All this, from beginning to end of his public career, is consistent with the Synoptic conception of him as "the Servant whom God according to promise had raised up from among his brethren, to bless them in turning away everyone of them from his iniquities."

The Johannine conception contrasts strangely with all this. The moment one turns from the pages of Matthew, Mark or Luke to those of John, one is conscious of moving in a different climate, of breathing a different atmosphere, and of seeing the central Figure and much besides in a different light. The opening words of the unique metaphysical Prologue affirm a conception of Jesus which is wholly foreign to everything met with in the earlier Gospels. The source from which this foreign element is derived can hardly be a matter of question. In the earlier half of the first century, the doctrine of the Divine creative Word, the personified Mind of the Eternal, had been developed by the Jewish Alexandrine philosopher, Philo. Before the end of the century it had spread far and wide over the East and affected the teaching even of Paul. Of our author's acquaintance with this philosophic system of thought and with Pauline doctrines, there can be no reasonable doubt. Experts in what the Germans call "*Quellen-forschung*" have no hesitation in declaring that "every verse in the Prologue offers striking analogies to corresponding sayings of Philo," and "all of the Logos doctrine but the name is already present in the Pauline Epistles." What the writer of the Fourth Gospel did, as shown by a study of it and its sources, was to identify Philonic notions regarding the Eternal Word with the Jesus of history, and to adapt Pauline teachings to his purpose of vindicating the philosophico-religious conception with which he had started out,—steps, these were, which not only determined the course and character of the thought which runs through the Fourth Gospel, but have, in connection with those of Paul in the same direction, affected the whole subsequent development of Christianity.

Once Jesus has been conceived of and presented as incarnating the Eternal Word in his unique person, under the influence of Philo and Paul, everything that such a super-humanly originated Being might be expected to say and do in order "to manifest forth his indwelling glory," and to make clear his redemptive mission, *that* is represented to be said and done by Jesus. With unsurpassed literary skill, everything is made to serve the writer's aim of justifying his conception of our Lord. Dean Inge declares that "Philo showed an utter indifference to chronology and historical fact, and regarded historical events as valuable only as they symbolized some eternal unchanging truth," and like him, the Fourth Evangelist handles his constructive material. Precise accuracy in the use of historic facts is for him less essential than the employment of them in changed form as symbols of timeless and abiding value. What is the result? The simple ethical and religious utterances of Jesus, reported by the Synoptists as having been illustrated and enforced by Parables of matchless beauty and depth of insight, give way in John to lengthy discourses and spirited dialogues on Christological doctrines. In John not a single one of our Lord's parables is retained,—the word "parable" itself does not occur. The "miracles" of the Synoptists, wrought according to their version out of the Lord's sympathy with suffering and sorrowing men, become "signs" in the Fourth Gospel whose performance was intended to reveal Christ's own nature and commend him to those who witnessed the signs. The writer makes no attempt to present happenings in chronological order or historic connection, gives no heed as a rule to the antecedents or consequences of reported events, and employs them simply in defence, not of the powerful teaching, but of the wonderful personality of Jesus. In the Synoptic narratives Jesus is described as Prophet, or Son of Man, or King of Israel, and the description serves far on into his public ministry if not to its end. The Fourth Evangelist tells us that he was recognized by the Baptist at the very beginning of his public appearance as "the Lamb of

God which taketh away the sin of the world," thus presenting from the outset a prophetic intimation of the redemptive act in which the mysterious Life was to culminate.

That the doctrinal contrast in which the Fourth Gospel stands when compared with the other three, cannot be shown in its full significance by such a brief examination as this, must be perfectly plain. Enough has been said, however, to show the radical nature and the fundamental importance of the contrast, and to establish the fact that it compels us to face difficulties of stupendous proportions and consequences. To the reality, the difficulty and the significance of this doctrinal contrast, vigorous reference is made by the Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University, in his great book on *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*. "It makes a tremendous difference," he says, "whether the particular and distinctive doctrine of John as to Christ's person and office is or is not to be enforced as the main feature of the Gospel message. On this question we are driven unavoidably to the alternative: Either the Synoptists, or John. Either the former are right in their complete silence regarding the pre-existence and incarnation, and their subordination of the doctrine of Jesus' own person, in presenting his work and teaching as concerned with the kingdom of God, with repentance, a filial disposition and an obedient life, as the requirement made by the common Father of His children for attaining unto eternal life; or else John is right in making Jesus' work and message supremely a manifestation of his own glory as the incarnate Logos, effecting an atonement for the world which otherwise has no access to God. Both views cannot be true, and to a very large extent it is the science of literary and historical criticism which must decide between them."

By thus definitely and squarely stating the issue with which critical research has brought us face to face, Dr. Bacon renders the Christian public a notably important, though perhaps not generally appreciated service. If we are prepared to accept the conclusions of advanced scholarship, then, our lives of

Christ must be re-written, our interpretations of Christianity revised, our confessional standards reconstructed, in accordance with facts brought to light by modern inquiry. That this cannot be done without entailing some loss as regards the contents of the Fourth Gospel in the traditional view of it, is of course plain, but at the same time much of what constitutes its charm, its religious value, its abiding power, may be conserved. If, on the contrary, we are unwilling to accept those conclusions, then, we must do one of two things, either blink the light of the facts brought to our knowledge by modern methods of studying the Scriptures—in which case we may rest passively content in holding on to traditional Christological views and ancient creedal statements; or else, acknowledging the facts, insist that they are erroneously interpreted by critical thinkers—in which case it is necessary for us to discover the error and to correct it.

This latter position, it must be frankly acknowledged in this connection, has the support of some eminent scholars. Dr. Forsyth may be mentioned as one of their most distinguished representatives. In his study of *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, he observes that "the final tendency of advanced theology is backward" (backward that means, one may suppose, to the teaching of Jesus as found in the historical narratives of the Synoptists). "Its great act of violence is in the driving of a wedge between the Synoptists and the Epistles" (including those of John which represent of course the same views as those of the Fourth Gospel), "between the message of Jesus and the Gospel of his Apostles." "The Synoptists," he continues, "exhibit an incomplete situation, a raw audience, an inchoate context of evidence. It is in the Epistles (and in the Fourth Gospel, he might have added) that we find the essence of Christianity. The apostolic inspiration takes as much precedence of Jesus' earthly and partly interim teaching as the finished work is more luminous than the work in progress."

Contentious like these show into what desperate straits the

progress of theological thought has driven reactionary thinkers, and to what questionable theories they are compelled to resort in their efforts to maintain the positions of traditional orthodoxy. "The first impression made by this new defense of the faith," it has been well said by an able American writer, "is that it turns the New Testament up side down." Paul and John, not Jesus, in its view, become the real founders of the Christian Religion. Jesus had a "message," the Apostles preached the "Gospel." The Synoptic Gospels are subordinate to the Epistles of Paul and the Johannine writings. Jesus, it tells us by implication, was not understood while he lived, indeed, did not understand himself. "Orthodoxy is thus saved at the loss of historicity. The Sermon on the Mount and the Parables are subordinated to the mysticism of the Christian tradition. '*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*.' Christian faith is not likely to find itself strengthened by this undermining of its foundations. The creeds are but poorly defended when they are set in sharp contrast with the facts. Even more obvious, however, is the fact that Christian ethics on these terms become impracticable. We are left, not with a teaching of duty, but with a rapt communion of the spirit which is possible to the elect alone. Contemplation has supplanted obedience. The knowledge of the doctrine supersedes the doing of the will." Considerations like these force upon one the conviction that such reactionary views, even though they have back of them a great name like that of the Principal of Hackney College, cannot in the final outcome of the discussion of our problem succeed in commending themselves to the calm and enlightened judgment of unprejudiced thinkers, rather than those suggested by men who feel compelled to surrender the Johannine authorship, the historical nature, and the distinctive doctrinal forms of the Fourth Gospel.

One can rest in this conviction the more securely when it is realized that although some loss is sustained by such required surrenders, much that is of priceless value to us remains un-

touched. If John, the brother of James, cannot be regarded the author, that does not hinder us from recognizing with admiring gratitude that the writer was a profound spiritual genius and a rarely gifted soul,—one whose confidence in Jesus as the Christ was absolutely commanded by him, and whose rich and enriching religious experiences were due to his having found and without reserve committed himself to him as his Lord and Master. If the Fourth Gospel cannot be read as a chronicle of actual historical events—and likely it was never intended to be so read—that does not prevent us from reading and prizing it as an elect and lofty spirit's interpretation of the religious significance and value of the historical Jesus for those who trustfully follow him, and of the enlightening and rewarding nature of the timeless and ageless truths which he taught while here among men—an interpretation which, once it is seen to be what it is, must be recognized as a precious if not indispensable commentary on the earlier Evangelical writings. If, in the progress of biblical and theological inquiry, the peculiar philosophical form in which the Fourth Evangelist saw fit to express his doctrinal conceptions in order to make them effective in his age, fails to meet the intellectual requirement of the present generation, that does not forbid us to confess with the eldest of the Apostles that Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of the living God," and, in terms suited to our day, to attempt re-stating our conceptions of him as the supreme revelation of the Eternal Father—the revelation which satisfies the deepest cravings of human souls for both the life that now is and the life that is to come.

The critical view of the Fourth Gospel as largely an interpretative symbolical representation, based on the knowledge and personal experience of its writer, of the meaning and saving efficacy of Jesus and his Gospel for men of the second century, should afford light for our guidance in attempting to re-interpret Christ and Christianity to men of the twentieth century. A knowledge of what has been wrought by the historic Jesus and his revelation in the progress of the world's civiliza-

tion, and a personal experience of the regenerating power that resides in a vital faith in and obedience to his spirit and word, must give support to the doctrines of the faith in the re-stated form demanded by our age. Lessing's famous saying that "the eternal truths of reason cannot be dependent on the accidental truths of history," is valid if we regard "the eternal truths of reason" to be in the main the formulations of men's experiences. The Fourth Evangelist illustrates this. He had experienced the truths which he formulates in his doctrinal conceptions. He writes as one who has spiritually heard and seen and handled and verified the word of the historical Master, as one whose life was transformed, whose character was transformed, and whose hope of immortality was abidingly confirmed. Hence we can understand why in unshaken confidence he can represent Jesus as saying "Except a man be born from above he cannot see, cannot enter into the kingdom of God," as declaring "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst," as inviting men "Come unto me, . . . I will give you rest," and as giving the assurance "I am the way, the truth and the life." Mere historical information could not have supported or given authority to such eternal verities. In a corresponding way the facts of history have importance also for us. They challenge us to put them to practical test, and though our resulting experiences may require our doctrinal conceptions to be expressed in altered language, Jesus will continue to command our adoring gratitude and love, our constant devotion and ceaseless praise.

"Yes, thou art still the Life; thou art the Way
The holiest know. Light, Life, and Way of heaven!
And they who dearest hope and deepest pray,
Toil by the Life, Light, Way, which thou hast given."

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

II.

AN ESSAY OF PROVINCIALISM.

C. ERNEST WAGNER.

Men and women will travel to the ends of the earth in search of "local color." In the fishing villages of Brittany, in the sequestered Hallingdal, on the tiny Isle of Marken, among the marshes of the Spreewald and the valleys of the Tyrol, in the bazaars of the Orient—in Algiers, Stamboul, Delhi, Smyrna, Cairo, among the teeming millions of Pekin or amid the blandishments of fair Tokio, they will find what they have come so far to seek. Now, "local color" is only another name for provincialism—provincialism of the most pronounced type, provincialism, so to speak, in its most aggravated form.

A curious thing, is it not, that men will prize so highly and go so far afield to enjoy that which, in themselves, they make every effort to conceal, and of which, for "the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them," they would not be convicted? Curious too, it is, that women will rave over the costumes and caps of the Breton peasants—so distinctive, so womanly, and withal so pleasing; they will deplore the signs which betoken a coming change and the gradual displacement of these charming oddities by modern *modes* and millinery; and then they will proceed studiously to conform to the latest Parisian decree and, regardless of individual figure or physiognomy, permit themselves to be flattened, elongated, hobbled, and otherwise disfigured. And why? Merely in order to look, as nearly as may be, like other fashionable women and, at all hazards, avoid the suspicion of provincialism. What, then, is provincialism that men should, by turns, seek and avoid it; that women should, with like intensity, admire and abhor the mysterious thing?

In its literal signification, provincialism is that which characterizes a province or a provincial person. When applied to dress, it is a certain singularity of costume, such as we have already noted; when applied to speech, it is a matter of expression peculiar to the people living in a province, a county, or a parish—a local or dialectal way of speaking. In its broader signification, it applies also to a certain rudeness of manners and a certain narrowness of thought or opinion, characteristic of the inhabitants of a province, as distinguished from the metropolis, or of the smaller cities and towns, as distinguished from the larger. So much for the formal definition. Let us see, now, how it may be elucidated.

In England there is the simple, hard-and-fast distinction between London and the provinces. London is the one metropolis, and whatever is not of it is of the provinces. Newspapers published in other cities (of which the *Manchester Guardian* is a good example) are representatives of the provincial press, no matter how able they are or how wide their influence may be; theatrical companies, after they have finished their engagements in London and have taken to playing "one night stands," are said to be "on tour through the provinces." Roughly speaking, there are as many provinces in England, as there are separate counties, each county having something about it that marks it off from its neighbors. In colloquial speech the variations are notoriously striking. One need only pass from Yorkshire to Kent, on the east coast, or from Lancashire to Cornwall, along the western boundaries, with one's ears open for the speech of the rustic population, to have this matter of dialectal divergence brought home in the most forcible way, and to understand what provincialism, as exemplified by speech, really means in England. Diversity in dress and manner of living are by no means so noteworthy.

In France the situation is similar. Paris is the metropolis *par excellence*, and in all things holds the primacy. Beyond her borders lie the provinces, each with something distinctive about it, in dialect, costume, cuisine, popular customs, and

method of tilling the soil. The French spoken in Tours may be grammatically above reproach, the speech of Provence may charm by its soft and liquid beauty; but to the sensitive ear of the Parisian, both alike are provincial and therefore to be eschewed. To Paris gravitate scholars, poets, artists, musicians, publicists—all eager to efface the provincial stamp and merge their identity in the gay, brilliant, stimulating life of the capital. And thus the sway of Paris, in the realm of thought and taste, is absolute; her authority is never seriously questioned. To be provincial in France is to vary, in some particular, from the Parisian standard.

In the United States of America it is not so. Here there is no single metropolis or capital, whose decrees are binding upon the people as a whole. We are too vast in extent, too heterogeneous, too varied in our interests, proclivities, and opinions, to acknowledge the authority of any one tribunal. In consequence, we are both cosmopolitan and provincial to a remarkable degree. Over the greater part of New England, Boston is supreme; but her sway hardly extends beyond the Connecticut Valley. New York, though the metropolis of the country, both numerically and commercially, rules only so far as her mammoth journals circulate. Along the banks of the Delaware and westward to the Alleghanies, Philadelphia is acknowledged arbiter of thought and taste. South of Mason and Dixon's Line and west of the Alleghanies, the territory is so immense and the elements of population so composite that, in the nature of the case, no one city can hope to exercise more than a limited sway. In the South, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Louisville stand out as centers of influence; in the Middle West, Chicago, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, Denver, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle. In consequence of this lack of a supreme tribunal, an ultimate court of appeal, provincialism assumes, in our country, an infinite variety of forms; it may be said, indeed, to develop a type unknown in other lands. We are provincial, not only in our outlying districts; we are provincial in our large cities—yea, in the very largest of all!

Let us, then, in a detached, dispassionate mood—if that be possible—consider the question more attentively. It will certainly be granted that anyone who exhibits, in speech, accent, intonation, manners, opinions, or mental attitude, certain peculiarities which vary from the commonly accepted standard in such matters, is essentially provincial. There are men, for example, who seem so sublimely content with the mode of life and thought habitual to them and common to the region in which they have been “raised,” so supremely indifferent to the great current of life which moves outside their “pent-up Utica,” as to merit the contemptuous sneer of Geraint in Tennyson’s immortal *Idyls*:

“Ye think the rustie cackle of your bourg
The murmur of the world!”

Again, anyone who goes about with a chip on his shoulder challenging “all comers” in defense of his own particular town or “section” of the country, is aggressively and laughably provincial. He is, by turns, inciter to and defender of provincialism, unconscious exponent and champion of that which he would disown.

As chief pattern of this type I have in mind a woman from the Middle West, whom I met in a French *pension*, not many years ago. It was her first trip abroad, and she was consumed with zeal to see and do and know. But, paramount even to this was her desire to impress every one at table with the superior learning, culture, refinement, and sophistication of the Middle West. She discoursed confidently upon art, literature, music, and domestic economy; and when, after throwing down the gauntlet and boldly inviting attack, she failed to draw upon herself the expected fire, her contempt for the craven, effete spirit of the East, as exemplified by her table companions, was amusing beyond words. Never shall I forget my feelings when I heard her say, one evening at dinner: “I haven’t yet seen, in Europe, any church that surpasses a church we have at home, in my own block, just a few doors from

where I live." I have read such things in the humorous column of newspapers, and have laughed at them, as jokes; but never has it been my good fortune, before or since, to hear, in casual conversation, anything so impregnated, so saturated with the essence of provincialism. And to be asked to take it seriously, and actually to do so—that, to my mind, was the real humor of the situation!

It has always seemed to me that the irrepressible curiosity which many people display with regard to the habitat and occupation of fellow-countrymen whom they chance to meet in traveling, and a corresponding eagerness to proclaim their own identity, abiding-place, and social standing constitute the very hall-mark of provincialism.

To press the inquiry further, it is not only the "Down-East Yankee" or the Georgia "Cracker," the "Pennsylvania Dutchman" or the Ohio "Hoosier," the dweller in the Mississippi Valley or beyond the Rockies—it is not alone any or all of these who, being known of other men by his shibboleth of speech, may be confidently dubbed "provincial." If the whole truth must be told, the resident of our largest cities is often essentially, if less obviously, provincial.

In search of a shining example, let us venture into the metropolis itself, and what shall we find? A smug, self-confident, imperious sort of man, capable and aggressive to the last degree, who, nevertheless, upon close acquaintance, exhibits certain tell-tale signs which set us thinking. In his overweening pride of citizenship, in his contempt for all other mortals who hail, vaguely, from "the country," in his indifference to what may go on outside of Manhattan and the Bronx, he is—(may we be permitted to breathe it?)—really provincial. For, as we learned at the outset, New York is not, to this great land, what London is to England, or Paris to France. Furthermore, when the New Yorker is guilty of what Mr. Kipling calls "the unreproducible slid *r*," when he says "fy-ist," or "by-id," or "gy-il," he is undeniably provincial; for thereby anyone, not a New Yorker, is able immediately to place him. Again,

when he confuses "lie" and "lay," in their several forms (as he is so prone to do), he is indefensibly provincial. And again, when he undertakes to rule (as a certain university professor, ignoring "reputable use" in the English-speaking world, has actually done), that "don't" shall do double duty for "do not" and "does not," he is flagrantly provincial. Behold, in all these things, a paradox! One may live and move and have one's daily being in the metropolis; and yet, because of the intoxication that comes with breathing that electric air, and because of one's indifference to what the great outside world may think and do and say, remain, in certain particulars, blindly and incurably provincial.

In the world of letters, critics, from time immemorial, have distinguished between literature which is "polite"—of the city, the center, the capital,—and literature which is "provincial"—remote from the center, in spirit, quality of thought, tone, and style. If our present-day literature were tested for this "note of provinciality" (to use Matthew Arnold's phrase), how much of it, think you, would be found free from harsh discord? Polite literature, if it be worthy of the appellation, has about it not only an air of refinement, ease, and urbanity—like the manners of a gentleman, accustomed to move in good society; it has about it also a certain elevation of thought, a certain distinction of style, which comes only to the man who has kept company with the best thinkers and writers of all time.

To escape provinciality, in matters literary, it is not enough to wield a facile pen, to be vivid, vital, and virile, in the treatment of living issues. One may be all that and still remain crudely provincial. One may live in the heart of the great metropolis, and from that vantage ground be able to sketch studies of the "under-world" which shall find a ready market in a score of magazines, and be devoured with avidity by thousands of readers. One may write of "crooks" and "grafters," of "rounders" and "gunmen" in a way that shall make these worthies live again on the printed page; and yet,

the tone of that writing may be so low, its spirit so debased, its vocabulary so meagre, its range of thought and expression so pitifully limited, that if the work had been done anywhere but in the heart of the metropolis, if its subjects were other than the denizens of the great city, it would be crassly provincial, and nothing more.

The French do well when they call the woman of this "under-world" the *demi-monde*. She knows but half the world, after all, and it is the under half—the poor, shabby, seamy side of life. It is a half that should be treated tenderly, a side that one should view with sympathy; but to think of this under-world, this half-world, as "real life"—to treat it as though it were the whole of life—is surely to have a very imperfect and distorted view of things; to cultivate a taste for it alone, to batten on the stories that unmask it, to gaze with deadened sense and unaverted eyes upon its ghastly hideousness—this, surely, is to be provincial in thought, proclivities, and feeling.

If a writer would produce something which shall be other than provincial, he must have not only an insight which penetrates the "eternal verities," he must have a vision which reaches beyond the confines of his county, parish, or quiet village—an outlook wider than his city, ward, or daily "beat." As a stream cannot rise higher than its source, so a man cannot produce anything greater than that which he has within him. If he know only his own region, town, or city, and the types that there confront him, and think he need know nothing more; if he be indifferent to the great life of humanity, in its myriad forms and phases; if he be ignorant of "the best that has been thought and written in the world"—he is and shall remain hopelessly provincial.

Carlyle, the seer, once said: "Not a parish in the world but has its parish accent." And again: "All men have accent of their own,—though they only notice that of others." If this dictum be accepted, who that breathes and speaks can plead exemption from provincialism? The accident of birth,

the associations of childhood, the fixed environment of later years, unite in our undoing. As with Peter of old, our speech, if nothing else, is sure to betray us. We all have accent of our own,—though we only notice that of others. Doubtless we are all provincial in many, many, ways—though we only notice the provinciality of others. If, then, we abhor provincialism of every sort, and, whether conscious or unconscious of it, would fain rid ourselves of the taint, how shall we proceed? Schooling will do much, reading will do much, travel will do much, keeping good company will do much. But all these are not enough. Last of all, we must not be heedless, though resentful, when others—be they friends or enemies—who notice our provinciality, in accent, thought, opinion, or ethical standard, frankly tell us of it. By harkening to such reproof and rigorously applying it, we may go a long way toward clearing ourselves of the suspicion which secretly annoys or the direct charge which so surely irritates.

LANCASTER, PA.

III.

SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

EDWIN M. HARTMAN.

We are all familiar with the well-known saying of Sir William Hamilton, "on earth there is nothing great but man; in man there is nothing great but mind." Back of every machine and every movement is mind. The important matter and forces in the world are intellectual and moral, not material. Greece is great in history, not because Alexander conquered the world, but because men like Socrates and Plato and Aristotle thought and taught. Leibnitz said, "If you will leave education to me I will change Europe in a century." Napoleon, when urged to develop an educational system for France after Pestalozzi, contemptuously replied, "I have no time for the alphabet," and he lived to see the day when the power of the German schoolmaster overcame the finest military machinery of Europe in which Napoleon had put his trust.

At some time in the process of evolution there was a great and comparatively sudden change of the conditions under which our pre-human ancestors lived, perhaps for instance the glacial period. The change was too sudden and too great to be met and survived by bodily adaptation. The only adequate response to this challenge for survival was a mental one which met the changed conditions by devising new means of adaptation, such as protection by the invention of clothing and shelter, food secured by their wits or by preparation rather than by chance or force, etc. Those who were affected by the sudden change of conditions and could not respond to this mental challenge perished and the others rapidly developed a higher nerv-

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ous organization and mentality. This hypothesis supplies the missing link which scientists have been seeking by effecting adaptation and development through nervous organization rather than through gross bodily changes, thus making the link largely a mental one.

The body of a man is about the same weight as the body of an orang-utan, but the highly organized part of the brain of the former is three times the weight of that of the latter. In the other sections of the brain and nervous system there is comparatively little difference between the two.

As the hard conditions of that great change could be successfully met by mind only, so must mind and not brute force or violence finally solve many of the problems of the future. Herein lies a suggestion of the possible service or application of the better knowledge of the mind furnished by modern psychology. Since mind is the latest, the highest and the most complex product of the process of evolution it is but natural that the science of the mind should be the newest and the most difficult of all the sciences.

Before we speak of the application or service of modern psychology (for only modern psychology can be called a science) it may be well to sketch very briefly the birth and the wonderful development of this science in the last fifty years and of its practical applications in the last ten years. The last decade or two has seen a miraculous development in all sciences and their application. It is said, that if Tyndall and Huxley, who died in 1893 and 1895, were to return to life, the present-day scientific literature would not be intelligible to them because of the new terms that have been brought into use by inventions and scientific development since their death. Note the following illustrations of this fact in the science of psychology: The 1899 edition of the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia contains about 100 words or expressions beginning with the letters P-s-y-c-h, and of these many are simply adjective or adverb forms of the same word. In the latest edition issued under date of 1911 there are 88 new or re-defined words beginning

with P-s-y-c-h. Münsterberg says:¹ "There is no doubt that in these few decades (since 1860) more psychological facts have been discovered than in the preceding 2,000 years of the history of psychology." Wundt says,² in substance, that psychology as a science did not advance a single essential step between Aristotle and the middle of the nineteenth century. During the 2,000 years or more referred to, psychology was not an independent subject of investigation. It was an integral part of ancient and medieval philosophy and received consideration only in so far as it seemed serviceable or necessary in solving the problems of philosophy. The principal subject of investigation in the earlier psychology was the soul, which, by the way, has entirely dropped out of modern psychology. This does not mean that psychology denies the existence of the soul but simply that in its present status the science is not cognizant of it as a fact. As an object of belief or faith its existence is posited by philosophy rather than by any science.

Philosophy deals with large problems and conclusions, such as the ultimate nature of matter and mind, of truth, goodness and beauty, of values, of the fundamental laws of reality and their relation to human experience. In their direct attack of these large problems men paid little attention to individual phenomena, therefore there could be practically no science. Wundt says, progress in natural science is bound up with progress in methods of investigating phenomena. Every important new apparatus or instrument is followed by a series of new discoveries. Modern science originated, therefore, in the discoveries, and in the change and development of methods effected by such men as Bacon, Galileo, Newton and a host of others.

Naturally the more concrete sciences were the first to take form. Inventions, experiments and measurements transformed "Astrology into Astronomy, Alchemy into Chemistry and Mystery into Physics." These were followed by the study of the human body leading to the development of anatomy, physi-

¹ *Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 90.

² *Founders of Modern Psychology*, p. 319.

ology and medicine, which ultimately led to a science of psychology. The obstacles which had to be overcome in the gradual development of these sciences may be inferred from the following illustration from medicine of sixty years ago: Instead of realizing that the body is material, subject to physical and chemical laws, general medical practice went on the principle that the main thing to deal with in diagnosing and treating a case was a sort of psychic life principle which must be understood and treated by a sort of philosophic intuition. The spirit of medicine represented a perversion of the old Hippocratic maxim, "Godlike is the physician who is also a philosopher." When Helmholtz, after an attack of fever, bought a microscope to make some investigations in medicine (and this was within the time of men still living and in Germany) the old doctors shook their heads in disapproval. Tapping a patient's chest to learn the condition of the lungs, listening to the heart beats, measuring the temperature, etc., were coarse mechanical means of investigation disparaging to the dignity of the patient and quite unnecessary and in bad taste for a physician with clear mental insight.

It is a long step from this status of knowledge of the body to the miracles that are now being wrought. Recently, for instance, a surgeon in Paris removed the injured cornea of a patient's eye and successfully planted the cornea of another eye which had for a month or more been preserved in a serum in cold storage. From an authorized report recently published³ we learn that Dr. Carrel at the Rockefeller Institute in New York is taking tissue from the heart of an animal after death and making it grow and beat for months. He recently removed the essential organs of a cat—heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, stomach, intestines, etc.,—placed them in a solution, started the lungs with artificial respiration, after which the heart began to beat, the blood circulated and all the other organs resumed a state of active functioning life. If such results can be attained through experiments on the body then we ought to expect much from an experimental study of the mind.

³ Burton J. Hendrick, in *McClure's*, Jan., 1913.

Modern psychology dates its real beginning from the establishment of the first laboratory for psychological experiment at the University of Leipzig in 1879 by Wundt.

Among the John the Baptists who, by preparatory contributions of various truths, half-truths or even suggestive errors, prepared the way for this master of the new science, we may name Locke (1690), Berkeley (1709), Kant (1780), Herder (1785), Volta (1801), Gall (1805), Bell (1811), Herbart (1825), Johannes Müller (1835), Benetre (1835), E. H. Weber (1846), Du Bois Reymond (1848), Lotze (1852), Helmholtz (1856), Bain (1857), Lewes (1860), Fechner (1860), Broca (1860). Some of these men had visions of the promised land but did not live to enter it.

The scientific and experimental methods of modern psychology, which distinguish it from the philosophical method of the older psychology, originated, largely as we shall see, among physiologists, and were first developed on the physiological side, so that physiological psychology, in the more restricted meaning of the term, may be considered the real basis of all modern psychology.

Among the more important discoveries which furnished Wundt, and others, bases and methods and material for experimental work and investigation were the following:

1. The Weber-Fechner psycho-physical law that sensation varies, within limits, in arithmetical ratio as the stimulus varies in geometrical ratio.

2. Reaction time, or the measurement, by Helmholtz, of the rate at which sensory and motor impulses travel along the nerves. These two laws were demonstrated to the confusion of Kant's dictum that psychology could never become a science because, he says, "neither can mathematics be applied to conscious processes nor can one work experimentally with the mind of another." Just two years before Helmholtz made this discovery the great physiologist Du Bois Reymond had said that nerves were too short and the impulse too rapid ever to be measured. To-day there are instruments that measure and

record the rate of a nervous impulse to the one-thousandth of a second.

3. The principle of the specific energy of nerves, *i. e.*, that the stimulation of the same nerve always produces the same sensation no matter how stimulated. If the optic nerve, for instance, is stimulated by pinching, by heat, by an acid, or electricity, or by light it responds always and only by a sensation of light. This principle is said to have meant to psychology what Newton's law of gravitation has meant to physics.

4. Wundt found at hand a mass of very careful work in the investigation of the senses by physiologists and psychologists such as Johannes Müller, Du Bois Reymond, Lotze, Helmholtz and others.

5. Some early studies in brain localization such as the center of speech, located by Broca in 1861.

The names connected with the above discoveries, together with the work done and impetus given by Wundt and his students oblige us to brand the modern psychology "made in Germany." Wundt is sometimes called the Darwin of psychology.

At this point we may ask what definitely are the ends of psychological study and investigation, and what the methods?

I suppose we may say the immediate end of the study is to acquire a knowledge of the various mental processes and contents, the sum total of which constitute consciousness. This involves an investigation of mental processes with a view to finding the cause of each process, the laws governing it, its myriad relations to other processes antedating and accompanying it, an analysis of the complex into its elements, and finally its issues or the conclusions to be drawn. So far the end is purely scientific, a knowledge of the mind for its own sake. But this may be followed by ulterior ends, such as, first, the service which such knowledge of the mind can render to the other sciences and to philosophy, the latter of which especially depends so largely on the validity of the mind's testimony: second, the service which such intimate knowledge of the mind

can render to all studies that are humanistic. Dr. Felix Kreuger, a pupil of Wundt's, professor of psychology at the University of Halle, Wittenberg, lecturing at Columbia University this year as Kaiser Wilhelm exchange professor, says:

"The developments of the humanistic sciences demand and prepare the way for a new psychology. As history ceased to be a mere study of fact and became a study of relationships as well, it came naturally to be a psychological study; as political economy ceased to devote itself to concrete conditions and treated of cause and effect it, too, became a psychological study. Ethnology presents many problems that are purely psychological, and ethnology and psychology are closely related."

A third field of opportunity for still more direct service and application includes education, where mind deals directly with mind. Less clearly and yet surely, it is related to law and medicine and finally industry.

Now the question of methods of psychological study. These are of course self-observation or *introspection*, and *experiment*, the estimate of the validity and efficiency of either, as compared with the other, being determined largely by the fundamental viewpoint. We may as well say right here that however necessary the experimental method, and important its contributions, in the words of Titchener, it came into psychology, "not to oust the introspective method but to fulfil it."

There is ample opportunity and need for both methods. A man can lay bare another's brain and watch it by the hour without seeing there the suggestion of a *thought*. Another can sit and think by the hour without discovering by his thinking that there is a brain.

The introspective psychologist will observe a mental process as, for instance, an emotion, pass slowly across the stage of his consciousness. He will look at it with the mental eye, look for its cause, analyze it as well as he can, describe it, classify it and probably theorize about it. This is the only method by which we can have *direct* knowledge of any mental process or state of consciousness. But this method has too many shortcomings to be able to build up a science alone.

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Only a mentally mature person is competent to make observations of the working mind. Thus psychology can, by this method, get no knowledge of the child mind, of the abnormal mind, or of animal intelligence all of which have great significance.

A man can only look into and observe his own mind and as his opinion can count for no more nor less than another's this method affords opportunity for different opinions and controversies.

So much material has been stored, so to speak, in a mature mind that the observer is no longer able to see facts of consciousness in their pure state. As Mill says, "Hardly has consciousness spoken when its testimony is buried under a mountain of acquired notions."

Again, as Dr. Rauch says in the first psychology written in this country as early as 1840, our mental life is so closely bound up with our bodily life, especially the brain and nervous system, that we cannot properly understand one without knowledge of the other. The most fruitful source of information is in the relation between the two, which constitutes physiological psychology. In this department of psychology the brain, as the central organ of sensory, motor and mental activity, has been investigated to such an extent that we know the exact location of the center of each of the senses and of speech. We know what section of the brain controls the movements of each part of the body so that if the hand were paralyzed the surgeon would know where in the brain to find the clot of blood that caused the paralysis. The centers of the higher mental activities such as imagination, reasoning, etc., and the paths connecting them, have also been fairly well located.

Probably every mental activity, from the simplest to the highest and most complex, has a physical basis in the brain and nervous system. Psychical states can therefore be investigated through physical processes which are amenable to modification, test, analysis, measurement, etc., that is, to experi-

ment, with results, about many of which there is no more room for individual opinion or dispute than there is in the fact that 2 plus 2 makes 4. So fruitful has experimental psychology proved that over a hundred universities have established laboratories fully equipped with all sorts of instruments of recent invention and unpronounceable names. A number of the better institutions for feeble-minded have also established laboratories for use in their work and for research. One instrument for instance is the chronograph which can measure reaction time to a thousandth of a second. Another is the sphygmograph which records the degree of variation in the brain pulse produced by mental effort, or emotion of different degrees of intensity. The sensitiveness of this instrument as shown by the marked variations of the recorded curve on the slightest mental effort, or suggestion affecting the feelings, is really remarkable. Another is the ergograph used to investigate the character, extent and effects of mental fatigue. Many more instruments of similar kind might be enumerated by means of which, together with ever-improving methods, we can now investigate sensation, perception, association, attention, volition, emotion, memory, imagination and to some extent the highest forms of intellectual activity. The invention of instruments and experimental methods has, according to Titchener not only revealed a mental complexity and made possible a degree of analysis that was before undreamed of, but "has changed the whole face of psychology from sensation to self-consciousness." The character of this change may perhaps be crudely and partially illustrated by comparing knowledge gained through the naked eye with the more detailed knowledge gained by scientific methods. The naked eye knows water as a liquid. The methods of the chemist reveal it as a union of two gases. The naked eye knows the gross structure of the body, but the microscope of the biologist knows it as composed of ultimate cells. The naked eye recognizes in a general way the fracture of a bone, but the X-ray reveals the character of the fracture in detail. The formulas

of the chemist cannot give me the idea of water, the microscope cannot give me the general idea of the human body, the physicist's theory of matter cannot give me the idea of an object, which my own common sense observation can give me. If I had to choose between the two, I would choose the latter. Yet it must be recognized that practically all the advancement made along such lines as medicine, hygiene, the sciences and the various industries has grown out of the contributions of the former methods. Scientific experimental methods have not only changed psychology and deepened it but also broadened it infinitely beyond the dreams of thirty years ago and have made possible its application along many lines in practical activities. The supplement to the New Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia lists twenty-four different kinds of psychology. Just a few of these will suggest the present scope of the subject: Abnormal psychology, animal psychology, educational psychology, experimental psychology, folk psychology, functional psychology, genetic psychology, professional psychology, physiological psychology, social psychology. Many of these terms suggest service both to the problems of other sciences and to the problems of practical life. I shall endeavor in the rest of this paper to discuss briefly the promise there is in present-day psychology of service to a few problems or activities of present-day life.

For the first twenty or twenty-five years the results of the psychological laboratories remained book knowledge. Psychologists seemed reluctant to relate the results of their discoveries to practical life. They were investigating the relation of body and mind, the nature of the mental processes and the laws governing them, for their own sake. Psychology was not a "Brot und Butter Wissenschaft."

Meanwhile, however, all that was brought to light in the laboratories of the physicists and the chemists, the physiologists and the pathologists, was promptly turned to the service of physical and chemical industry, of medicine and hygiene, of agriculture, mining, transportation, etc., and besides, every

practical application reacted and stimulated research. In the words of Münsterberg,⁴ "The pure search for truth and knowledge was not lowered when the electrical waves were harnessed for wireless telegraphy, or the Roentgen rays were forced into the service of surgery." Likewise will the science of psychology be dignified and stimulated by the practical application of its principles and discoveries. The suddenness and rate at which the idea of the application of psychology developed is illustrated by the number and standard of the magazines recently founded and the books published in this field. Of equal significance is the character of the courses in psychology offered at many of the larger universities to-day.

The first aim of a new science is to discover typical facts and general laws. Early experimental psychology was therefore engaged in discovering the facts and laws of the typical or common mind. But a man is specially fitted for a certain task, or vocation, or a position, because he has certain mental characteristics different in kind or degree from the average mind. We succeed in dealing with an individual or a certain group of individuals as we appreciate their peculiar mental divergence from the average mind. For instance, the *difference* in children's minds, and not the things they have in common, furnishes the difficult problems in education, as we shall later see. It was only, therefore, as psychology advanced beyond the facts and laws of the general mind to the study of individual variations or differences that any considerable application of psychological experiment to practical problems became possible. Furthermore, the earlier tendency was to borrow facts and principles from the laboratory and apply them to practical problems. Now the practical problems of every day life are taken into the laboratory, and with larger results. Both methods must, however be used, depending upon conditions.

The service or application of psychology to practical problems may become possible through purely mental tests, of which there are very many, or through physical tests with

⁴ *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, p. 6.

devices or instruments, or a combination of both methods. There are, for instance, dozens of carefully prepared and well-tried tests for practically every mental act. Whipple, in his "Manual of Mental and Physical Tests," gives 8 tests of physical and motor capacity; 9 tests of sensory capacity; 7 tests of attention and perception; 2 tests of description and report; 7 tests of association, learning and memory; 5 tests of suggestibility; 5 tests of imagination and invention; 2 tests of intellectual equipment and 3 tests for mental development. The statement of these tests, with directions for their use, fills a volume of over 500 large closely printed pages. These tests can render service wherever the human mind is used from the judge on the bench down to the man who operates a machine that makes pins. The following are two very simple illustrations of these tests, the first physical and the second a combination of mental and physical. The reaction time to different stimuli, or in other words the mental and physical alertness of a man before taking intoxicating liquor were carefully measured and recorded with the chronoscope. The man was then given intoxicants in varying amounts and again tested with the result that the chronoscope revealed a distinctly slower mental reaction. This experiment has been made on thousands of men, mostly in Germany, the results being invariably the same. A man may feel mentally more alert after taking liquor, but here is one instance of a number where the feeling is deceptive and the instrument tells the truth. It was on the testimony of this experiment that ex-president Eliot of Harvard changed from his former attitude tolerant of the moderate use of intoxicants, to a position squarely against it.

A combination of a mental and a physical test may be used as a means of mental diagnosis as to whether a certain consciousness, as of guilt for instance, is in a man's mind. The mind is so organized that any single word mentioned by an experimenter to his subject will call up a related word. Ice might suggest cold to one man, skates to a boy, money to a dealer, damage to a man living at Safe Harbor, etc. This is

called the law of association, and the time between the mention of the suggested word and the response of the associated word is called the association reaction time which can be measured with the chronoscope. This test is based on the theory that disquieting ideas will reveal themselves in variations in the reaction time, and in the nature of the associated word. The sphygmograph, if applied, will at the same time record the variations in the brain pulse caused when any disquieting word is suggested. A great many experiments to test this theory have been made in American and European laboratories, and with impressive results. A good illustration is the following experience of Dr. Jung, the distinguished neurologist of Zurich, Switzerland, who used the method to good effect in trapping a thief:⁵ "One of Dr. Jung's patients had confided to him his fear that he was being systematically robbed of small sums of money by his nephew, a young fellow of eighteen. It was arranged that the young man should be sent to Dr. Jung, ostensibly to undergo a medical examination. On his arrival he was told that in order to test his mental state he was to respond, as quickly as possible, to a list of one hundred words, which Dr. Jung read to him one by one. Most of these words were quite trivial, but scattered among them were thirty-seven which had to do with the thefts, the room from which the money had been taken, or possible motives for robbery. As measured by the chronoscope, the difference between his reaction time to the harmless and to the significant words was startling.

Dr. Jung said "head," he responded—or, to put it technically, associated—"nose"; Dr. Jung said "green," he associated "blue"; Dr. Jung said "water," he associated "air"; and so on, the average reaction time being 1.6 seconds. But it took him 4.6 seconds to find a word to associate with "thief," 4.2 seconds for an association with "jail," and 3.6 seconds for one with "police." In other cases there was an abnormally quick reaction to significant words, followed immediately by a tell-tale slowing up in the reaction to the next

⁵ *The Outlook*, June 25, 1910, p. 406.

two or three trivial ones. When he had gone through the list, Dr. Jung sternly told the young man that he found his health excellent but his morals bad, accused him of stealing from his uncle, and, basing his assertion on the character of the reaction words, charged him with having dissipated the proceeds of his thefts in extravagant purchases, such as a gold watch. The young man, dismayed at the seemingly supernatural knowledge of his doings displayed by Dr. Jung, broke down and made a complete confession."

To the layman this may not seem very convincing, partly because he lacks the experience to appreciate the significance of the variations in reaction time and the character of the associated response, partly because he fails to feel the cumulative force of thousands of experiments and partly because he can imagine attendant vitiating factors of which, however, the psychologist is more fully aware and for which he is more ready to make allowance than is the layman. This test, or certain modifications of it, has been urged upon courts for use in the examination of defendants in trials. Similarly there are psychological principles which are helpful in interpreting the testimony of eye witnesses of an incident. Minds of different types or different degrees of maturity will be impressed by different features or factors of an incident. If the type of mind of the witness and the psychological principles involved are appreciated it is frequently possible to harmonize apparently contradictory testimony. For instance let individuals of varying maturity and differing mental type take a brief look at a picture that is full of objects and action and color and then describe it. One type of mind will see and enumerate the objects in the picture; another will be impressed by and describe the action; still another will observe relations. The attention of one observer will be attracted by a certain point from which he will orient, and another observer will orient from quite a different point and is likely therefore to interpret the picture differently. The observation of an incident by the witness who testifies in court was usually incidental and hasty

and not deliberate and careful with a view to an accurate report, therefore the testimony of such a witness in large measure duplicates the description of a picture just mentioned. It is important therefore that those who elicit and interpret the testimony should do so in the light of the psychological principles involved if they sincerely want to get at the actual truth which they ask the witness to give under oath instead of warping the evidence into a certain shape with a view to serving one side or the other of a case. I think however that the legal profession is likely to get less help from these rather concrete and superficial applications, than from some more profound and fundamental work such as that of Hans Gross for instance in his *Criminal Psychology*. If there are any who are skeptical about the possible service of psychology to the legal profession I would refer them to this book. Some may take it up to scoff and lay it down to pray. The translation of this book is from the press of Little, Brown and Company, of Boston, costs five dollars and is worth the price. The author served for some time as an examining magistrate in Czernovitz, Austria, and is at present professor of criminal law at the University of Graz, Austria. One of his previous works has reached five editions and has been translated into eight foreign languages.

In the general introduction William W. Smithers, secretary of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association, compares the present status of the application of law to the criminal, to the status of medicine when the old doctor had a few remedial agents of universal efficacy, calomel and blood-letting being the two principal ones. A larger or a smaller dose of calomel, a greater or less quantity of blood-letting. So the law, machinelike, says a smaller or a larger dose of the same medicine with practically no individualization of the treatment. But crimes, like diseases, have causes which, together with methods of remedial treatment, need to be studied. Medicine has diligently experimented and investigated with remarkable results in methods of treatment and especially in

sanitary and preventative medicine. Somewhat similar work has been going on in the subject of criminology, in Europe for forty years, and recently in limited fields in this country. "All the branches of science that can help have been working—anthropology, medicine, psychology, economics, sociology, philanthropy, penology. The law alone has abstained. The science of law is the one to be served by all this. But the public in general and the legal profession in particular have remained either ignorant of the entire subject or indifferent to the entire scientific movement. And this ignorance or indifference has blocked the way to progress in administration."⁶

Criminal Psychology has been translated and published largely in the interest of this reform and will, no doubt, prove a thorough-going and effective contribution.

A very striking book on *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, by Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard, came from the press of Houghton, Mifflin & Co. recently.

Within recent years a great cry has gone up for the conservation of our natural resources. This has turned the attention of some men to the almost limitless waste of human material, a waste going on everywhere in the world, but nowhere more widely than in our own country. The feeling is growing that no waste of valuable possessions is so reckless as that which results from the distribution of living force by chance methods instead of examining carefully how work and workman can fit one another. In the words of the author, a more careful adjustment of work and worker will insure not only greater success and gain, but above all greater joy in work, deeper satisfaction, and more harmonious unfolding of the personality. Dr. Münsterberg's book represents a sort of pioneer effort to use psychology as a means to bring together the right workman and the right task. He goes on the theory that the mental make-up and equipment of an applicant for a position and the special mental requirements for the task can both be determined and the two compared. I shall cite here a few illustrations from this book to show the definite promise of

⁶ *Criminal Psychology*, by Hans Gross, p. 7.

service to economic and industrial problems the present-day psychology gives in this direction:

The type for a great newspaper is set up by linotype operators. Some operators can never get beyond a speed of 2,500 ems. Others in the same time and with no more effort will develop a speed of 5,000 ems. This difference of ability is a fundamental one and can be discovered by a psychological test before the applicant has ever set a line. If this test were made so that the 2,500-em man would not work alongside of the 5,000-em man the work could be done in less hours, for better wages and under better conditions. The chances are that the 2,500-em man would be more useful and more happy at a job that called for a different psychic make-up. A striking illustration is the story, given in Dr. Münsterberg's book, of Mr. S. E. Thompson's work in a bicycle ball factory where a hundred and twenty girls were inspecting balls.⁷ "They had to place a row of small polished steel balls on the back of the left hand and while they were rolled over and over in the crease between two of the fingers placed together, they were minutely examined in a strong light and the defective balls were picked out with the aid of a magnet held in the right hand. The work required the closest attention and concentration. The girls were working ten and a half hours a day. Mr. Thompson soon recognized that the quality most needed, beside endurance and industry, was a quick power of perception accompanied by a quick responsive action. He knew that the psychological laboratory has developed methods for a very exact measurement of the time needed to react on an impression with the quickest possible movement; it is called the reaction-time and is usually measured in thousandths of a second. He therefore considered it advisable to measure the reaction-time of the girls, and to eliminate from service all those who showed a relatively long time between the stimulus and reaction. This involved laying off many of the most intelligent, hardest-working, and most trustworthy girls. Yet the effect was the possibility of shortening the hours and of reducing more and more the num-

⁷ *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, pp. 54 ff.

ber of workers, with the final outcome that thirty-five girls did the work formerly done by a hundred and twenty, and that the accuracy of the work at the higher speed was two thirds greater than at the former slow speed. This allowed almost a doubling of the wages of the girls in spite of their shorter working-day, and at the same time a considerable reduction in the cost of the work for the factory."

In the illustration just given the principles and instruments of the laboratory were taken into the factory. In the following illustration, from the same book, the practical problem to be solved was taken into the psychological laboratory. Dr. Münsterberg says there are electric railway companies in this country which have as many as 50,000 accident indemnity cases a year. The payments of indemnity imposed by the court have, in the case of some companies amounted to 13 per cent. of the gross earnings per year. If some man could invent a mechanism which would either eliminate the accidents or reduce the companies' operating expenses by, say 10 per cent., that inventor's fortune would be made. If psychology can effect the same result it will render an immense service. Last year the American Association for Labor Legislation called a meeting of vocational specialists and street railway men to discuss the problem of these accidents. Much attention was given to the questions of fatigue, the hours of labor, the time of day the accidents occurred and practically every other factor which seemed to have any bearing on the question. Since all motormen work under the same conditions and some had numerous accidents while others had few or none, though they might be equally faithful, it was finally concluded that probably the most important factor was the mental make-up of the motorman. Dr. Münsterberg was therefore requested to undertake the task of analyzing the mental requirements which the motorman's work demands and to devise a test which might be applied to a motorman to discover to what degree he possessed the psychic equipment which the position required. He concluded that the really central or vital mental process of this

problem of accidents was a particularly complicated act of attention and imagination by which the manifold objects, the pedestrians, the carriages, the automobiles, etc., are continuously observed with reference to their speed and direction in the quickly changing panorama of the street. There are some men whose impulses under such circumstances would be too much inhibited and therefore would never learn to run a car on schedule time under difficult conditions. Others would tend to have their attention fixated by one object and thus not comprehend continuously the complex moving situation. For testing the motormen Dr. Münsterberg devised an apparatus which called for the same mental equipment as does the running of a car on the street. This device included a cardboard nine half inches broad and twenty-six half inches long with two heavy lines half an inch apart lengthwise along the center to represent a track. The space between the track and the edge of the card is divided into half inch squares and in many of these little squares are placed figures, some black and some red, the black figures representing objects moving along the street without crossing the track and the red figures, objects going at various angles so that they cross the track. The red figures are numbered 1, 2 and 3, 1 representing a pedestrian who moves 1 unit of space in a given time, 2 representing a horse and wagon which moves two units in the same time, and 3 an automobile which moves three times as fast, or three units in that time. The device has a crank by means of which the motorman reproduces the movement of a car through the field of twelve such cards, the speed of the car being determined by the rate at which the motorman turns the crank. As he drives the car through the field he is required to call out in advance as he goes along the figures which will collide with the car. The man to be tested is, of course, allowed to experiment under instruction for some time so that he may be thoroughly familiar with the apparatus before the real test is made. Efficiency is indicated by the ability to combine the greatest possible speed with the smallest number of oversights. These two

factors are averaged and on this average the efficiency of the man is judged. The result of the experiment is expressed by three figures: (1) the speed of the car in the number of seconds required to move over the 12 cards; (2) the number of accidents, that is, failures to call out the right figures that would collide with the car; and (3) the number of figures incorrectly called out as colliding which would not really collide.

A street railway company which coöperated with Dr. Münsterberg furnished a large number of motormen to take the tests, some with poor records and others with excellent records, some men new in the service and others old—Dr. Münsterberg not having any knowledge of the status of the men in advance of the experiment. The value of the experiment as a test of efficiency was proven by the fact that the results of the test corresponded remarkably well with the records of the men in their actual service on the car. There are, of course, a number of accidental factors which may modify the value of the test, but the psychologist will appreciate these more fully than the layman, and will be able to make allowance for them. The experienced motormen testified that they went through the experiment with the same feeling which they have on the car. "The necessity of looking out in both directions, right and left, for possible obstacles, of distinguishing those which move toward the track from the many which move along the track, the quick discrimination among the various rates of rapidity, the steady forward movement of the observation point, the constant temptation to give attention to those which are still too far away or to those which are so near that they will cross the track before the approach of the car, in short, the whole complex situation with its demands on attention, imagination and quick adjustment," was felt to be practically the same in the experiment as it is in the car on the street. The experiment needs, of course, to be repeated a number of times and the results averaged in order to eliminate the influence of accidental conditions. Dr. Münsterberg thinks that in time this test can be much refined, but even as it is he claims that he

can eliminate from the service the 25 per cent. of the motor-men who are likely to have 75 per cent. of the accidents.

Dr. Münsterberg made a somewhat similar test for the Bell Telephone Company which employs some 16,000 operators. He found that from the time when the speaker takes off the receiver to the cutting off of the connection fourteen separate psycho-physical processes are necessary in the typical case for each call, and there are certain hours in the day when one girl may have to handle as many as 300 calls per hour, or sometimes even as many as 10 per minute. Of the girls who enter the service more than one third leave during the first half year and many older employees are obliged to leave on account of nervous breakdowns which result from a lack of proper mental make-up for the task. In this case the girls were examined with reference to eight different psycho-physical functions connected directly or indirectly with memory, attention, intelligence, exactitude and speed. For these tests the company also furnished Dr. Münsterberg with all grades of employees from the poorest to the best and the results of the tests were so satisfactory that he feels that by means of a test of a few minutes per applicant thousands of applicants might be saved long months of time and effort which are completely wasted and which might be devoted to efficient and profitable work along some other line for which they are better fitted.

The above experiments clearly show that successful achievement does not by any means depend only on good will and faithfulness and experience, for none of these can correct a lack of the mental equipment which a position may demand. It is often ill-adaptation that makes the task hard, the position insecure, joy in the day's labor impossible and the economic output short of what it should be to bring really good wages, whereas mental fitness is likely to bring joy to the task, confidence to the worker, better wages, and better relations between employer and employe. If psychology can help the employe to find the kind of task for which he is gifted and the employer to find a means of employing efficient labor instead of cheap

labor, it ought to become a factor in the problems between capital and labor. We have called upon capital to do justice to labor on ethical grounds, but on the whole the plea has not been very effective. A large department store will still use its horses in relays so as to work each only six hours because if the horse wears out the loss comes to the owner, but the same store will work its employes for ten hours or more, often under pressure, because if the employe wears out the loss is his and the store can employ another for the same money. It seems to me the best hope for better conditions is to be found in substituting adaptation and efficiency for exhaustive driving and long hours, thus adding an economic factor to the ethical one in the effort to improve the relations between capital and labor.

As evidence of the faith and promise there seems to be in the possible service of psychology along the lines indicated in the illustrations just given it may be of interest to note here that in the book from which these illustrations are largely taken Münsterberg quotes from, or refers to, some sixty different pamphlets, monographs or books (about one half of which were printed in the last two years), dealing more or less directly with the application of psychology along the lines indicated.

While the service of modern psychology is felt along numerous lines of human thought and endeavor it is, perhaps, nowhere else so much needed and has nowhere such possibilities as in education. The sculptor needs to know not only lines and curves and proportions and visions but also the quality and texture and eccentricities and possibilities of the marble. But no material with which any artist deals is in any way comparable to the complexity and delicacy of the child mind. Much more does the teacher therefore need to know not only the subject matter and methods of instruction but still more should he know both by natural instinct and by earnest study the phenomena and laws and eccentricities of the functioning of the child mind; and especially the peculiarities of the indi-

vidual child's mind. Dickens appreciated the need and the difficulty of this as we see repeatedly in his novels.⁸

He criticized the blindness of those who saw boys as a class or in a limited number of classes, distinguished by external and comparatively unimportant characteristics, in Mr. Grimwig, "who never saw any difference in boys, and only knew two sorts of boys, mealy boys and beef-faced boys."

He exposed the ignorance of vast numbers of parents and teachers who indignantly resent the suggestion that they need to study children, in Jane Murdstone. When Jane was interfering in the management of David, and, with her brother, totally misunderstanding him and misrepresenting him, his timid mother ventured to say:

"I beg your pardon, my dear Jane, but are you quite sure—I am certain you'll excuse me, my dear Jane—that you quite understand Davy?"

"I should be somewhat ashamed of myself, Clara," returned Miss Murdstone, "if I could not understand the boy, or any boy. I don't profess to be profound, but I do lay claim to common sense."

Many Jane Murdstones still claim that it is not necessary to study so common a thing as a boy. Yet a child is the most wonderful thing in the world, and, whether the Jane Murdstones in the schools and homes think it necessary or not, people are beginning to study the child with a view to finding out what he should be guided to do, in the accomplishment of his own training.

Richard Carstone had been eight years at school and he was a miserable failure in life, although a man of good ability. Concerning him Dickens says:

"It had never been anybody's business to find out what his natural bent was, or where his failings lay, or to adapt any kind of knowledge to him." Esther wisely said: "I did doubt whether Richard would not have profited by some one studying him a little, instead of his studying Latin verses so much."

⁸ *Dickens as a Teacher*, by J. L. Hughes.

In a recent novel, "The Major's Niece," there is a passage which seems to me quite significant. It reads about as follows:

"You'll find," said Meldon—"in fact, I expect you've observed already—that it's the people who haven't got any children who take the keenest interest in education. All the authorities on the subject—those who invent the new theories—are either unmarried women or confirmed old bachelors."

This gives expression to the feeling that we do not have a sufficiently definite basis for our system of education. Such system as we do have seems to be based largely on a priori judgments from which we draw deductions and spin theories which are unscientific and to a certain degree unstable as was our knowledge before scientific methods and apparatus and induction made it definite. Some ten or twelve years ago the writer had the privilege of studying pedagogy for two years as a graduate student at a university under probably as good teaching as could then have been found at any university in the country. While this work was interesting, suggestive and inspirational it was after all disappointing. There were important conclusions based on centuries of experience, and yet they could never be so conclusively demonstrated but what they could be disputed by the experience of another individual, or school, or nation, or period. It was evident that there was no science of pedagogy with definitely established facts, such as he found, for instance, in the laboratory of psychology at the same institution. It seems reasonable to believe that the higher the stage of development and the finer the organization the more definite, though subtle, the laws governing the organism and its activity. If effective control and direction of material forces is dependent upon accurate and scientific knowledge of the nature and laws of the forces, much more does it seem necessary that effective control and direction of the mind in its development through education should be based upon a scientific knowledge of the mind and of the laws inherent and operative in it. Professor Paul Hanus, of Harvard, who is spoken of as "probably the leading authority in the country on the

art of teaching and on the practice of schools," who headed the commission which spent two years and \$50,000 to investigate the school system of New York City, says in his report "there are as yet no universally accepted standards whereby the adequacy of educational aims and practices can be judged." Through the skill of its champions many an injurious fad makes its way into education and is eliminated only by years of experiment upon pupils to their loss. This is going on to some degree all the time. If psychology can furnish a really scientific basis for the methods, the organization and the content of education many a proposed fad will be ruled out immediately just as surely as the ignus fatus of perpetual motion has been ruled out by the laws of physics.

Over the entrance of the New York Public Library are inscribed the words "On the diffusion of education among the people rests the preservation of our free institutions." This is our ideal for popular education. To what extent is it realized? Dr. Ayers, of the Russell Sage Foundation, says that in the United States less than one half the children reach the eighth grade and only one in ten graduate from the high school. Furthermore, over 50 per cent. of the pupils in school are for some reason behind their natural grade. Each year about 10 per cent. of the twenty millions of children in our schools are repeating the previous year's work. These repeaters cost the nation about \$80,000,000 annually. In the words of one investigator, the financial loss is small compared with the spiritual loss. "The retarded pupil loses that fine spirit of initiative, of progress, of growth, of self-reliance, and of eagerness to achieve which constitutes the chief glory of youth, and which sends him from school into life an effective member of society. By allowing him to become retarded the school system trades that birth-right of the American boy for the pottage of idleness, failure and self-distrust."

I believe that both observation and psychology will bear me out in saying that one of the most powerful influences for good in the making of a boy is doing a hard task accurately and in

good spirit; doing it indifferently is not only no gain but is actually demoralizing. The real loss to the retarded pupil is much more in this failure to develop robust character than in the failure to acquire knowledge.

In a recent address before the National Educational Association Dr. Draper said,⁹ "When but one third of the children remain to the end of the elementary course in a country where education is a universal passion, there is something the matter with the public schools." Why does our system fail to educate the masses as it is supposed to do? Why do these children drop out of school? The answers are, "to go to work," "to help at home," "visiting," "lack of ability," etc. But these are only superficial reasons that would not operate if there were proper interest in and zeal for what the school offers.

There are those who say that the failure of our public school system to educate the masses as it should is due, in part at least, to the fact that the schools do not offer the right thing, that the courses require too much of an intellectual tight rope walking. Those of us who believe in culture as one of the ends of education are reluctant to give ear to such a statement, but let us see whether there may not be some truth in it. Ninety-six per cent. of the world's work is manual or industrial, about four per cent. is professional. Our courses meet fairly well the needs of the four per cent. How well do they meet the needs of the other 96 per cent. of workers? Would not fewer subjects better done be more acceptable to at least a considerable proportion of parents and children? Might not a certain proportion or type of children, especially the laggards and those who fall early by the wayside of education, be helped if, for some of the subjects at present studied beyond the three R's we would substitute some work connecting up more directly with the future life and work of the 96 per cent.? Let us see what recent psychology and experience suggest in this connection.

⁹ *Psych. Clin.*, Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 70.

Our education, in method and content, has been planned for a typical, general child mind, but literally there is no such thing. Children's minds are even more different than their faces and the individual differences must be more fully recognized both in the methods and the organization of our work if we would reach the children more effectively and more universally. The potential mental capacity of the child is determined by a physical basis in the structure of the nervous organization. Different capacities require the presence of different kinds of neurones or nerve cells. It is worse than useless, therefore, to try to develop a child mentally along a line for which there is no basis in the nervous organization. If there is even a poor basis for a certain capacity this can be improved by education and training, but if the basis is lacking a teacher can no more develop a child along that line than a farmer can cultivate corn if there are no seeds in the ground to start with. The education of the individual child must be determined, therefore, not only by some ideal imposed from without but still more by its own peculiar, inner limitations. A wrong demand upon the child will inevitably result in discouragement which will lead to loss of interest in all study and in dropping out of school. Psychology points out, for instance, that many children have no ability for knowledge that must be acquired by symbols but are apt in acquiring object knowledge, and if the latter form were to be adopted the object pupil would be the brighter one and the bright symbol pupil would prove the slow one. This suggests the need for more variety in the content of education since at present knowledge must be mostly acquired through symbols. Both classes mentioned above are likely to respond well and to develop favorably if their peculiarities are recognized. But there is another class of abnormal pupils which constitutes a very large proportion of the boys and girls in the schools of the country who, under existing conditions, not only fail to be educated themselves but very materially stand in the way of the most effective education of the normal and especially the brighter children.

In the words of Münsterberg¹⁰ "their attention cannot adapt itself, their perception is defective, their memory is uncertain, their associations are slow and uniform, their judgment is helpless, their feelings are utterly unstable, their will is weak and suggestible, their instincts unusually impulsive and generally their bodies show disabilities.

Such children must be recognized as unfit for instruction in the common schools. If their presence in the schoolroom is ignored, they themselves must from year to year have less chance of becoming useful members of the community. They sink down through their inability to follow, become utterly discouraged, and do not profit at all from school. On the other hand, if the teacher adjusts the instruction of the classes to their inferior psychical make-up, the whole class is held back and must suffer unfairly."

In some instances this deficiency is not mental, but may be caused by physical defects which should be discovered by some specialist whose business it is to find them and have them corrected. Pioneer work in the interest of this class of defectives was done by Dr. Witmer, the head of the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, whose laboratory and psychological clinic are now rendering very material service not only to the schools of Philadelphia but to our whole educational system.

Superintendent Bryan, of Camden, with whom the writer worked for several years in the psychological laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, as a part of that work, was one of the first to collate careful statistics of retardation among school children.¹¹ He found that in the elementary schools of Camden 47 per cent. of the children were retarded one year or more, 26 per cent. two years or more, 13 per cent. three years or more and 5 per cent. four years or more. There are in the United States some 300,000 mentally defective children and over 5,000,000 retarded children. Dr. Witmer's clinic has for years been investigating the mental, physical

¹⁰ *Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 228.

¹¹ United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin 461, p. 13.

and environmental causes of this defect and backwardness. The importance of this work can be appreciated when we realize that the bulk of the people who fill our prisons, almshouses, insane asylums, etc., comes from this backward class, many of whom would have improved instead of degenerated if our educational system had made provision to meet their needs. I cannot refrain from quoting here a statement, in part, made by the teacher of a class of defectives at a round table discussion in the clinic after the class had been dismissed.¹² "One cannot decide very often that a case really is hopeless until the child has had every chance, until every effort has been made to train him. While there is life there is hope. We cannot grow a second arm, but in the developing mind, who can tell what is going to happen? We know that much is possible in the rebirth of adolescence; there is much to hope for at that time.

There is going to be a great change when this work spreads throughout the country, and you are the people who are going to spread it. We want you to get the point of view of special class work, and go back to your community, and help to mould public opinion there. The problem will present itself in some way like this. You will have some children in your class who don't belong there. They will stay year after year and learn little. Some one will say, What are you going to do with them? You will have to take a step forward and say, Put them in institutions. Then the people will say, But that costs money, and these children could earn a living; let that boy go to work, he could sweep streets, and let this girl go to work as a servant. You will answer, That's all very true, but he's going to get married, and she's going to get married, and here I am teaching school, and I am going to have their children to teach. And it will all be gone over again, and those children will marry and have children. The community is spending its money to educate them, and they are getting no good of it. It is spending money on them in prisons, and

¹² Elizabeth E. Farrell, in *The Special Class for Backward Children*, by Lightner Witmer, Ph.D., pp. 185 ff.

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almshouses, and hospitals,—more and more money. Then your friend will say, Let us put them in institutions. And you will find that the institutions are full and have long waiting lists. They will have to build more institutions. And even when the children do at last get into an institution, an ignorant or greedy parent can come and get them out and put them to work. After a while the people will not leave it for a feeble-minded father or mother to say, "No, he shan't go into an institution. I can take care of my own boy." As sure as the sun sets to-night, the day is not far distant when in *New York State* we will have a commission to pass upon our mentally defective children and send them to an institution, just as we have a commission to pass upon criminals and small-pox cases, and other persons dangerous to the public. And here I will be a prophet. I believe that within ten years in *New York State* we will have definite compulsory care for children unable to get along in school. A great scheme has been worked out to provide for almost any contingency which may arise while custodial care is being brought about.

Now if each of you will go home and teach and show the wastefulness of feeble-mindedness, make your school boards and your community see how much money is wasted by letting these feeble-minded persons run at large and have children,—that is what will impress them, the extravagance of it. I want you to get the right point of view. These particular children do not matter so much, if we can use them as laboratory material to demonstrate the problem, to show the facts. Remember that we have 150,000 to 300,000 idiots in this country, and less than 15,000 in institutions. Where are the rest of them? About the country-side, marrying and having children. Come back to the question of cost; the state takes care of them anyway. The almshouses are full. The jails are full. The lunatic asylums are full. That could all have been wiped out if the teachers had been intelligent enough. The day will come when I (as a teacher of defectives) will not have a job and you ought not have a job. We ought to work

ourselves out of our jobs, if we are good for anything. If we could lock up all the feeble-minded in New York State to-night, in thirty years we would have very few feeble-minded persons living. We would take care that the next generation would have very few feeble-minded persons in it. There would be a few sporadic cases, of course. If you will remember that you are to work yourselves out of a job, you will be doing a great work. You will be following out the doctrines of the great biologists, and preparing the way for the future perfect man and perfect woman."

Those children whose defects are really mental (and this class is large) should by all means, in justice to themselves, and to the normal pupils, be taught in special classes or special schools. This will not only give the weaker ones a chance but it will mean a saving of time and an increase of efficiency in educating the brighter ones. In continental Europe a child will reach the end of our High School course in two years less than our children do here. The reason for this is not that the European child is brighter or even the teacher more efficient, but class or caste classifies the children in a rough way along the lines of study for which each is fitted and close classification is still further effected by a large number of special classes or schools both for the abnormally weak and for the abnormally bright pupils. We do not want here a class or caste classification, but it is not necessarily in the interest of democracy to "keep bright pupils in quarantine with mental mediocrity." Psychology furnishes tests which can be used in classifying children at least to some extent according to their natural limitations or their special ability. It can test separately each one of the mental elements just mentioned in describing the weaker pupil and it seems now to be standardizing a test, the Binet test, which in a general way reveals all of them and can be used as a means of classifying the children of a school on the basis of their actual mental capacity, into a number of different classes. Special classes and special schools have been provided for

years in some of the European countries and are lately being organized in some of the cities of our own country. Some of us will live to see the day when many a city will have its psychological laboratory and specialist as a part of its educational system just as it now has its city chemist and its health department. Mental welfare and economy is no less important for good citizenship than physical and material welfare, and it is much more difficult to secure.

The school system of Chicago has such a psychological clinic which examines every subnormal child and prescribes definitely both the intellectual and the physical training which it is to receive in the special schools maintained for subnormal children. Several other cities have recently made similar provision.

On the basis of the data issued by the U. S. Bureau of Education, there are in the schools of a city of 50,000 probably thirty or more pupils of such defective mentality that the schools should not admit them. They cannot be served and they are a hindrance. They should be in special institutions for defectives, most of them permanently. There are about 300 more sufficiently weak mentally to be classified as feeble-minded. These might develop into self-supporting citizens if cared for in special classes or a special school. They are not helped by the regular school curriculum. Then there are a thousand or more who are not mentally deficient but still are too slow to succeed alongside the normal pupil. These should be taught in special classes or sections in their respective schools, or they will become repeaters and drop out of school without getting the education the city owes them, and can give them with proper management. Finally there is a group of 5 per cent. or more who are distinctly above the normal child in ability. In proportion to their ability these are the most neglected pupils in the school. Any teacher realizes, or should realize that if he or she had an opportunity to expend the same effort on this group that is expended on the lower fourth of a class these abnormally bright pupils might get twice the educa-

tion they now get in the same time. In order to make our educational work really effective these various classes should be defined and provision made according to their needs. Much of the classifying can be done on the basis of school records while in doubtful cases the Binet test can serve as an X-ray machine to get at the child's mental capacity. We hope that the stimulus which psychology is giving along this line may lead to much needed improvement, yet we cannot hope for much so long as the public is willing to invest only twenty cents per pupil per day while education at private schools averages at least one dollar per pupil per day. Perhaps when the public learns that the lower third of our schools is a serious factor in our social life in that it furnishes most of the class which through our almshouses, hospitals, asylums, prisons, and various immoralities is costing us about \$100,000,000 per year, we may come to realize that it would pay to invest some of this money in forming this class while it is young instead of trying to reform it when it is too late.

I can merely give a suggestion of the possibilities in psychology for the teacher in determining methods and revealing the nature of development. Even the most concrete and simple laboratory experiments are making their contributions. For instance, the relative merits of different methods of teaching reading may be better determined by reason of a simple experiment on the movement of the eye in reading. A small lever may be attached to the eyeball in such a way that it records the slightest movement of the eye. By this device it was discovered that in reading the eye does not move steadily along the line but jumps to a point in the line, rests there while it takes in a part of the line and then jumps on to another point, resting there again a moment while the reading is done. The number of stops and the length of the periods of rest are determined by the ability of the reader. This suggests that we naturally do our reading not by seeing parts of words or even individual words but parts of sentences or even short sentences. This information is of value when we come to examine the relative merits of teaching reading by beginning with the

alphabet or using the phonic system, the word method or the short sentence method.

One of the best contributions of the Montessori system which has in it many things that are excellent and some things not so excellent, is its method of motor training in writing. Writing should no longer be taught by slow and painful imitation of a set copy but by developing the muscles and free motor action by movement exercises which, so far as the child is concerned, need not have any relation to writing. The first step in the Montessori method is to trace a geometrical figure from an object laid on paper, as, for instance, a circle with a smaller circle inside, leaving perhaps a quarter of an inch between the two and then having the children fill in the space with a pencil moving around or back and forth in the open space and thus developing both muscle and motion. The same development is also secured by having children trace rapidly with their fingers letters which are cut out of sandpaper and pasted on cardboard. Thus a child will develop skill in making the movements and some day be surprised to find itself able to write quite freely without knowing that it ever learned writing. That which is best in her method Madame Montessori got from teaching defective children and from years of work in a psychological laboratory.

A number of experiments or tests which have contributed to methods in teaching other subjects might be mentioned but time does not allow.

The more important thing, however, is not pedagogic methods but the efficient teacher. In the words of another "the really vital spark in teaching is something you can't define or hand on from one to another. It is something we have in us. We have it or we have it not, and if we have it not we are not teachers," and neither pedagogic knowledge nor pedagogic methods will make us teachers. It is true, however, that the best teacher with the finest intuitive insight will welcome the added insight and understanding of mental processes and individual development which psychology can give. Native intuition should therefore be supplemented by a knowledge of the

laws governing the mental processes common in the schoolroom such as interest, attention, memory, suggestibility, association, fatigue, etc. They should also know something about the way in which individuals learn or develop in their learning. For instance if the progress of a child in a certain subject were plotted in a curve this curve would rise rapidly at the beginning, then for some time move almost horizontally, then rise again to be followed by another horizontal line. Though the effort may be steady the apparent improvement will not be continuous but will correspond to a series of rapid rises and plateaus, the rise representing a period of acquisition and the plateau representing a period of assimilation. Unless properly understood the period indicated by the plateau may cause discouragement since the development at that time is not apparent, but the assimilation represented by the plateau is as essential as is the acquisition indicated by the rapid rise. Close observation will make this same phenomenon evident in physical development. Professor James expresses this phenomenon by saying we learn to skate during the summer and to swim during the winter. It is important that this intermittent character of development be appreciated since the period of acquisition and the period of assimilation should have somewhat different kinds of training. The value of expression, as over against the traditional importance placed upon impression as a force in the process of mental development, is also definitely established by the psychological interpretation of development. This suggests the important contributions made by physiological psychology in establishing the fact that education or the development of our mental powers depends upon the systematic training or development of the living substances of our nervous organism, especially the brain. In this organism we have some 9,000,000,000 nerve cells, all having in them the capacity of being developed into functioning neurones and being organized into the activity which represents our various mental processes. These neurones, as already indicated, are in groups like the trees of the forest and for those which are present mental capacity can be developed

whereas it is utterly useless to try to develop any mental ability for which the corresponding neurones are wanting. One basic principle suggested by this physical basis of the mental life is that education must not go counter to the laws of nature but must take nature into partnership. Professor James says, "The great thing in education is to make our nervous system our ally and not our enemy." This same truth is stated as follows by another: "Natural organization must not be interfered with unless that organization is known to be positively abnormal." Here is a suggestion for the teacher and the parent who are always too ready to repress the childish activity which is so different from the disposition of the more mature. There is a tendency on the part of many to turn the child into a little mature individual. A noted neurologist says, "Do not stop a child's movements unless you know why you do so." The child's instinctive actions should usually be encouraged and made the basis or the occasion of training instead of being inhibited and lost. The story is told of a gosling that was reared in a building away from water; when it was some months old and was taken to a pond, it not only refused to go into the water, but when thrown in, scrambled out again as a hen would have done. The swimming instinct was entirely suppressed.

We have a remarkable illustration of the loss of capacity from disuse in the following statement of Darwin. Writing of himself in 1876 he says:¹³ "Up to the age of thirty or beyond it, poetry of many kinds, such as the works of Milton, Gray, Byron, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelly gave me great pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare, especially in the historical plays. I have also said that formerly pictures gave me considerable, and music very great, delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures and music. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part

¹³ *Life and Letters.*

of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive."

Many similar illustrations of the suggestiveness of a knowledge of physiological psychology could be given but space forbids.

In conclusion I may say that recent psychology doubly emphasizes the importance of early training and habits by calling attention to the plasticity of our nervous organization in childhood as compared with its fixedness later. Radical changes can rarely be made in mature life or only with the greatest effort. "We can plant corn in the autumn but nature will refuse us a harvest." This finds expression in the following lines of Romanes:

"No change in childhood's early day,
No storm that raged, no thought that ran,
But leaves a track upon the clay,
Which slowly hardens into man."

Baldwin concludes a lengthy chapter on "The Mind of a Child" in the following words:

"Finally, I may be allowed a word to interested parents. You can be of no use whatever to psychologists—to say nothing of the actual damage you may be to the children—unless you know your babies through and through. Especially the fathers! They are willing to study everything else. They know every corner of the house familiarly, and what is done in it, except the nursery. A man labors for his children ten hours a day, gets his life insured for their support after his death, and yet he lets their mental growth, the formation of their characters, the evolution of their personality, go on by absorption—if no worse—from common, vulgar, imported and changing, often immoral attendants! Plato said the state should train the children; and added that the wisest man should rule the state. This is to say that the wisest man should tend his children! We hear a certain group of studies called the humanities, and it is right. But the best school in the humanities for every man is in his own house."

LANCASTER, PA.

IV.

POLITICS OUT OF OFFICE.¹

EDWARD EVERETT HALE, JR.

It will not surprise you if I take this evening as a subject for our thought some topic not merely scholastic. As members of this oldest of American college societies you are well aware that philosophy is the guide of life—and everybody knows that life is not a matter of books alone. As friends of this distinguished foundation you have always before you the great example of Franklin. You must by this time have been informed of every characteristic of that great man, who made a great impression upon his generation. Yet it would be hard to say whether he made the greatest impress as a scholar or as a public man. The famous epigram, *Eripuit fulmen caelo sceptrumque tyrannis* (He snatched the lightning from the heavens and the sceptre from the tyrant), refers first to his scholarly and then to his political work. He was a great scientist, but he was no less great as a public man. And though as a public man he often held office—indeed his fellow-citizens would never cease calling upon him to take charge of their and his joint affairs—yet Franklin does not make the most impression upon us as Clerk of the Assembly of the Province, as Commissioner to France, as President of the New State, but as a public-spirited citizen alive to anything that might serve the welfare of his fellow citizens, and the originator of almost all modern improvements in his native city. I am sure that were he here with us tonight there are few matters to which he would like better to give careful consideration, few matters on which

¹ The Phi Beta Kappa address delivered in the chapel of Franklin and Marshall College, at Lancaster, Pa., on June 11, 1913, by Professor Edward Everett Hale, Jr., of Union University, Schenectady, N. Y.

he would be more competent to advise than the topic which I have taken for this evening's discourse. That topic is a question of politics, of such politics as may and ought to engage the attention of all citizens, but in a peculiar way of all who have the advantage of a higher education. I have called it "Politics Out of Office."

The public duty of educated men is no new theme for a gathering such as ours. More than fifty years ago that striking example of elegant scholarship and public spirit, George William Curtis, in speaking to the literary societies of Wesleyan University, upon a subject such as this, felt the need of an apology. "I know well," he said, "that a conventional prejudice consecrates this occasion to dull abstractions and timid, if not treacherous, generalities. It would allow me to speak of the scholar and the American scholar in his relation to Greek roots and particles, but would forbid me to mention his duties to American topics and times. I might speak of him as a professor, a dialectician, a dictionary, a grammar, but I must not speak of him as a man." Such were the words of a Commencement Orator in 1856. How old-fashioned, how archaic those words sound today. We have gone far beyond them. If I thought tonight that I needed apology for my subject, it would not be because it was something new, but because it had been worn threadbare, not because it was a paradox, but because it was a truism. We do not need to be told that the scholar has a duty to politics, that he should have a place in political life. Those are not ideals, they are facts. And to tell the truth my message today is not directed to academic hearers alone. It is meant for all those persons who are conveniently grouped under the name of "good citizens," "citizens of the better sort," and such like. It is more particularly needed perhaps by the specifically academic class—persons in college or just out of college or closely connected with college, because such people are apt to have nothing to do with politics at all. It is needed a little more particularly by educated men in general, men with intellectual interests, because such people

are more apt to neglect their political duties than men of commercial or material interests. But in the main the exhortation to think of politics out of office might be addressed to ninety-nine per cent. of our citizens without finding one who could say, "All that is familiar to me and unnecessary."

Politics in America are far too closely connected in the public mind with office. Many people cannot think of one without the other. Politics with them always means office, and office to their mind always means politics. This should not be. Offices are necessary, but after all not the only thing to be considered. Politics is the carrying on of public business. To carry on public business we, of course, need office and officers. But there must be much in politics beside office, much which has no close connection with office. To one man office is merely the question, How can I manage to keep my position of clerk of the board of supervisors? To another politics is merely a question of, How can I manage to gain the election as assessor? Yet the really important thing about office is not how to get it, but how to carry it on. And the really important thing in politics is not how to get the votes, but how to get the right spirit, the right public opinion. It is true that we cannot, unfortunately, neglect the other thing. We cannot say, Do the duties of office well and the election or appointment will take care of itself. We know it will not. We cannot say, Get the right spirit in a community, the right public opinion, and the votes will be all right. We may wish it were so, but we know there is more to do than that. Still those are the fundamental things. No one will complain at a certain amount of drudgery and machinery. But let us never go so far as to think that the drudgery and the mechanism are the main thing. Let us realize that the real thing of importance in regard to office is how to administer it for the best interest of the people, and the real thing of importance in politics is how to get the people to think rightly and seriously of their own public interests.

But before I go farther will you pardon me for a preliminary word of a personal character? To many people the

idea of a college professor dealing (as one may say) with politics is a humorous one. They think that college professors must be theorists, visionaries, doctrinaires, impracticable people who live their lives reading books and never meet any one in the real world. Their idea of a theory is of course of an ill-founded theory, of a vision as a misleading vision, of a doctrine as a false doctrine. But—not to stop at that—they feel that a college professor can never count in real politics, can never know anything about them. It is true that such ideas have received something of a shock of late. We have recently seen the inauguration as our chief magistrate of one who stepped directly from the academic cloister to the Executive Mansion of an important commonwealth. And we have seen his predecessor, having finished his term of office in the loftiest position in American public life, turn to a university professorship as a congenial and profitable occupation and means of expression of the public wisdom he had gathered from many years of worthy service of his country. The university professor became president and the president became a university professor. The last year has been quite a year for college professors in public life. Still I shall cheerfully admit that I do not believe that, in the main, college professors make very good politicians, just as I do not believe that, as a rule, they make very good citizens. They are in several ways exempt from some of the ordinary duties of citizenship. In a good many cases they are practically exempt from taxation. In most, they are exempt from jury duty. They often live on a special place away from their fellow-citizens. In all there is something of a barrier, a something of a gulf, between them and people in general, coming, perhaps, from the very early time when the university was always a body of strangers in any university town. But this is something which is being remedied in slow degrees. In my own city we are at the present moment working with some fair expectation of success for a non-partisan administration of municipal affairs. We are at the moment starting a

"citizen's movement" in preparation for the municipal campaign. I mention this merely to note that the chairman of the citizen's committee is a professor of the college, the professor—of all things in the world—of philosophy. He, you see, at least believes in philosophy as a guide of public life as well as private.

If then I may add a word of a directly personal character I should say I have chosen this subject, not as a matter of theory but of practice, not because I have read and talked about such matters but because I have had a little political experience and know a little something of them. Not much experience, but, I venture to think, of the right sort. After all, in such matters it is not quantity that tells so much as quality. We do not need to eat a whole cow to know something about beefsteak. I have worked through a primary campaign in a local election district and an election campaign in a congressional district; have seen both from the inside. I have been a worker in a ward committee and a delegate to a presidential convention. I have been a candidate for the lowest of offices and for almost the highest. It may be thought something of a reproach to one that I should speak particularly of politics out of office, because I have never known anything personally of politics in office. It is certainly true that I have never held public office, and I cannot bring myself to have much ambition to do so. But instead of considering that fact a reproach, I believe it to be rather a testimonial. I speak of politics out of office, because that is the kind of politics I know about and believe in.

So, then, to turn more specifically to my topic. I began by allusion to the teaching and example of George William Curtis. In one especial respect his words and his life are worthy of our most careful attention, for with the entire acceptance which has been given to his general idea, they represent also something which has been only gradually making its place in the public mind, which has even now not succeeded in making itself an active factor in our thought and action.

In a commencement address at Union College almost half a century ago, in speaking of the public duty of the educated man, he said: "By the words public duty I do not necessarily mean official duty, although it may include that. I mean simply that constant and active practical participation in the details of politics, without which, upon the part of the most intelligent citizens, the conduct of public affairs falls under the control of selfish and ignorant, or crafty and venal men. I mean that personal attention—which as it must be incessant, is often wearisome and even repulsive—to the details of politics, attendance at meetings, service upon committees, care and trouble and expense of many kinds, patient endurance of rebuffs, chagrins, ridicules, disappointments, defeats—in a word, all those duties and services which when selfishly and meanly performed, stigmatize a man as a mere politician; but whose constant, honorable, intelligent and vigilant performance is the gradual building, stone by stone and layer by layer, of that great temple of self-restrained liberty which all generous souls mean that our government shall be." No words of the great orator bear better the test of fact. Were it needful to say the right thing but once, and be done with it, sure that it would bear its due fruit, I need say no more tonight.

And now that we may get right at our subject, let me at once specify what are some of the forms of politics out of office, which may hold the interest and should have the coöperation of those who are called "all good citizens."

We are inclined to think that the chief thing in our politics is election day. That is the day that makes or breaks. Before election day there are things to do,—but the average citizen does none of them except read the newspaper and talk to friends as he goes down town in the trolley. What is there to be done? Why everyone knows that before the election comes nominations; before the campaign comes the primary. It has for some twenty-five years been gradually dawning upon the American people that the primary is as important as the election. All through my earlier days "attend the

primaries" was a sort of watchword. But there must have been millions of Americans who did attend the primaries and who found when they did attend them that they were as powerless at the primary as at the election. One had to go even farther back.

What then is the very first thing in the course of events that leads to election? The first official act is registration and enrolment. Now the process of registration and enrolment seems a very simple one. Most citizens consider themselves very virtuous if they register and enroll themselves. But the registration itself is the place where the very first political work should be done. Let me simply mention one possibility connected with party enrolment. Let us imagine an election district where both parties are organized by men who believe that politics and office are one, and indivisible. What can they do in the matter of registration? Why this. If in one party there is any doubt as to the organization carrying the primaries, the other party can lend them a certain number of helpers. Suppose the Republican organization in the district be threatened by a movement of independent voters within the party. A number of Democrats may enroll as Republicans; the enrolment is at first secret, who is the wiser? Then when the primary comes round the Republican leader has so many solid men to count on and the independent citizen has so many votes to cast before he even gets a start. This is one of the simplest manipulations of the enrolment. To beat it somebody must be on the watch. Who will take the time and trouble to look out for such a thing? Very few, indeed; it takes an organization. Hence if the independent citizen wants his rights in his own party he must take some part in the organization of that party. He must be willing to do a little work at the beginning, to save himself from much complaint at the end.

But suppose no enrolment: next the primary. What happens then? Why whatever the primary law, the organization will have a candidate. And who will that candidate be?

In ordinary cases somebody who, recognizing the necessity of organization, will act in the main as the organization desires. What can be done against such candidates? Primary laws differ in different states and I am not familiar with those of Pennsylvania, but it is clear that in any state two things can be done. The good citizen can either control his local organization, or he can fight it. Whichever he does, the result is better nominations. If you can get a really public-spirited man to act as your party committeeman you will do well; but if you cannot do that you can often force good nominations by the threat of opposition.

Then comes the primary. A primary is nowadays in most states as formal a matter as the election. The organization workers of the district are present as a matter of course. They will like nothing better than to have no one else present. But citizens in general ought to be there, not merely to vote but to watch the others vote. What can they do? Let them read the election law and find out. You will perhaps laugh at that and say that they are not lawyers. But a man does not need to be a lawyer to construe the election or any other law. He has as much right and duty to construe it as anyone else. True his construction may be overruled, but so may a lawyer's. We have one of the worst election laws in New York that I know of. I believe that it was drawn especially to beat the man who wants to act against the organization. But I have had the opportunity of working through a primary campaign under that law and in four weeks' experience have discussed and heard discussed the provisions. And the experience has shown me that any clear-headed citizen who knows the law and has a copy in his pocket will generally succeed against anything but physical force.

Well we get to the primary. It is easy to see, though not generally recognized, that a primary is often more important than an election. In many districts a party nomination is equivalent to an election. Then, as a matter of course, the primary practically is the election. But even where there

is no party preponderance, where the nomination is not equivalent to the election, the primary is an important matter. Too often an election is merely a choice between two poor candidates, a choice of evils. It is possible in the primaries to make it just the reverse, a choice between two strong candidates, a choice between the good and the better. If it is known that one party is bound to have a strong candidate, the other is bound to have one equally strong. With the interest of citizens aroused to the importance of the primary the work of the election is half accomplished.

And after the primary there is still work to do. There is public opinion to be made, meetings to be held, voters to be visited from house to house, registration to be made, as well as the more particular work of carrying on the campaign. And in all this the average citizen can play his part and that no unimportant one. If he does not himself care for public meetings he can at least make one in the general display of interest without which nothing good can be accomplished, if he always registers himself he can also make it a point to see that his friends register, if his own mind be pretty well settled as to candidates and policies he can certainly aid in the general diffusion of ideas and interest if only by talking with those with whom he comes in contact, and if he does not always make his own views prevail he aids in creating that atmosphere of good ideas and right thinking that is essential to the best results of any popular movement.

And here I am led to say a word on a subject which is always to be found, if generally in the back-ground, in discussions of this sort, namely the matter of political organization. At the present day in America there is a strong feeling against political organizations. While almost everybody has a feeling, often unconscious, in favor of political parties, yet very many have a feeling equally strong against political organizations. Party organization is represented in our minds by such words as boss, machine, slate; it stands too often for corruption and crookedness. But some sort of organization is an absolute

necessity in political life, except in the very smallest units, or in the very largest interests. A fairly small election district, like a New England town meeting, may often get on very well without much permanent organization. A very great public interest, like the feeling for tariff reform, will generally express itself without much direct organization. But for the carrying on of politics in general in ordinary places and on everyday issues some sort of organization is almost a necessity. It must always be remembered that, whether or no good citizens will continue for the public interest, those citizens who are not so good will be sure to conspire for their own interests. So I believe in organizations, from those of the national parties down to those in wards and districts. And if there are to be organizations, a man who means to make himself felt even as an individual must take his part in them. Your own Franklin with his famous *junto* is a good example. No man in America was more able to accomplish good results as a purely private citizen. His autobiography, which is one of the most illuminating of books for the American citizen, shows us how in a purely private way he was able to set on foot great movements. The paving and lighting of his native city, its fire department, its library and its university were all started by him, at a time when such things were by no means matters of course, and started by him as an individual. But even Franklin saw the advantage of an organization and the *junto* with its proposed continuation of subordinate societies was an example of what may be done by citizens acting together instead of alone.

It is true that organization involves some trouble. If there be no wide interest in an organization it easily falls into the hands of a few. And when an organization is managed by a few, then the many are naturally prejudiced against it. Suppose a man gets the idea that he will join the political clubs in his district. He joins and goes round to a meeting, and what is the result? Perhaps he finds a number of routine matters put through by half a dozen present who are obviously those who run the organization. No one asks his opinion; indeed

he has no opinion, for the matters are not of any real importance. He goes from the meeting feeling that nothing much is to be accomplished and that he might as well leave those routine matters to people who are willing to deal with them. Of course there is a great deal of routine in any organization, and of course too there almost always will get together a set of men who are willing to handle routine matters. But if there are not others to take an interest and exercise a supervision over their proceedings, such a group—though it start with the best intention in the world—easily degenerates.

But we shall easily be led to spend too much time upon this very matter-of-fact phase of our subject. Granted that an individual citizen *can* do something more in politics than he does it still may be asked what is the use of so doing. I myself do not believe that the average citizen has any idea of what he really can do. I do not believe that he has any true idea of the many ways in which he can make his influence felt. Many men really feel that there is nothing for them to do. But suppose it be not so, suppose a citizen see clearly that he can do something in political life without running for office or helping anybody who does. Yet life has many interests. To everybody today, to the educated man in particular, come many calls. The church is insistent today that the work of religion must be done not by the clergy alone, but by the combined effort of clergy and layman. Social service calls to everybody who will help to do something, even though it be but a little, to carry through the great philanthropic reforms which will be one of the distinguishing marks of the century. The different private interests of each individual broaden out today to a degree that would have been undreamed of fifty years ago. And a man naturally wants to make his work count. Suppose he recognize, as most college men do, that society has some right to his effort and his help, yet it is still a question where his work will be most effective. One man is a strong church worker, one is in the board of trade, one is absorbed in the affairs of his union, each is doing something and each can see

some result of what he does. What can the political organization say to such a one?

I cannot pretend to do more than indicate the general lines of such an answer. One must first, I think, view the negative side, though such views are rarely inspiring. One must say that without participation by those who make it a duty, our politics will surely remain in the hands of those who now make it their business. Unless we have a wide-awake voter we are sure to have a boss. Unless we have a good organization we shall have a machine. Unless we have a true democracy we shall have an oligarchy, if not a tyranny. I don't think this view is inspiring. I don't think it will arouse people. But I am sure it is true.

More interesting, however, are some positive views. A man is more truly a citizen if he will do something beside vote, and there is always a satisfaction in being something worth while. One will certainly find it worth while to be a real worker in the commonwealth, to feel that one is, to some degree, at the bottom of things, that one is surrounded by actualities and not statements on paper. Nothing is more curious to me than to see how little the average voter knows of the very commonest matters of political routine, how slight an idea he has of the practices and duties of the different officials who carry on public business. A year or so ago when the citizens of my home county inspected the party enrolments they found that in some districts many enrolments had been thrown out and that many voters would be unable to vote at the primaries. It was curious to see how few of those who were indignant at their disfranchisement so far as the primaries were concerned took steps even to find out why they had been disfranchised. It needed only a visit to the election commissioners and an inquiry. To most of the voters the election commissioners of the county were merely official politicians with whom one could do nothing. Practically they were very well-meaning men who tried to carry out their duties as nearly according to the letter of the law as was possible. I looked up some cases. The com-

missioners (although political opponents) were most obliging. They looked up every ballot and showed it to me. They showed me the election law, they showed me the opinions from the county attorney and the attorney-general under which they had acted. Everything was made plain. It was not just, but it showed how justice could be obtained. And so it will generally be. If people want actually to understand our politics they must take a part in them. And if we want to determine what our political life ought to be we must, I am sure, know what it is. That view surely ought to appeal to the scholar. If it do not he is surely the kind of theorist, visionary, doctrinaire, that too many people think he is.

So really to be what he thinks he is the good citizen should take a more active part than is usual in political life. The hard-headed business man is apt to laugh at the college professor as an empty theorist, as we have said. But I do not know any more empty theorist than the average American citizen, whether hard-headed business man or not, who believes in a general way in the theory of American government, in the theory of democracy, and yet will do nothing really to know how it actually works, and just why it is that the practice is so different from his theory. He is an empty theorist of the worst type, for he holds an empty theory about something that vitally concerns his everyday life. (A college professor may be foolish who holds to some theory or other that has no close connection with his everyday life—say the theory of survival of the fittest.) But in a broader way some personal knowledge of politics is of a practical value to any man—or I might better say some personal knowledge of politicians. I do not believe that the time will come when every one will be able to take a considerable part in public affairs. There will always be a comparative few who will give more time and attention to politics than their fellow-citizens. And these people will always tend to make politics a business, to find in politics a means of support. We cannot hope, we should not desire, to have, as is the case in England, a large class of men who do

not have to work for a living, who are willing to conduct, for nothing, the public business of their fellow-citizens. We shall probably always pay our political workers and officials, and thus we shall always have, probably, a class of persons more or less dependent on politics for a livelihood. We have such a class now, but as a rule people in general are very slightly acquainted with them, and in general as politicians I doubt if they have a high respect of the community. I will not say that the politician today stands in the same estimation with people at large that the publican stood in among the Jewish people in the day of our Lord. But I don't believe that many of us who are gathered here this evening have much knowledge of politicians, either as a class or personally. Now this is not as it should be. I don't hold a brief for the professional politician, but I am sure it is for the best interest of all that people should be well acquainted with him. And the educated man, especially the college-bred man, I believe, will gain by knowing more than he does of those who are carrying on the public business of the country. Doubtless he may not like them all when he does know them, but in the main I believe the knowledge will be of use to both parties. We are far too apt to have in our minds a picture of the ward politician, founded upon sketches in the comic paper or gossip in the daily press. Let me give a personal illustration. A little while ago I became associated politically with a man who had previously been closely connected with the party organization which I had commonly opposed. The last few years you know have been years of plentiful changes in politics. Well, my friends rallied me a little in the matter. "What are you doing with so-and-so?" said they. "He has certainly pulled off some pretty raw political deals." I said only that every citizen has a right to work in politics, whether he was corrupt or not. But I got to know this man rather better than my friends, and I was surprised that with all his political sharpness there was in him a genuine desire to improve political conditions. He was a Hebrew, and he had the strong feeling for family that dis-

tinguishes that race. One night he said to me, "You see, professor, I've got children, boys growing up. I want that they should have a better chance in politics than I had. I've had to take hold in the only way a man can take hold here in America and I guess I've done a good many things that people think I'd better not have done. But I want to have my boys have a better chance than I had." Of course a thing like that doesn't make a man an idealist, but it makes you understand him better. So not only from the general standpoint of an improved body politic, but from the more particular view of better individual citizenship do I feel that every citizen should try to participate more actively in public affairs. Let me add a more practical consideration. It was President Taft, I believe, some time ago, in speaking for some of the current proposals for political reform, who said that they imposed about four times as much work upon the average citizen as the present methods, when it was well known that even the present opportunities were very slightly used. I believe that remark was correct in both respects. Current political propositions—the direct primary, the initiative, the referendum, the recall, etc.—do impose a good deal of actual work upon the average citizen. And there is little doubt that the average citizen now does not by any means do all he might do for the best management of public affairs. But I am not sure of the inference that because a man does not do a little well, he may not under different circumstances be able to do a good deal. It is true, I think, that our citizens generally do not take much part in politics. They vote at elections and they read the papers and talk politics at other times. But they do little else. But I believe that one reason why they do little is because they do not know how they can do anything effectively. It is true that, as a rule, few voters participate in the primaries. I believe the reason is that few voters feel that they can *do* anything by such participation. When a man feels that by attending a primary he can only indorse the choice of somebody else, I do not much blame him for staying away. But if he saw

that he could do anything at a primary that would count he would be likely to try to do it. Americans are a practical people and a busy people. They do not like to put energy into things that will not show result. If, however, they become convinced that by a fuller participation in politics they can really do something in politics that they want to do, the chances are that they will take the opportunity.

So anyone who would have the college man take a fuller part in politics must be able to show him that by that fuller part he can succeed in bringing to pass some of those things which he thinks worth while. If it be a question of going to a meeting, he must feel that something will be done at that meeting. If it be a question of writing to his assemblyman or senator, he must feel that his representative will pay some attention to his letter. If it be a question of subscribing to a political organization or taking part in its work, he must feel that that organization is really accomplishing something more than having a constitution and by-laws and appointing committees. Well in this case I cannot offer myself as an example and say, "Take my case: I went into politics and see what I have accomplished." I wish I could do that, but as a fact I don't know but I could have got more so-called "practical" results in some other way. Let me tell you how I came to take a more active part in politics than I had been in the habit of doing.

Yet, such as it is, I am well satisfied with my experience, and I think anyone else will be who works sincerely. Sometimes one will be able to do something definite. A friend of mine, for instance, was chairman of the social service committee of the Men and Religion Movement. He became interested in housing conditions, did a lot of work, got expert assistance, drew up a report. It took time and money. Then when the common council of the city was about to adopt a housing code he went to the public hearing and showed up the failures of the proposed code in such a way that it was definitely tabled and work was begun on the lines that he indi-

cated. And as a result of his work we shall have a good housing code. I might add other instances, not so very many, I am sorry to say, as one would like, but enough to count. And I may say as the general result of some years' political experience, I feel sure that with some exceptions it will be found that political organizations will be glad to avail themselves of the work of men who will work, and that politicians will at least pay attention to the advice of those who have any advice to give.

There is one part of my topic which now, as time has flown, I must touch on very lightly. I have so far aimed to show that, aside from the question of office for himself or for anybody else, the public-spirited man should busy himself in politics in a practical way. He should not only register and vote at election. His duty is not even accomplished if he enroll and vote at the primary. He should take some active part in some political club. He should be on hand at political meetings. He should keep a lookout on the action of his representatives in state and nation, and write to them to express his opinion. He should do something to form public opinion by taking around petitions among his fellow-citizens or at least by discussing with them what is going on. He should, when he can, take an active part in the campaign; it is not everybody who will want or be able to get up on a soap-box and address a crowd at a street corner, but there are very few who cannot help the district captain by taking a list of names of voters on his own street and seeing where they stand.

But I want to add one other view of this subject. Even if the citizen do all this, he will still have but a partial grip on the matter if he feel that all is done when he has elected mayor or governor, alderman or representative in congress, or even if he keep an eye on them when elected. There is still one further responsibility; suppose his candidates do not get elected, there is still the responsibility of the minority. We desire to accomplish certain political ends. We try to elect men who can carry through those ends in a practical way.

But suppose we do not succeed? Shall we then give up our effort and acquiesce in the action of the majority. No, certainly not; a practical man who really wants to *do* something will see in failure only a stimulus to harder work.

And it is from this standpoint that I would urge upon the citizen the necessity for the parties who are not in power, still accepting the responsibility of doing what they can to make their ideas prevail. In my own state the party with which I acted was defeated in the last election. The measures for which we strove were put in the background. But we did not feel that we were thereby absolved from farther effort, save as directed to the next time. There was organized a legislative committee to put in definite form what we thought could really be accomplished in the matters of interest to us. I had the honor of serving upon a sub-committee to which was entrusted the question of employer's liability, a matter of current importance with us. We drew up a bill embodying our ideas and tried to get it adopted. We failed in that important particular, but we did accomplish a much better understanding of the principles and possibilities in the case.

And such action is typical of the whole case. Men should not go into politics merely that certain men be elected to office. They should not go into politics merely to carry through certain measures that appeal particularly to them. There is an old political proverb—measures, not men. But I do not believe that citizens should participate in politics either for measures or men. They should participate in politics because it is right that all should pay attention to public affairs and not a few only, because the American government is not an oligarchy but a democracy.

For let us remember that this is a matter of fact that we are talking of, and not a matter of talk alone. And let us remember that however much we may call our American government a democracy, a government by the people, yet it will never be really such unless the people do something about governing. Unless they will govern themselves somebody else

will govern them. Public business, the joint affairs of you and me and the others of our fellow-citizens, will certainly be attended to. If you and I will not attend to them somebody else will. And it is doing little and often nothing merely to vote,—one must do more if one means to do anything. If our American democracy is to be a democracy, we the American people must make it one.

SCHENECTADY, N. Y.

V.

THE IDENTITY OF CHRIST.

HIRAM KING.

The avowed enemies of Christ, in seeming contradiction, help Him more than they harm Him. Thus, they sought to destroy Him by putting Him to death, but they assured His exaltation instead, since the cross was in order to the crown (Phil. 2: 8-11). They seek to overthrow His Kingdom by martyring His people, but "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" and they sow it broadcast in persecution.

The Socinian¹ friends of Christ, on the contrary, harm Him more than they help Him. They exalt Him for faith, it is true, but, unlike St. Paul, they neither "preach Christ crucified" (1 Cor. 1: 23) for sin (15: 3), nor do they affirm His Godhead (Col. 2: 9). They, in fact, eliminate the divine nature from His person and thereby annul His saving function, since a mere man, although godlike, could not, under any proper conception of moral principle, atone for the sins of his fellow men. They can, therefore, commend Him to the sinner at the best, as only a righteous example for his *imitation* instead of proclaiming Him as the spiritual Progenitor of the race (Rom. 5: 14; 1 Cor. 15: 45) through whom the natural man becomes righteous in a *new birth* (1 John 3: 9).

The sum of the Socinian contention, accordingly, is, that Christ is a mere man, but that, unlike other men, He did not imitate the sinful example of Adam and become unrighteous, and that, on the other hand, the sinner becomes righteous by believing on Him and imitating His sinless example. Salvation, according to the Socinian creed, is therefore obtained by contemplating Christ and adopting His virtues.

¹ The term "Socinian" is used comprehensively and is meant to characterize all forms of disbelief in the proper divinity of Christ.

It is the purpose of this paper to establish the divinity of Christ and to demonstrate the lamentable failure of His Socinian friends from the sixteenth century to the present, to correctly identify Him.

Any proper attempt to ascertain the identity of Christ, it is plain, must be preceded by the question, From what source is the *true* knowledge of Christ derived? Is it from tradition and history filtered through the reason? or is it from revelation accepted by faith? It is the consensus of the friends of Christ, orthodox and heterodox, that He exemplified the virtues of a perfect life, that His character was unblemished and that His knowledge was unexampled. The assumption is, accordingly, justified, that His Socinian friends will admit the correctness of His own answer to the preliminary question. When the disciples replied to his inquiry concerning the popular opinion of His identity, that some said He was John the Baptist and others that He was Jeremiah or one of the Prophets, He asked them: "But who say ye that I am?" and when Peter answered: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," He said to Him: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah: flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven" (Matt. 16: 13-17). The incident was typical. The popular judgment was based on natural and historical conditions and the resultant identifications of Christ, although in the light of promise and prophecy, were not only diverse but also, in every case, incorrect. And all subsequent attempts to identify Him from historical data have likewise failed. His identification by Peter, however, was not thus conditioned on His person, His life and His works. It was, necessarily, a *revelation*, since Christ Himself, whose truthfulness the Socinians concede, said: "No one knoweth who the Son is save the Father" (Luke 10: 22).

It is plainly, then, through *divine revelation* that the identity of Christ is established. It was made known to Peter by direct revelation; it is made known to the world through the inspired record of revelation.

The Scriptures teach:²

1. *The Preëxistence of Christ.*—St. John very significantly states the advent of Christ in the terms, not of a birth but of an incarnation. "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us," he says (1: 14). Incarnation implies the prior existence of its subject, and the writer distinctly affirms the preëxistence of Christ in the declaration, that "In the beginning was the Word" (1: 1). Should, however, the testimony of St. John to the existence of Christ prior to His birth be deemed insufficient, that of Christ Himself, in His plea to the Father for His reinvestment with the glory which He had with Him "before the world was" (17: 5) and His frequent declarations that the Father had *sent* Him (5: 36; 12: 49; 14: 24), is certainly conclusive.

As Christ, then, existed *before* His birth and as men come into existence *in* their birth, it clearly follows that He is not an ordinary member of the race. As the Word became incarnate in the birth of Christ, it follows, moreover, that the Person of Christ is the constituent union of the Word and man. Since Christ, as the Word, had "the glory" with the Father "before the world was" and existed throughout the countless intervening ages from "the beginning" (of creation) to His birth, it may be assumed, finally, that He is higher on the scale of being than mere man. While, therefore, He is the "man, Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. 2: 5) by birth, He is also more than a man by incarnation.

2. *The Creative Agency of Christ.*—St. John asserts of Christ, as the Word, that "all things were made by him" (1: 3). St. Paul wrote to the Colossians, that "in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers," that "all things have been created through him and unto him," that "he is before all things" and that "in him all things consist" (1: 16, 17). The writer

² The writer acknowledges the benefit of suggestions from "The God-Man" in *The Fundamentals* and from critical comments by Dr. Lange.

of the Epistle to the Hebrews declares of Him, not only that it was through His agency that God "made the worlds" but also that it is His function to uphold "all things by the word of his power" (1: 2, 3).

It is self-evident that the Creator is superior to the creation and that He not only sustains it but that He also *comprehends* it in all its magnitude and intricacies. Man, on the contrary, is not only the work of the Creator but he is also a midget in the interior of the universe. He is, moreover, local to the earth and cannot possibly traverse outlying space to ascertain the character and dimensions of the Creator's works. He cannot hope, even, to ascend a score of miles above the earth's surface in his recently invented devices for aerial transportation. He has discovered, however, that the earth is not only a heavenly body, swinging in space, but also that it is a planetary sphere in a solar system, so vast that its outermost planet revolves about the sun at the incomprehensible distance of two billion, seven hundred and ninety-two million miles. His inference, too, seems justified, that the fixed stars are solar centers, each with its planets a constituent of the material universe. His telescope, moreover, has disclosed the astronomical marvel, that the Milky Way is really an elongated mass of suns, so dense and so remote as to appear to the naked eye a gray band across the sky.⁸

Well may the astronomer stand appalled at the practical

⁸ The French astronomer, Camille Flammarion, says: "We know that each star is a sun, and that the one nearest to us is 25,625,000,000,000 miles away. Sirius is more than twice as far, Aldebaran three times, Altair four times, Vega five times as far. Beyond these are stars that are millions of billions and billions of billions of miles from the earth. We know that there are more than 100,000,000 suns in the visible universe, and that they are all moving at the rate of from 50 to 200 miles a second." It takes light, which moves 186,000 miles a second, over four years to reach the earth from the nearest star and a through-trip ticket on a supposed railroad from the earth to it, at a cent a mile, would cost 256,250,000,000 dollars, which is more than sixty times the amount of coined gold in the world.

infinity of the outstretching heavens and, vast as it is, summarize man's solar system thus:

Sun, Mercury, Venus, earth and Mars,
A planet burst by explosive jars;
Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, stars—
Totius coeli minima pars.

On the one hand, now, is man, a creature, who is restricted to the diminutive planet, earth, and is unable, accordingly, even to trace out the boundaries of the natural order in which he is involved, or to affect it in the least. On the other hand is Christ, the Creative Agent, in whom "all things consist." That the distinction between man, thus in bonds on the earth, and Christ, the Author of the universe, is absolute, becomes a demonstration in a comparison of the impotence of the former with the omnipotence of the latter. Or may, perchance, the former Gnosticism which, although it robbed Christ of His divinity, magnified Him, nevertheless, have, Proteus-like, assumed, in Socinianism, virtually the *form* of the present Agnosticism? At all events, the Socinian friends of Christ do not seem to *know* that He performs the creative function, although the Scriptures attribute it to Him in unmistakable terms.

3. *The Universal Sovereignty of Christ.*—The crown of the world was decreed for Christ before His birth (Ps. 2). The Prophet Daniel foretold that His Kingdom would be world-wide and perpetual (7: 13, 14). Christ Himself admitted to Pilate that He was a King (John 18: 37) and subsequently assured His disciples that the dominion of heaven and earth had been given to Him (Matt. 28: 18). After His assumption of sovereign power, St. Peter asserted that "angels, authorities and powers" were "made subject to him" (1 Peter 3: 22). While St. Paul declared that in His name "every knee should bow, of things in heaven (angels) and things on earth (living men) and things under the earth" (dead men), that "every tongue should confess" that He is Lord (Phil. 2: 10, 11) and that "he must reign, till he hath put all his

enemies under his feet" (1 Cor. 15: 25), the last enemy to be abolished being death (v. 26).

As, now, Christ was exalted, at His investiture with sovereign authority (Ep. 1: 20), "Far above all rule, and authority, and power, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come" (v. 21), and as He thus became "Lord of lords and King of kings" (Rev. 17: 14), it is plain that His sovereignty is wholly distinct from the sovereignty of men. The distinction between the two sovereignties is, indeed, one of *class* in all essential particulars. Thus, men become kings while they live; Christ became a King after He died. Men reign over national units and their kingdoms are political; Christ reigns over "heaven and earth" and His Kingdom is spiritual (John 18: 36). The kingdoms of the world are dynastic and the Crown Princes succeed to the sovereignty of their ancestral predecessors; the kingdom of heaven is mediatorial and Christ, the mediatorial King, had no predecessor and can have no successor. Men become subjects of earthly kingdoms through natural birth; they become citizens of the kingdom of heaven through the birth of "water and the Spirit" (3: 5).

The distinctions between the sovereignty of men and the sovereignty of Christ, now pointed out, have not only the sanction of revelation but they are also exemplified in history, and they clearly demonstrate the functional infinity of Christ. The Socinians, however, reject the proposition, that while Christ is human by birth He is also superhuman by incarnation. They thus commit the colossal crime, against faith, of mutilating Him on the Procrustean bed of the reason to reduce Him to the stature of a mere man.

4. *The Divine Sonship of Christ.*—The fact of Christ's divine sonship is not in doubt, since it is attested at first hand. God called Him His Son (Matt. 3: 17) and He called God His Father (John 5: 17).

The relation of father and son is established, not by *creative act* but in *generative process*. The divine sonship of Christ is,

accordingly, due to His eternal generation from God. Not only did Christ refer to Himself as the "only begotten" Son of God (John 3:16) but He was so designated also by His most intimate disciple (John 1:14, 18). St. Paul, in affirmation of the priority of His generation, ranked Him as the "first-born of all creation" (Col. 1:15).

5. *The Equality of Christ with God.*—It has been pointed out that the creature is *inferior* to the Creator. That offspring, however, is *equal* with progenitor is a self-evident fact of biological science. Thus, for example, the descendants of Adam, from the birth of Cain to the present, have been *identically human*. The propagation of the race in natural generation is, in fact, the *reproduction* of the race, in the sense, that the successive generations of men are the *duplicates* of their predecessors. Not only is the *identity* of the race maintained, thus, through the equality of offspring with progenitor but their equality is, *necessarilly*, exemplified, continuously, in the *perpetuation* of the race. As, moreover, all life is *generative*, the dual equality is not peculiar to the human order of life but is exemplified, everywhere, among the inferior orders in the reproduction of their *species* (duplicates).

The equality of Christ as the *Son* of God, with God as the *Father*, on the scale of being, is plainly the logical deduction from the equality of offspring with progenitor in the order of earthly life universally. Is it also the teaching of the Scriptures? Yes. Thus, Christ did not disavow the charge of the Jews, that He "called God his own Father, making himself equal with God" (John 5:18) and St. Paul not only wrote that He was "in the form of God," in His preëxistent state, but also that He "counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God" (Phil. 2:6). In His preëxistence, it appears, Christ did not consider His equality with God as a prize to be seized by Himself. Although He was in the "form of God," and, therefore, "on an equality with God," He not only refrained from exercising equal prerogatives with Him, but He

"emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."⁴

6. *The Divinity of Christ.*—As Christ was thus in the "form" of God prior to His birth, did He possess the essential attributes of God? As He took the "form" of a servant at His birth, the question suggests the plainer one, did He acquire the essential attributes of a servant? All affirm the latter interrogative proposition and the parallel between the "form" of God and the "form" of a servant absolutely compels the affirmation of the former. As, then, the essential attributes of humanity must manifestly be accorded to Christ in the "form of a servant," it would not only be inconsistent to deny Him the essential attributes of Divinity in the "form of God" but it would also be absurd.

Of what, now, did Christ, as the Word, "empty" Himself as He "became flesh"? As the "form of a servant" is exclusive for His incarnate state and function, it is not doubtful that He relinquished the "form of God" (mode of existence) to be "found in fashion as a man." As, however, the "form" itself was not the essential being of Christ but only its manifestation, it follows that, in putting it off, He did not "empty" Himself of the divine nature.⁵ Do the Scriptures sanction

*Men, too, are generated from God (1 John 5: 1) and are His sons (Heb. 12: 5). Why, then, are they not, like Christ, equal with God? Why is offspring not equal with progenitor in the order of the spiritual humanity as well as in the order of the natural humanity? Men, as the natural race, it is answered, are *preexistent* at their generation from God and it is in a "new birth" that their filial relation to Him is established. The prior-existing human nature is not abolished in spiritual birth but it is regenerated, and the "new man" (Ep. 4: 24) is human as well as divine. The new-born man, moreover, partakes of the "divine nature" (2 Peter 1: 4) only as it is modified in the incarnation. Men are thus the sons of God as a "new creation" (Gal. 6: 15) and, although they are "born of water and the Spirit," they are not equal with God. On the other hand, Christ, in His eternal generation from God, was *not* pre-existent. As the Son of God, He was generated in the Divine Being, becoming thus a distinct Person in the Godhead. Unlike men "begotten of God," He is, accordingly, the *natural* Son of God and therefore "on an equality with God."

*Godhead, like manhood, is not transferable, and even the World-

the conclusion of logic? Yes fully. "For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2:9), is the fashion in which St. Paul sets Christ over against the predatory teachers of his time (v. 8) and it seems quite impossible for His Socinian friends to repudiate the writer's comprehensive ascription of divinity to Him without denying his inspiration. He, furthermore, asserts that, in Christ, men are "made full" (v. 10) and prays that they "may be filled unto all the fulness of God" (Ep. 3:19). The Scriptures distinguish, thus, between Christ and men and set them in contrast, teaching that Christ bears the *divine nature* ("all the fulness of the Godhead") but that men only receive *divine grace* ("all the fulness of God").

The author of Hebrews, in affirming the supreme exaltation of Christ in the realm of being, declares that God "of old time" spoke to men "in the prophets" (1:1) but that He "hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son" (v. 2), "who being the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high" (v. 3). By way of climactic contrast, he then pointed out that God makes "his angels winds, and his ministers a flame of fire" (v. 7), but that He says of the Son "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" (v. 8).

It is well-known that this Old Testament ascription of divinity (Ps. 45:6), applied thus under New Testament conditions, loses its specific emphasis on the divinity of Christ in its translation from the Greek original into the English language. In the Greek text, however, the word, *ho*, placed before *Theos* (the term for God) attributes absolute divinity to Him. *Ho* is the definite article, *the*, in Greek and the literal translation of *ho Theos* into English is, therefore, *the* God. As, moreover, the article *the*, is exclusive, Christ is designated in the ascription Builder (the Demiurgos) of Plato and the World-Fashioner (the Demiurge) of the Gnostics could not be thus equipped for their colossal tasks. The Godhead is, in fact, the divine nature itself.

tion, not only as *the* God but also as the *one* God. "My Lord (ho Kurios) and my God (ho Theos)," is Thomas's confessional identification of Christ (John 20: 28) and as he confessed faith in Him as *the* Lord and *the* God, it follows, not only that his confession is conclusive for His divinity, like the ascription just considered, but also that it is superior to the earlier confession of Peter. Thus, while Peter identified Christ as the *Son* of God, Thomas identified him as *God*. The confession of Thomas, accordingly, complemented the confession of Peter in the evolution of the orthodox Christian creed.

Thomas's identification of Christ is, however, not only the one, explicit apostolic confession of faith in His divinity but it was also made an *incontrovertible proof* of His divinity by His implied sanction of the divine appellation in not *disclaiming* it. The Socinian friends of Christ will agree that, if He were a mere man, as they allege, He could not possibly have accepted Thomas's adoring ascription without losing His moral integrity. As they, moreover, concede that He maintained His moral uprightness throughout His earthly career, it follows that they can not possibly *deny* that His acceptance of the ascription is conclusive proof of His divinity.

The dilemma which here involves the Socinians is this: Christ either rightfully, as God, accepted the ascription of divinity and is *divine*; or He accepted the ascription wrongfully, as a mere man, and was an *impostor*. Under the logic of the former alternative, they can not deny His divinity; under the logic of the latter alternatives, they can not affirm His moral integrity. As, now, they plainly can not hope to avoid impalement on the sharp horns of the dilemma, it seems reasonable that the natural craving for mental comfort as well as the chivalrous spirit of logical fairness in the arena of discussion ought to suggest the restoration of Christ's eliminated divinity, which has now been logically established from the tenet of His moral integrity in their own creed.

The writer of Hebrews cites the divine sonship of Christ in

proof of His exaltation above the angels (1:5) and, in relation to His second advent, he quotes from the mouth of God the *climactic* proof of His divinity: "And let all the angels of God worship him" (v. 6).⁶

If, now, it will appear that the worship of men and angels and all other real and imaginary objects is idolatrous and that the worship of God alone is lawful, it will follow that Christ, the Son of God, whom the angels are here directed, by the Father, to worship, is *divine*.⁷

"Thou shalt have none other gods before (beside) me" (Ex. 20:3), is the absolute restriction, by divine statutory enactment, of worship, by man, to God alone. The prohibition was persistently reiterated in the progress of the Old Testament economy (2 Kings 17:35, 36) and the observance of the restriction was most dramatically exemplified in the primitive church. Thus, when Peter entered His presence, "Cornelius fell down at his feet and worshipped him" (Acts 10:25). The Centurion very properly regarded the Apostle as an ambassador of God, but, being a pagan, he could not know that, in the true religion, divine honors must be paid *directly* to God. Peter promptly rejected the proffered worship, as idolatrous, bidding the Roman to stand up and saying: "I myself also am a man" (v. 26). "Sirs, why do ye these things? We are men of like passions (nature) with you" (14:14, 15), protested Barnabas and Paul, with rent garments, at Lystra, against the purpose of the priest of Jupiter who "brought oxen and garlands unto the gates, and would have done sacrifice with the multitudes" (v. 13). "And I fell down before his feet to worship him" (Rev. 19:10; 22:8, 9), wrote St. John, concerning his angel instructor on Patmos. The angel, however, also being a creature and therefore not an object of wor-

⁶If Christ were not divine, His worship by the angels, here enjoined, would plainly be idolatrous. Must not His Socinian friends, then, under stress of the logical situation, charge God with instituting idolatry in the spirit world?

⁷The assumption is justified, on general principles, that worship by angels as well as by men is restricted to God alone.

ship, made peremptory protest, saying: "See thou do it not: I am a fellow-servant with thee and with thy brethren that hold the testimony Jesus: worship God" (v. 10).

Unlike these men and their "fellow-servant," the angel, who rejected divine honors as due to God alone, Christ, whose integrity is unquestioned, ACCEPTED the adoring homage of the disciples (Matt. 28:17) and the logic of the dual situation clearly demonstrates His divinity.

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VI.

THE SOURCES OF THE GOSPEL OF LUKE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GOSPEL OF MARK.

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A careful comparison of the synoptic gospels reveals a marked difference in literary style and method of treatment of the materials at the disposal of their authors, or we might say editors. Mark, the shortest and earliest of the gospels, is a terse, vivid account of the public career of Jesus. Its author is ever conscious of His power, and in a few bold artistic strokes paints the picture of the majestic figure of Jesus as teacher and healer, and as the suffering, dying, and risen Lord. The Gospel of Matthew is throughout informed with a stately, solemn style representing Jesus especially as the promised Messiah, the fulfiller of Old Testament prophecy. The third Gospel, however, the last of the three to assume its present form, exhibits characteristics which strikingly differentiate it from the other two. Renan calls it "the most literary of the Gospels" and "the most beautiful book in the world." Luke's Greek, especially when free from the influence of Aramaic sources, is nearer to classic Greek than any of the Synoptists. He is the only evangelist, as Plummer has stated, "who writes history as distinct from memoirs." He writes "in order" and connects his narrative with the history of Syria and Rome. He reveals throughout his interest in emphasizing the universal aspect of the Messiah. His descent is traced from Adam, the father of the human race, rather than from Abraham, the father of the Jewish race. His ministry extends to all men. In this gospel He is especially represented as the friend of publicans and sinners. The parables of "The Good Samari-

tan," "The Lost Sheep," "The Prodigal Son," are found only in this gospel and emphasize the abundant grace of God.

These characteristics of the third gospel are undoubtedly due to the personality of its author, Luke the Gentile Christian physician and companion of Paul. The drift of modern critical opinion under the leadership of Harnack ("Luke, the Physician") has been toward the acceptance of the Lukan authorship of the third gospel and the Book of Acts on the ground of linguistic and historical evidence. Our present task is to attempt to point out the sources, oral or written, which were employed by the author of this gospel, paying special attention to the Gospel of Mark. In doing so we must bear in mind the literary methods of the age that gave birth to the Gospel. To incorporate other writings in one's own work, without mention of such action, was quite the order of the day. The gospels consist of compilations of oral and written material. Luke explicitly states that he is indebted to others "who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word" for the sources of his information. He himself was not of that fortunate number. But in view of the fact that many have written narratives, Luke having had special opportunity to trace all things accurately from the first, will also draw up his account for the edification of Theophilus. Unless Luke had had at least some additional information at hand, and a consciousness that he could improve upon the narratives already written, we cannot well imagine any justification for his writing. "No other gospel is throughout so full, for of the 170 sections contained in the Synoptic narrative 48 are peculiar to Luke."¹

When we attempt to penetrate the present form of Luke in order to discover the sources which have entered into its composition, the entire synoptic problem confronts us. In dealing with this question I have found no book so helpful, so thorough and sober in its methods of criticism as the recent volume "Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem" written

¹ Plummer, *Commentary on Luke*, p. 4.

by members of the University of Oxford under the editorship of the great New Testament scholar Dr. Sanday. The views particularly of Dr. Sanday and Sir John Hawkins in so far as they bear on the present subject, appealed to me with greater weight because of their simplicity as contrasted with the complex theories of Dr. Streeter and Dr. Allen, and in this paper we shall occupy in the main the position of the former rather than the latter.

In accounting for the sources of Luke we assume what is commonly known as the "Two Document Hypothesis." We assume that the marked resemblances are due to the use of common documents, and that the fundamental documents are two in number: (1) A complete Gospel practically identical with our St. Mark, which was used by the evangelists St. Matthew and St. Mark; and (2) a collection mainly, but not entirely, of discourses which has been termed "Q," which furnishes the common matter found in Matthew and Luke, but not in Mark. In addition Luke had lesser oral and written sources to which he was indebted for the matter peculiar to his gospel.

A long line of ancient tradition beginning with Papias² testifies that the second gospel was composed by John Mark, the companion of Paul and afterward of Peter, who recorded the reminiscences of Peter concerning the words and deeds of Jesus, paying more attention, however, to accuracy than to order. This gospel of Mark, substantially in the form in which we have it today, was the first and chief source for Matthew and Luke. "Rather more than three-fourths of St. Matthew's Gospel, viz., 816 verses out of 1068, and rather more than two-thirds of St. Luke's Gospel, viz., 798 verses out of 1149 may be taken as generally supporting the now prevailing opinion that the compilers of these two gospels used the Gospel of St. Mark—pretty nearly, if not quite, as we have it—not only as one of their most important sources, but as a framework."³

² Quoted by Eusebius, *H. E.*, III, 39.

³ Hawkins, in *Oxford Studies*, p. 29.

This general statement, however, does not apply to what forms nearly a quarter of the first gospel, viz., Mt. 8 to 13, containing 252 verses, nor to what forms nearly one-third of the Third Gospel, viz., Lk. 9: 51-18: 14, containing 350 verses. In these sections the Marcan arrangement is put aside.

Examining now more particularly the Gospel of Luke we find that we must account for the divergence from the Marcan source, not only in the disuse of the Marcan source in 9: 51-18: 14, but more particularly for what is known as "The Great Omission" by Luke of the matter contained in Mark 6: 45-8: 26, and also for the many changes from the Marcan order found in Luke's passion narrative 22: 14-24: 10.

The section in Lk. 9: 51-18: 14, is generally called "The Great Interpolation," because of the striking variations from the Marcan account which this section exhibits. Hawkins after a detailed investigation concludes that Mark's Gospel was entirely disused as a direct authority for this section. This conclusion is also accepted by Dr. Sanday. Let us point out briefly the arguments which Hawkins advances.

There is a section of Luke preceding "The Great Interpolation" extending from 6: 20-8: 3 which indicates that Luke here also laid aside his Marcan source, and therefore lends weight to the opinion that he did so in "The Great Interpolation." In this section we find that the setting is completely different in Luke and Matthew from what it is in Mark. For instance, we find that the words "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you" are identical in Mk. 4: 24, Mt. 7: 2 and Lk. 6: 38. But when we look at the context, we find that it is the same in Matthew and Luke, this saying occurring in connection with the injunction concerning judging and giving; however in Mark we find that it follows the command concerning hearing, "Take heed what ye hear." "Here as sometimes elsewhere in reports of a discourse, it is the Marcan connection which gives the impression of being the less original." This seems to be the case also in the quotation from Mal. 3: 1. "Behold I send my messenger before my

face," which is recorded in Mt. 11:10 and Lk. 7:27 as spoken by Jesus after the message from John in prison, but which Mark 1:2 uses as an introduction to his account of the Baptist's preaching in the wilderness. There is a third case of parallelism between all the Synoptists in the description of the anointing of Jesus by a sinful woman in the house of the Pharisee, Lk. 7:36; and in the account of the anointing by Mary at Bethany, Mt. 26:6 and Mk. 14:3 ff. "But these resemblances between the two narratives are so very largely outweighed by the differences between them, as to the time and place of the action and the teaching founded upon it, as to make it clear that any influence of the one upon the other can only have been very indirect."

The disuse of the Marcan source, as seen in this section, is more strikingly evident in the section 9:51-18:14. This section, we remember, contains material found only in Luke, such as the parables of "The Good Samaritan," "Prodigal Son," "Lost Sheep," etc. But, in addition to these narratives, peculiar to Luke, this entire section exhibits certain phenomena which indicate that the author broke away from his Marcan framework and drew upon other sources. To substantiate this Hawkins furnishes a striking argument as the result of a minute investigation showing that of the eleven doublets occurring in the Gospel of Luke, nine have one member in this section, although it is only one-third of the length of the whole gospel. This in itself indicates that the author was using an additional and independent source, for one who like Luke laid claim to accuracy and orderliness, would not repeatedly let himself use twice over materials derived from a single source. This assumption is substantiated by the evidence that the member of the Lucan doublet, which corresponds to Mark in position, is also considerably more similar to Mark in wording than is the member which occurs in the interpolation. In the same way Hawkins furnishes a list of short sayings (p. 38) found in this section which are placed in entirely different position from that which is assigned to them in Mark. The

verbal similarities are found also to be greater between the Marcan and Matthaean, than between the Marcan and Lucan versions of these sayings. As to the nature of the particular source to which Luke was indebted for this part of his gospel, we cannot be very certain. Hawkins is not inclined to believe that he incorporated an entire section of the Logia (Q) exclusively of all other authorities, but rather that Luke laid aside the Marcan account at this point to follow the accounts of some who were still living in Caesarea or Jerusalem, and who had been "eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word," on this last journey of Jesus. But this distinction, which Luke himself draws between the narrators of whom he was one and those who were their informants, forbids us to accept a tradition which placed Luke among the seventy disciples who accompanied Jesus on this journey.

But in addition to explaining the motives that led to the "Great Interpolation" into the Marcan framework, the student is confronted in the next place with the task of accounting for the omission of an important section of Mark, viz., the matter contained in Mk. 6: 45-8: 26. This omission forms a startling contrast with the way Luke has dealt with Mark's gospel up to this point. From the commencement of the Baptist's ministry he has closely followed the order of Mark, supplementing it occasionally with fresh material, but here he omits entirely, nor does he at any later point introduce the matter contained in Mk. 6: 45-8: 26, which contains 74 verses, or almost exactly one-ninth part of the 661 genuine verses of our Second Gospel. Three theories have been advanced to account for this.

(a) The omission may have been unavoidable because this whole division of Mark may not have been inserted into that Gospel when Luke used it. In other words, that this section belonged to a deutero-Mark. But this theory is entirely refuted by the proofs, lexical and grammatical, which Hawkins submits (pp. 64-66) and which demonstrate the unity of authorship of the Second Gospel. Luke used the Greek form

of Mark, substantially as we have it to-day. And this Greek form was the work of one man throughout.

(b) A second theory advanced is that this division of the Second Gospel was omitted by Luke accidentally. Some suppose that he was misled into doing so by passing on in his manuscript from the mention of the feeding of the multitudes in Mk. 6: 42-44 to that in Mk. 8: 19-21, or from the name Bethsaida in 6: 45 to the same name in 8: 22. This does not commend itself to me. We cannot imagine Luke to have had such a slight knowledge of Mark, to have read it so few times. He might have overlooked in on a certain occasion; but we cannot think that he could have forgotten this section entirely. We rather feel that Luke was acquainted with this section, and that in accordance with the third theory:

(c) Luke omitted this section intentionally. The material was not of the kind that commended itself to Luke, as we shall see.

This section contains two passages which are absent from Matthew as well as from Luke—two accounts of miracles of healing Mk. 7: 31-37 and 8: 22-26. These narratives are the the only ones in the Synoptic Gospels in which any other means than the laying on of hands is used by Jesus, and the means used in both of them—the application of saliva was so familiar in magic and medicine that it might seem to detract from the exceptional character of the miracles. "Something of the same effect might be produced by the gradual process of the recovery of sight by the blind man at Bethsaida as contrasted, for instance, with the case of the man or men at Jericho who immediately received their sight."

When we keep in mind one of Luke's striking traits, that which has been expressed by the German word "*Sparsamkeit*," we can understand why he avoided the selection of a number of incidents reported in this section of Mark. He was ever desirous of avoiding repetitions. Dr. Sanday (p. 25) makes a suggestion to account for this trait of Luke. He states that Luke may have been limited by the length of his roll of

papyrus. The length of a book or of the subdivision of a book was determined by the length of a roll of papyrus. It has been shown that the length of the rolls on which were written many of the ancient classics was from 24 to 28 feet. It has been calculated that the length of the text of Mark would require 19 feet of an average sized roll; John would require 23 ft. 6 in., Matt., 30 ft.; the Acts and Luke, about 31 or 32 feet respectively. The last figures are larger than those for any existing manuscripts. Doubtless Luke was pressed for space and had to economize his materials. Whatever, we can conceive, brought no new teaching was omitted. Thus we can understand why the miracle of "The Feeding of the Four Thousand" (Mk. 8: 1-9) coming so soon after that of "The Feeding of the Five Thousand" (Mark 6: 30-46) is omitted. The miracle of "Jesus Walking on the Water" (Mk. 6: 47-56) is omitted because of its similarity to the "Stilling of the Tempest" (Mk. 4: 35-41) which is recorded. Luke limits in like manner the account of miracles worked on the plain of Gennesaret (Mk. 6: 53-56), because he has preserved a somewhat similar narrative in 6: 17-19 founded on Mk. 3: 7-11. There is a like tendency to limit the amount of anti-Pharisaical material. Thus Mk. 7: 1-23 is omitted. These denunciations appear in different form in a number of other places.

The omission of the section Mk. 8: 10-21 is accounted for on the ground of one of Luke's peculiarities, his tendency "to spare the twelve"—to say comparatively little of their faults and failings. Thus Luke passes over both the prediction that they all should be offended (Mk. 14: 27, Matt. 26: 31), and the fact that after their Master's arrest they all left him and fled. He omits the attempt of Peter to "rebuke" his Master, and the stern repulse with which it was met (Mk. 8: 32 ff., Matt. 16: 22 ff.); he has no record of the ambitious request of James and John (Mk. 10: 35-45, Matt. 20: 20-28). So likewise this section (Mk. 8: 10-21) is omitted as it includes the rebuke of the disciples because of their dulness and hardness of heart.

The section lastly containing the account of the cure of the Syrophenician woman's daughter (Mk. 7: 24-30) is omitted, because the manner in which the cure of a pagan is effected is so exceptional, as to have the effect of proving the rule that the Lord was not sent forth but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel. It would seem to be repellent rather than attractive to Luke's Gentile readers, so far as it was taken as bearing on the mutual relations of Jews and Gentiles in the Christian Church. It seems probable therefore, from what we know otherwise of Luke as an author, that he was disposed to pass over the varied matter contained in this entire section (8: 45-8: 26).

The third of these limitations of Luke's use of Mark is of a different kind from the first and second which we have just noticed. In the passion narrative extending from Lk. 22: 14 to 24: 10 we find that Luke does not desert the Marcan source as in the previous case, but that he uses it with a freedom which we find nowhere else in those portions of Luke which have a Marcan basis. Hawkins (p. 78) has shown by comparing the 123 verses of Luke's Passion-narrative with the 130 verses of Matthew's parallel narrative (Matt. 26: 20-28; 28: 6) in their respective agreement with Mark that 51 per cent. of Matthew's words agree either wholly or in part with the words used in Mark, but on the other hand only 27 per cent. of Luke's words show such an agreement. That is to say, Matthew adheres to Mark's language almost twice as closely as Luke does. In the Lucan account of the ministry of Jesus, which appears to be founded on Mark, we find about the same percentage of verbal agreement with Mark as Matthew shows, viz., 51 per cent. "In other words, the verbal correspondence with the Marcan source is about twice as great in the Lucan account of the ministry as it is in the Lucan account of the passion."

But another and more remarkable distinction is found in the transposition or inversion of the material of the passion narrative. The twelve digressions from Mark's order are the following:

1. In Lk. 22: 15-23 the reference to the coming betrayal is recorded before the institution of the Lord's Supper.

2. (a) If the short Western text used by Wescott and Hort is adopted in Lk. 22: 17-20, the only cup mentioned is given before the bread at the Last Supper and not after it, as in Mk. 14: 22-24 (so Matt. 26-28).

(b) If the usual and longer text is there followed, there is a transposition of another kind, for the saying "I will not drink from henceforth," etc., in Lk. 22: 18-20 precedes, while in Mk. 14: 22-25 it follows the words of institution.

3. In Lk. 22: 21-23 the condemnation of the traitor precedes, in Mk. 14: 19-21 it follows the question of the disciples as to which of them should be the traitor.

4. In Lk. 22: 33 Peter's denial is foretold before, in Mk. 14: 29-32 after the departure from the upper room.

5. In Lk. 22: 56-71 Peter's denials are recorded before the examination by the high priest and the mockery by the soldiers there, but in Mk. 14: 55-72 after these incidents.

6. In Lk. 22: 63-71 the mockery is related before, but in Mk. 14: 55-65 after the examination.

7. In Lk. 23: 35-38, the superscription on the cross is not mentioned until after the reviling and mockery by the rulers and soldiers, in Mk. 15: 26-32 it precedes the same.

8. Mark mentions mockery from the soldiers only at an early stage of the passion (15: 16-20), referring to the *Prætorium*. Luke in 23: 36 mentions it in connection with the offering of vinegar to Jesus on the cross. He also speaks of Herod's soldiers as mocking.

9. In Lk. 23: 45 the rending of the veil is recorded before, in Mk. 15: 37 ff., after the death of Jesus.

10. The time of the request of Joseph for the body of Jesus and its burial, viz., the evening of the preparation, is only mentioned by Luke (23: 50-54) after the account of the request of Joseph and the entombment, but it is named before these incidents in Mk. 15: 42-46. In Luke the notice of the time however may have reference to the following statement about the women.

11. In Lk. 23: 56 the preparing of spices and ointments is mentioned before the Sabbath is named, and if we had no other information, we should have supposed that this work was done on the eve of the day of rest; in Mk. 16: 1 the spices are said to have been brought when the Sabbath was past. Matthew has no mention of spices or ointments.

12. Luke in 24: 1-10 does not mention the names of the women until after he has described their visit to the tomb; Mark in 16: 1-8 commences his account by naming them.

The consideration of these remarkable variations, both linguistic and in the use of material from the Gospel of Mark, call for an explanation. It is self-evident that these variations were the result of reliance upon oral rather than upon written tradition. We cannot imagine a copyist consciously or unconsciously making so many digressions. It is inconceivable that any original source ever existed to which Luke was indebted for the form of his passion narrative. By what process then, we ask, did the passion narrative of Luke assume its present form. Hawkins makes a suggestion which seems to account satisfactorily for all the facts involved (p. 90 ff.). Luke was a disciple of and a fellow-worker with St. Paul. He must have been a preacher of Christianity after the Pauline type, and must have been mainly occupied with the Pauline range of subjects. We know from the extant epistles of Paul and from the account of his preaching in Acts that there is a remarkable coincidence between the Pauline conception of the passion and the passion narrative of Luke. Paul, as far as we know, seldom quoted teachings of Jesus or related His miracles. The Cross and the Resurrection were the great themes. Paul and Luke must have frequently therefore proclaimed the facts of the passion, and when Luke came to write this part of his Gospel, he relied upon his memory to reproduce the familiar story, rather than upon written sources, with the result that his narrative showed the very variations which we might expect under these circumstances.

But, besides the Gospel of Mark, Luke used two additional

sources: an early document commonly called "Q," which contained the matter common to Luke and Matthew, and (as some suppose, although this is questioned by others) of which Mark was ignorant; and lastly special written memoirs, in which were included the matter peculiar to Luke.

Concerning the substance and extent of the rather elusive document called Q, we cannot speak at length in this connection. It is formulated differently by various scholars and the character which this document is made to assume is due, we cannot help but feel, to no little extent in each case to the theological prepossessions of the writer.

A school of critics represented by Harnack⁴ and Sanday⁵ defines this Q source of Luke as being practically identical with the source employed by Matthew. Another school represented by J. Weiss, Dr. V. H. Stanton, Dr. Bartlet, and Dr. Allen⁶ conceives the Q source of Luke as being different from Matthew and containing imbedded in it the special narratives peculiar to Luke.

We prefer the position of the first school as being on the whole more satisfactory and the explanations more simple. We cannot enter here upon an explanation of how the substance of Q assumed a slightly different complexion in the narratives of Matthew and Luke.

Concerning the character of the special sources we may refer to Harnack's suggestion⁷ that the special information of Luke was derived from Philip and his prophesying daughters. Luke met Philip and his daughters at Cæsarea⁸ and probably later in Asia. Papias, who himself saw the daughters, expressly states that they transmitted stories of the old days.⁹

This view is rather substantiated when we remember how

⁴ *Luke the Physician*, p. 128.

⁵ *Oxford Studies*, p. xxiii.

⁶ The last two in *Oxford Studies*.

⁷ *Luke the Physician*, pp. 153 ff.

⁸ Acts 21: 9.

⁹ Eusebius, *H. E.*, III, 39, 9.

large a part of the matter peculiar to this gospel deals with the feminine element. In his "Commentary on Luke" Plummer states:¹⁰ "It is a detail, but an important one, in the universality of the Third Gospel, that it is in an especial sense the Gospel for women." All through this gospel they hold a prominent place, Elizabeth, the Virgin Mary, the prophetess Anna, the widow at Nain, the nameless sinner in the house of Simon, Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Susanna, the woman with an issue, Martha and Mary, the widow with the two mites, the "daughters of Jerusalem," and the women at the tomb are all given a prominent place for the first time by Luke. Prophesying is the gift of some of these women. Elizabeth and Hanna and the women are the first evangelists of our Lord's resurrection, according to Luke 24:10. When we remember that another collection of stories in Luke is distinguished by the interest shown in the Samaritans, villages of Samaria in which the Gospel was preached are mentioned only in Luke (9:52-56 and Acts 8:25) and that Philip's great achievement was the evangelization of Samaria (Acts 8:14), "it seems probable that we have here a body of tradition which rests upon the authority of St. Philip and his daughters."

Harnack speaks slightly of this element in our gospel. He says: "Its authenticity is almost entirely dubious and it must be described as for the most part legendary." It is here that we dissent from Harnack's judgment. The unique charm of the Gospel of Luke is the presence of the prophetic element in his feminine characters. A highly poetical form of literature is not necessarily unhistorical. No one could have composed the Magnificat as a work of pure fiction. We prefer to say with Plummer, "Nothing that has come down to us of that age leads us to suppose that any writer could have composed these accounts without historic truth to guide him, any more than an architect of that age could have produced the Milan cathedral."

READING, PA.

¹⁰ Intro., pp. xlii ff.

VII.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

From Plato's *Republic* to the middle of the nineteenth century the world's social utopias, whether French, English, German, Italian, Greek or Roman in conception and national coloring, were predominantly communistic in character. Those of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth clearly reflect the marked change of interest from communism to socialism and anarchism as schemes of social reform. To be sure, communism lends itself more readily to utopian treatment than either socialism or anarchism; for it usually springs from a spiritual enthusiasm, which, while very sure of its end, feels little concern for the means of attaining a proposed end; nor have its speculative and idealistic tendencies suffered any material check through the various experiments in practical communism which were inaugurated in the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the United States. Socialism and anarchism, on the other hand, despite the fact that they have never been tried anywhere, have hewn closer to the line of feasibility. The further fact that they stand for governmental enterprise on a colossal scale, in the one case, and the abolition of all government, in the other, has compelled them to take serious account of the question of means. And, again, inasmuch as both socialism and anarchism at least profess to be based upon a scientific analysis of forces now at work in society, not only have they been less favorable to ideal schemes of social regeneration, but for a time their influence appears to have completely suppressed all social speculation of a utopian character. This was the case when the European revolutions of 1848 promised a speedy realization

of the world's hopes of a radical transformation of human society politically and industrially. Men were then engrossed with the prospect of an immediate social betterment. A better social order seemed within their grasp, and they left off dreaming. Until well into the ninth decade of the century no utopias of importance made their appearance, and until the beginning of the eighth there were none at all. But with the complete subsidence of the revolutionary uprisings leaving no tangible results in the way of social betterment, men began to realize that their hopes had been premature and that the changes which they had so confidently regarded as impending were still far off. And as the prospect of social regeneration grew dimmer hope gave way to despair, and men took once more to dreaming of the time when "all would be better than well." The consequence was a new wave of social utopias, which set in a quarter of a century ago, and which has not yet exhausted itself.

These recent utopias may be divided into four classes:

a. Socialistic utopias, represented by Rossi's *Un Commune Socialista* (1884), and Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888) and its sequel, *Equality* (1897). The first bases its socialism on contract, the other two on the state.

b. Anarchistic utopias, of which Morris's *News from Nowhere* (1890) and Bode's *Indivi* (1892) are the best representatives, the one representing communistic anarchism, and the other anarchism of the individualistic type.

c. Coöperative utopias, based on the principle of individualistic coöperation, and represented by Hertzka's *Freiland* (1891); *Reise nach Freiland* (1894), *Entrückt in die Zukunft* (1895); Secretan's *Mon Utopie* (1892); and Flürscheim's *Money Island* (1896).

d. Scientific utopias, which utilize modern scientific and technical discoveries in the construction of ideal societies, and which are transitional between full-fledged utopianism on the one side and scientific socialism and anarchism on the other. Representatives of this class are Lytton's *The Coming Race*

(1871); and Wells' *Anticipations* (1901), *A Modern Utopia* (1905), and *New Worlds for Old* (1908).

The best known of socialistic utopias is *Looking Backward*, to which belongs the distinction of being the first American utopia. Its author, Edward Bellamy (1850-1898), was a native of Massachusetts, who, after completing his education in Germany, returned to the United States and was admitted to the bar. Having no taste for the practice of law he soon drifted into journalism. Besides writing for various newspapers he was for a time an associate editor of the Springfield (Mass.) *Union* and later an editorial writer for the New York *Evening Post*. His first ventures in the field of pure literature were four novelettes, all of them dreamy fantastic romances, which attracted no attention, although not without merit in the judgment of competent critics. William D. Howells was so impressed by their power that he declared that "the mantle of Hawthorne has fallen upon Mr. Bellamy." Then came *Looking Backward*, which was first published in 1888, and which again attracted little attention at first, though highly commended by the critics. It was not long, however, before it began to sell rapidly, owing in part at least to a marked revival of interest in social problems which its earnest spirit materially abetted. For a time it was the talk of the hour both in Europe and in America. In the United States alone 500,000 copies have been sold. It has also been translated into most of the European languages.

The book had its origin in the purpose of the author to write a fairy tale of social felicity which should picture an ideal humanity organized in a world-state. At the time he conceived his dream Bellamy, as he himself tells us, had no particular sympathy with projects for social or industrial reform, not that he was indifferent to the miserable condition of the mass of humanity, but because a more or less clear recognition of the depth and depth of the social problem and the utter inadequacy of proposed solutions had made him a thorough skeptic. The idea of applying to the problem of industry the

principles of military organization and discipline was suggested by the existing military establishments of Europe. More and more it was borne in upon him, as a result of his residence in Germany, that if the organization of an entire people on the basis of universal service for fixed and equal terms is the only just and efficient system of public defense, it must be also the most just and efficient system for the business of production. It was Bellamy's original purpose to locate his picture of an ideal humanity in the thirtieth century. But as he worked out the details of his scheme he became more and more impressed with the real virtue and potency of its governing principle. He recognized in the modern military system as he had not done before, "not merely a rhetorical analogy for a national industrial service, but its prototype, furnishing at once a complete working model for its organization, an arsenal of patriotic and national motives and arguments for its animation, and the unanswerable demonstration of its feasibility drawn from the actual experience of whole nations organized and manœvered as armies." This idea led him to a complete recasting of the work. His purpose was no longer to picture a "cloud-palace for an ideal humanity" but rather the portrayal of a thing of beneficent and immediate possibilities. So impressed was he with the feasibility of his scheme that he placed its complete realization in the twentieth century instead of the thirtieth. He retained, however, its original romance form in order to secure a wider hearing for his ideas.

Looking Backward is in form the personal narrative of one Julian West, a young man of wealth and culture living in Boston, who because of chronic insomnia was accustomed to sleep in an underground stone chamber. When this seclusion from the noises of the street failed to bring sleep, as frequently happened, he sometimes called in a professional mesmerizer to put him into an hypnotic trance. This was the case on the night of May 30, 1887. That night the house was completely destroyed by fire. The remains of Mr. West's valet, who

knew how to resuscitate his master at a fixed time, were discovered in the ruins. The mesmerizer had left Boston that very night to locate in a distant city. No other besides these two knew the secret of the underground chamber, which, buried in ashes and debris, remained undiscovered until 113 years later, when a body of laborers engaged in digging the foundations of a new building brought it to light. Its sleeping occupant was resuscitated and introduced at a single bound into the midst of a marvellous social order, which had completely established itself during his long sleep, and which he proceeds to describe as it slowly reveals itself to him either through his own observations or the explanations of others.

The manner of the transformation from the civilization of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth is quite in accord with the principles of evolutionary socialism. The progressive absorption of industry by increasingly larger combinations of capital, which was the most distinctive industrial feature of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had persisted until every industry had fallen under the absolute control of a few powerful syndicates. These syndicates had not only throttled competition and fixed prices at their pleasure, but they had also clearly demonstrated the superior efficiency of industry conducted on a large scale, under consolidated management, and without the wastes inseparable from the competitive principle. To be sure, the benefits of this increased efficiency had gone mainly to the rich and had served only to widen the gap between rich and poor. To secure still greater efficiency, and at the same time avoid the accumulated evils of an inequitable distribution of wealth, it was only necessary, so the social renovators of that day reasoned, to carry the process of combination one step further by consolidating the entire capital of the nation, and placing it in the hands of a single syndicate representative of the people to be used in the common interest. When this was finally accomplished, as it was without violence or revolution, the era of trusts had ended in The Great Trust. The nation organ-

ized as a gigantic business corporation had become the sole employer and capitalist, and had superseded the many irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons who conducted business at their caprice and solely for their own profit. That the transition from the old to the new order was not attended with violence was due to the gradual enlightenment of public opinion, which, when it once recognized the great advantages of consolidation and the real significance of the era of trusts and syndicates as a necessary step in the evolution of the true industrial system, inevitably led the people to the point where they resolved to assume control of their own business; and when public opinion was once brought to this point opposition to the change on the part of the small class of beneficiaries under the old order of things would have been futile. No change in human nature was required either to establish or maintain the new social order. The only change needed was a change in the conditions of human life and the motives of human action. Unlike the old system, which places officials under a constant temptation to misuse their power for the private benefit of themselves or others, the new system by touching the nobler springs of human character and action rendered greed and selfishness motiveless.

The nation, having assumed the responsibilities of capital by taking over the ownership of all the means of production and the conduct of all industry, is the sole employer, and all the citizens are by virtue of their citizenship its employees. These employees are organized and disciplined after the manner of the military establishments of the nineteenth century. As it was then the duty of every citizen not mentally or physically incapacitated to contribute his military services to the defense of the nation, so now it is equally the duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of intellectual or industrial services to the maintenance of the nation. The period of industrial service is twenty-four years, extending from the age of twenty-one to forty-five. The years before twenty-one are given to education. There is no child labor problem,

therefore, to vex the nation. The period after forty-five is designed for culture and recreation. In cases of industrial emergency, however, arising from sudden and great increases in the demand for labor, the citizen remains liable to special calls ten years longer. The 15th day of October is the great day of the year. It is known as Muster Day when those who have reached the age of twenty-one are mustered into the industrial army and those who have completed their period of industrial service are honorably mustered out.

The problem of properly apportioning the labor force of a nation among the various industries has proved a troublesome one for modern socialism. But in *Looking Backward* the process is simple in the extreme. Each one is free to choose that particular trade for which he is best fitted by his natural aptitudes. It is only in this way that his service will be most profitable to the nation as well as most satisfactory to himself. To this end teachers and parents are under obligation to watch indications of special aptitudes in children in order that a wise choice may be made. And, furthermore, the rudiments of all the principal trades are taught in the schools, which greatly aids each one to find himself industrially; and the consequence is that the trade has usually been selected long before the close of the period of education. It is necessary of course that the supply of volunteers in each trade be adjusted in some way to the demand. This is accomplished through the principle of relative advantage. When the supply exceeds the demand in a given trade the inference is that that trade offers greater attractions than others. Its attractions are diminished, therefore, and in the reverse case where the supply of volunteers falls short of the demand the attractions are increased, until all trades are equally attractive to persons having natural aptitudes for them. This equalization is made possible by adjusting the hours of labor to the degree of attractiveness, so that fewer hours are required for a day's labor in the more arduous trades and more hours in the less arduous ones. The adjustment is not, however, determined

in accordance with any *a priori* principle, but simply follows the fluctuations of opinion among the workers themselves as these are indicated by the rate of volunteering. While no precaution known to modern science and calculated to secure the health and safety of the laborer is neglected, yet if there is any industry, which, because of unavoidable difficulties and dangers, should fail to command any volunteers, no matter to what extent the hours of labor should be reduced, it would only be necessary, in order to secure an overplus of volunteers, to take such trade out of the common order of occupations by declaring it "extra-hazardous" and those who pursued it especially worthy of the national gratitude. If, on the other hand, the supply of volunteers should exceed the demand in a given trade, despite all reasonable attempts at equalization, preference would be given those who had acquired the most knowledge of the trade in question, and the others would be assigned to their second or third choice of occupation. This principle of second and third choices is important in view of the constant necessity of readjusting supply and demand promptly by transferring laborers from one part of the industrial field to another. Such necessity might arise in various ways through a sudden failure of volunteers, a sudden need for an increased force of volunteers, unforeseen changes resulting from the progress of invention, changes in the relative demands for various commodities.

The problem of securing an adequate supply of unskilled or common labor, another difficult point with modern socialism, is solved by the simple device of requiring from all that the first three years of their period of service be given to that kind of labor. This is a time of severe discipline when young men are taught habits of obedience, subordination and devotion to duty. Every form of excellence receives some distinction, and every piece of negligence incurs a penalty. In this period, too, the laborer may be assigned to any work at the discretion of his superiors; and it is only at the end of the three years that he makes his formal choice of occupation.

Should he have no choice then, or be so stupid as to be unfitted for any trade, he would remain permanently in the ranks of unskilled labor. The choice of a trade is not necessarily final. While frequent and capricious changes are discouraged it is permissible under certain conditions to volunteer for another occupation on the same terms as before. Professions are chosen in the same way as trades, with this difference, however, that the opportunity for a professional training remains open until the age of thirty. To permit any one to enter a professional school after that age would leave too brief a period of service before the age of discharge. When any one finds himself unable to meet the severe requirements of the professional schools it is evidence that he has mistaken his vocation, and he is forthwith returned to the industrial service.

Having served three years in the ranks of unskilled labor, the young man enters the trade which he has selected, or which has been selected for him, as an apprentice. At the end of his apprenticeship he becomes a full workman and a member of his trade guild. Here again, as in the case of unskilled labor, detailed individual records are kept to indicate ability and industry, on the basis of which distinctions and penalties are meted out, and the standing of each workman determined. In each trade the workers are divided into three grades on the basis of merit; and in the larger ones these grades are again divided into first and second classes. The grade to which the full workman is assigned is determined in the first instance by his general record as an apprentice. Then at periodic intervals there is a regrading in which each one's standing is determined by his record in the preceding period. The results of each regrading are gazetted in the public prints, and those workmen who have succeeded in winning promotion receive the nation's thanks and are publicly invested with the badge of their new rank. Each industry has its distinctive style of badge which is the same in form for all grades. The only distinction between the badges of the several grades is in the material from which they are made,

that of the third grade being of iron, the second of silver and the first of gold. For excellence less than sufficient for promotion, and also for special feats and single performances, honorable mention and various sorts of prizes are awarded. Then there are also in the highest grade certain immunities with respect to discipline, and certain special privileges, among them that of electing a particular branch of a trade to be followed as a specialty. The entire system of grades and preferments is based on the principle that no form of merit shall wholly fail of recognition. On the other hand, if any one persistently refuses to render any service, though able to do so, he is sentenced to solitary imprisonment until he is ready to do his part. When a workman becomes an officer his rating is no longer determined by his work, but by the work of the men under him. He has every inducement, therefore, to hold every one subject to his orders to his full duty. And doing one's full duty means simply doing the best that he can. Those who do their best are equally deserving, regardless of what they accomplish. This is fundamental. It is to be emphasized, however, that a man's livelihood is in no sense dependent on his rating. Those who are too infirm in body or in mind to do much are organized into an invalid corps, and assigned tasks fitted to their strength. They do what they can, but whatever they do they receive the same income as those who are able.

Above the several grades of privates found in every industry are the various orders of officers: first, lieutenants or assistant foremen; then, captains or foremen, colonels or superintendents, major-generals or heads of guilds, under whose immediate direction all the operations of particular trades throughout the nation are conducted, lieutenant-generals or heads of the ten great departments into which all industry is divided; and, finally, the general-in-chief, who is the President of the United States, and who must have passed through all the lower grades of the industrial system, including that of unskilled labor. Promotion from the rank of private to that of officer,

or from one inferior grade of officer to another, is by appointment from above, and is strictly limited to those having the best records. The general of the guild makes all appointments to all the grades below his own, but he is himself chosen from the superintendents by the vote of those who have served their time in the guild and received their discharge at forty-five, and who are known as honorary members of their respective guilds. The active members of the guilds have no voice whatever in the election of their chiefs. The heads of departments are in like fashion elected from the heads of guilds by vote of the honorary members of all the guilds in their departments. The President of the United States is chosen by all the men of the nation not connected with the industrial army from former heads of departments who have been in retirement for a certain number of years. The purpose of this hiatus in service is to enable these former heads of departments to reach broader views, and approach industrial questions from the viewpoint of the entire nation rather than from that of the industrial army or particular parts of it. The President is usually about fifty years of age when elected, and serves five years. He is an honorable exception, therefore, to the rule of retirement at forty-five. At the end of his term of service a national congress is called to receive his report and express its approval or condemnation of what he has done. If his work meets with the approval of Congress he is usually elected by that body to represent the nation for another period of five years in the International Council, which exercises advisory powers over the nations which have adopted socialism, and which have organized themselves into a loose federation to promote their common ends. Congress also passes on the reports of the outgoing heads of departments and again approves or disapproves. The effect of a verdict of disapproval is to render the department head against whom it is entered forever ineligible to the office of President. The whole governing system is designed to afford every recognition to merit as a means of securing for the nation the highest talent and effort

in every walk of life. The tests by which a man rises are so various and severe that only those of exceptional qualities can hope to reach positions of responsibility. And to attain such positions he needs above all else the esteem of his fellows. There is every inducement, therefore, to faithfulness. Corruption is impossible for there is neither poverty to bribe nor wealth to bribe with. Intrigue for office is equally out of the question because the conditions of promotion are based entirely upon merit.

The liberal professions are not an integral part of the industrial army, and their members, while vested with the duty of electing the President, are not themselves eligible to that office. The reason for their ineligibility is that since the chief duty of the President is to exercise a general supervision over all industry, it is essential that he should have passed through all the grades of the industrial system. Each profession has its guild, the government of which is vested in a board of regents chosen by the honorary members of the guild and responsible to Congress. The President is *ex-officio* chairman of the several boards of regents, and has a casting vote at their meetings. While the nobler minds have less need of such special incentives as prizes and honors, which are so necessary to call out the best endeavors of the average man, the professions are not without their decorations and distinctions to indicate the honor in which their members are held by their fellows and by the nation. Membership in the various literary, art and scientific societies is greatly prized. But the highest honor that can come to a member of a liberal profession is the red ribbon which is bestowed by vote of the people upon the great authors, artists, engineers, physicians and inventors. A lesser degree of excellence is indicated by a blue ribbon.

The radical change which was inaugurated in the system of production when the nation was made the sole producer necessitated no less radical changes in the conditions of exchange and distribution. In fact there is no exchange at all, as that term is understood in competitive systems of industry with all

its vast and complicated mechanism of banks, money, credit, middlemen. Exchanges between individuals, while not impossible, are unnecessary. Every one works for the nation, and gets what he wants from the national warehouses through a system of direct distribution. Goods are delivered to the consumer from these warehouses on orders of the stores, which are distributed over the territory of a town or city in such numbers that no one is required to go more than three or four squares to reach one. These stores do not have goods for sale, but merely keep samples of all the different kinds of commodities made or imported by the nation; and from these samples, with the help of cards attached to them and containing their prices and brief descriptions of their qualities, the shopper is enabled to make an intelligent and convenient choice. There is no advertising of goods in newspapers or shop windows or by commercial travellers; and the sole function of the store is to take and transmit orders.

Each one's purchasing power, if it can be so called, is measured by the amount of his credit, which represents his share of the national income, and which is given to every citizen on the public books at the beginning of each year. By means of a card which indicates the amount of his credit he can procure whatever he desires whenever he desires it to the extent of his credit. These credit cards are reckoned in dollars and cents which are but algebraic symbols, since money is no longer in actual use. Such credit, being purely personal in character, is not transferable, save in exceptional instances, and only after the proper authority has inquired into all the circumstances to determine its equity. Ordinarily there is no occasion for any transfer of credit. Gifts might conceivably be exchanged between relatives and friends, but there cannot possibly be any buying and selling between individuals. These are inherently anti-social, being absolutely inconsistent with that mutual benevolence and disinterestedness and community of interest which ought to prevail among the citizens of a free

and enlightened commonwealth. If any one is under the necessity of exhausting his credit before the end of the year through extraordinary expenditures, he may obtain a limited advance on his next year's credit. But this is not encouraged, and a heavy discount is charged to keep it within narrow limits. An unexpended balance at the end of the year is ordinarily turned into the general surplus on the presumption that it was not needed. But in particular instances, again, where a special outlay is anticipated of which due notice has been given to the proper authority, such balances are permitted to accumulate to a certain extent. There is, therefore, no incentive to thrift which is so important a consideration in a competitive system of industry; nor is there need of any, since the nation guarantees the nurture, education and comfortable maintenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave, so that no one need have any care for the morrow, either for himself or for his children. Each one's credit ceases at death with a fixed allowance for funeral expenses; and what he has accumulated during his lifetime he disposes of as he pleases. This will be limited in amount for the reason that land and capital are not subject to private ownership, while accumulations of personal property become burdensome the moment they exceed the demands of comfort. To provide the room and personal attention necessary to their care will only deplete their owner's credit without any commensurate advantage. For similar reasons his heirs and legatees will accept no more than they can use or give away, resigning the rest. The resigned chattels are taken over by the nation, and whatever is of value is turned once more into the common stock.

The principle according to which the national income is divided among the body of citizens is that of absolute equality. Each one's title to an equal share of the national income is based on the fact that he is a man; and all that is required of him is that he do his best. Those who do their best are equally deserving, regardless of the results of their labor. The amount

of work done is a mechanical thing and cannot measure desert which is a moral quality. It may have some bearing upon social distinction and official power, but these are determined primarily by diligence and faithfulness. The degree in which one does his best, if the expression is permissible—the author is not altogether logical at this point—indicates his social rating, but does not determine his share of the national income.

LANCASTER, PA.

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

AS OTHERS SAW US IN THE MAGAZINES 1840-1860.

A LIST OF TITLES AND BOOK NOTICES RELATING TO THE
REFORMED CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, APPEARING
IN PUBLICATIONS NOT ISSUED BY THAT CHURCH.

The following list of titles of articles, of book notices, and quotations was gathered for the purpose of studying the outside sources of information concerning the Reformed Church. For the magazines covered, it aims at completeness between the years of 1840 and 1860, but contains a number of articles before and after those dates. Because of the great variety of sources consulted, the confusing number of series in certain publications, and their change of names, there is no attempt made to keep the form of page, volume, or year references uniform, but simply to avoid confusion on the part of those consulting them. Many of the references will seem very brief and trifling, but some of the shortest ones tell the most pointed stories, so all that were found were included.

American Catholic Quarterly:

Wolff, G. D., "Mercersburg Movement, The," III, 151.

American Presbyterian Review:

Harbaugh, H., "Schlatter, Michael, Life of," 1857, VI, 171.

"True Glory of Woman," 1859, VII, 157.

"Union with the Church," 1857, V, 696.

Nevin, Alfred, "Guide to the Oracles," 1858, VI, 694.

Nevin, J. W., "Mystical Presence," 1854, II, 663.

Rauch, F. A., "Inner Life of the Christian," 1857, V, 520.

American Quarterly Church Review—See *Church Review*.

American Quarterly Register:

Lancaster, Pa., Academy, May, 1833, 314.

Marshall College, February, 1839, 334.

Mercersburg Theological Seminary, do.

"Ministers of the Reformed Church in France, List of," from
Boston Recorder, August, 1835, VIII, 69.

"Reformed Church in the United States," I, 197; II, 182;
III, 251; IV, 226 (containing Dr. Mayer's estimate
of the strength of the Church), February, 1832; V,
317; VI, 201.

"Theological Seminaries of the Reformed Church in the United States," I, 121, 234 (giving curriculum); III, 306 (death of David Young in Georgia); V, 317; XI, 334.—Most of the references from this magazine are of but a few lines each, but have an interesting series of facts. The last one reads: "Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pa., Rev. Lewis Mayer, Senior Professor, Founded 1825—The students are all in the Junior Class and number nine." (Quoted in full.)

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- Schaff, P., "America," review, Vol. XIII, January, 1856, 217-8.
- "Brethren of Christ, The," Vol. XXI, 1864, 855-869.
- "John Calvin," Vol. XIV, January, 1857, 125-146, review of Bonnett's "Letters of J. Calvin."
- "Church History," noticed, Vol. XVI, April, 1859, 454-6.
- "The Conflict of Trinitarianism and Unitarianism in the Anti-Nicene Age," Vol. XV, October, 1858, 726-744.
- "Constantine the Great and the Downfall of Paganism in the Roman Empire" (review of Burkhardt's work). Vol. XX, October, 1863, 778-798.
- "General Introduction to Church History," Vol. VI, August, 1849, 404, 409-441.
- "German Literature in America," Vol. IV, August, 1847, 503-521.
- "History of the Christian Church," notices, Vol. XXIV, 1867, 397-8.
- "Hymn Book" noticed, Vol. XVII, 1860, 233-4.
- "Kirchengeschichte," Vol. IX, January, 1852, 223-4.
- "Progress of Church History as a Science, The," Vol. VII, January, 1850, 54-91.
- "Rise and Progress of Monasticism," Vol. XXI, April, 1864, 384-424.
- "Tercentenary Jubilee of the Heidelberg Catechism," Vol. XX, July, 1863, 670-75. Bibliography, 674-5.
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- "Theological Schools in the United States, Enrollment," Vol. VIII, April, 1851, 458, July, 1851, 666.
- Williard, G. W., "Translation of Ursinus' Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism," Vol. X, April, 1853, 418.

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- Schaff, P., "Catechism for the Sunday-school and the Family," noticed, Vol. III, January, 1863, 111-2.
- "The Person of Christ," noticed, Vol. V, September, 1865, 515.

Boston Quarterly Review:

- Rauch's "Psychology," 2d ed., Vol. V, April, 1842, 254. A most appreciative comment in which the author says he had not seen the first edition, also that he purposes to return to the volume in a later issue, but this

was the last volume of the magazine. A number of editors promised such returns about the same time, but failed to keep their promises.

Brownson's Quarterly Review:

"The Church an Organism," January, 1858, 102-127. See pp. 112 sq.

"Mercersburg Hypothesis," XI, 253.

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"Mercersburg Theology," VII, 1850, 353.

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"Mercersburg Philosophy," V, 253.

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"Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund," noticed, May, 1848, 467-9.

"History of the Apostolic Church," noticed, 1854, 155.

"Life and Labors of Augustine," noticed, 1854, 461.

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Harbaugh, H., "Heaven and Heavenly Recognition," XI, April, 1858, 162-3.

Kœppen, A. L., "The World in the Middle Ages," VII, January, 1855, 620-21.

Mercersburg Review, IV, July, 1851, 303.

Mercersburg Review, V, October, 1852, 460. This notice begins thus: "We have for years spoken of this work in a tone of caution. . . ."

Nevin, J. W., "Antichrist," I, October, 1848, 456.

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 "History and Mercersburg Theology," October, 1859, 369-386.
 "Life and Labors of St. Augustine," April, 1854, 134.
 "What is Church History?" April, 1850, 137-138.

Congregational Quarterly:

- "Ecclesiastical Statistics, German Reformed," Vol. II, April, 1860, 222.

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- "Schaff's Church History," Vols. I and III, reviewed; Vol. VII, July, 1867, 468.

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- Schaff, P., with portrait, LXXXVII, 504.

Evangelical Quarterly Review:

- "Church Question, The," Vol. II, 58.

Littell's Living Age:

- "Schaff's Recollections of Neander," translation from Schaff's "Kirchenfreund," XXX, 163-169.

Lutheran Quarterly:

- "Mercersburg Theology,—an Explanation," J. A. Brown, IV, 443.
 "Schneck's Mercersburg Theology," reviewed by J. A. Brown, IV, 251.

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- "Berlin Conference of 1857, The," July, 1858, 427; October, 1858, 538.
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 Harbaugh, H., "Heavenly Recognition," notice, January, 1852, 154.
 Kœppen, A. L., "The World in the Middle Ages," April, 1855, 320-1.
 "Lives and Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church," April, 1861, 329.
 Mayer, L., "History of the Reformed Church," I, July, 1851, 50.
 Nevin, J. W., "Antichrist," October, 1848, 638. This notice pays a personal tribute to Dr. Nevin.
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- "English University Life and University Reform," April, 1856, 270.
- "Germany," July, 1858, 503-4.
- "Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche," July, 1851, 490-1.
- "Government and Discipline of the Apostolic Church, The," 1853, 429, 574.
- "History of the Apostolic Church," noticed, July, 1854, 477-8.
- "History of the Apostolic Church," reference to, April, 1856, 291-2.
- "History of the Christian Church," January, 1859, 160-1.
- "Leo the Great and the Papacy of the 5th and 6th Centuries," October, 1864, 574.
- "Methodism, Dr. Schaff and," July, 1857, 428-436. A criticism by Wm. Nast which leads to considerable bitterness on both sides. Reference is made to the second number of Schaff's "Kirchenfreund." Cf. Schaff's "America," above.
- "Neander's Life of Christ," reviewed by Schaff, April, 1848, 248-268.
- "Oldest Opposition to Christianity and its Defense, The," October, 1858, 605-624. Review of W. J. Bolton's "Evidences of Christianity."
- "Preparation for Christianity in the History of the World, A Proof of its Divine Origin," Vol. I, 4th series, pp. 429, 552.
- "Saints of the Desert, St. Anthony of Egypt and Symeon the Stylite," 1864, 29.
- "Schaff in America," April, 1857, 296.
- "Synopsis of the Quarterlies." In each number the REVIEW is mentioned with special notices as follows:
- "Position Defined," April, 1857, 299.
- Brownson's Quarterly for January, 1858, 136, quoted on Nevin's position on the Church question, April, 1858, 306.
- Criticism on "Churchly," July, 1858, 478.

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- Nevin, J. W., "Apostle's Creed, Its Origin and Plan," noticed, VII, 487.
- "Mystical Presence," noticed, IV, 592.
- Rauch, F. A., "Inner Life of the Christian, The," noticed, XV, 337.
- "Psychology," noticed, I, 297.

- Schaff, P., "Church History," reviewed by Leonard Bacon, XII, 237; noticed, XII, 176, XVI, 186.
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 History of the German Reformed Church, Chambersburg, Pa., also a sermon on the covenant and its blessings, Rev. W. Wilson Bonnell, XVI, 603.
 Infant Baptism, the distinctive doctrine of the Reformed Church, 373; criticism of an article in the Mercersburg Review on efficacy of, 374; doctrine of Lutherans and Romanists, 378.
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- Mercersburg [Presbyterian Church history of, XVIII, 474], on Roman Theology, XXIV, 132; on the efficacy of baptism, XXX, 374; on the Christological ideas of Hegel, XXXII, 123; on our relation to Adam, 132.
- Nevin, J. W., "Age Question, The, a Plea for Christian Union," XL, 655.
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- "Antichrist," XX, 627.
- "Anxious Bench, The," XVI, 137.
- "Discourse on the Church," reviewed, XIX, 301; View of Heidelberg Catechism, XXIV, 114; 80th question, 121; reply, 126.
- "Inaugural Address at Mercersburg," XII, 459.
- "Mystical Presence of Christ in the Holy Eucharist, view of Nevin," XX, 227; System of Schleiermacher, XXXII, 125.
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- "Dr. Nevin and Church Reform in Germany," V, 636.
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Nevin, J. W., "Antichrist," VI, 272.

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CLAYTON HAVERSTICK RANCK.

THE EISENACH GOSPEL SELECTIONS MADE READY FOR PULPIT WORK. By R. C. H. Lenski. Two Volumes bound in one. Vol. I. Advent Sunday to Trinity Sunday. Pages 664. Vol. II. First Sunday After Trinity to Thanksgiving. Pages 451. 1910. Lutheran Book Concern, Columbus, Ohio.

The traditional selection of gospel and epistle lessons, which was accepted with some changes by the Reformers from the Catholic Church, has been considered unsatisfactory. One of the chief reasons is that the lessons present a disconnected and fragmentary view of the Scriptures. The omission from the original series of the texts for Wednesday and Friday widens the gap between the pericopes of the succeeding Sundays and, also, accounts for the fact that many choice sections of the Bible do not now appear in the old series.

To remedy this and other defects the leaders of the different state churches of Germany have published new pericopal selections. Among these are the selection of Weimar, 1825, of Baden, 1857, of Saxony, 1840-42, of Hamburg, 1843, of Rheinpreussen, 1846, and of the Conference of Eisenach, 1897. The last of this series is probably the most satisfactory and has been chosen by the author of these volumes for exposition. Whatever one may think about the relative merits of the traditional and of the modern selection, one will welcome, in the interest of variety and breadth of view, this truly monumental treatise of a new series of lessons adapted to the church year.

The author is a Lutheran pastor and expounds the Scriptures from a conservative Lutheran point of view. He has "undertaken to work out the *Eisenach Gospel Selections* in a way to meet as fully as possible the necessities and requirements of the Lutheran pulpit worker of to-day. He has handled these and other newer series of texts for some years in his own pulpit work, and his pleasure and profit have grown steadily."

According to the Eisenach Selections the year is divided into six cycles, extending from the Christmas to the Trinity cycle. Each cycle is complete in itself and is, also, an advance, in the unfolding of the plan of redemption, upon the preceding cycle. In a general introduction to each cycle the author discusses the formative ideas which run through all the lessons. Each lesson is then exegetically and homiletically expounded, closing with a series of eight to twelve themes with outlines for sermons. About

18 pages are given to each lesson. In the words of the Introduction, "An exegesis of the text is presented as thorough and sound—with a constant eye to the pulpit—as the author is able to furnish. He has embodied in it a multitude of the *gems of Lutheran expositors and preachers*. They will stimulate thought, suggest lines of treatment, and many of them—like those from Luther—will bear direct quotation in the sermon. *The Lutheran Confessions* have been used to a considerable extent for the same purpose. They are a store-house, full of rich treasures for the pulpit worker—a store-house, sad to say, untouched by many. *A little spiritual food for the preacher's own soul* has been introduced here and there as occasion offered. We preachers all need it. In the Homiletical Hints *suggestive thoughts, illustrative matter*, and other good things have been gathered. And finally for each text a series of *sermon outlines* has been added."

The author, who apparently is a busy Lutheran pastor, deserves to be congratulated upon the completion of so ponderous a work, covering about eleven hundred pages. We are sure that both he and his congregations were enriched by his patient and exact studies. In this country expositions of the pericopes are so rare that preachers will welcome this addition to the exegetical and homiletical literature. The book will appeal especially to the ministry of the churches which follow the order of the church year—the Lutheran, the Reformed, the Moravian, the Episcopalian. There is a growing tendency in the other churches to make use of the pericopal lessons as at least one rational plan for expounding the great facts and ideals of the kingdom of God. Even Congregationalists, Methodists and Baptists may find a work of this kind helpful.

We should prefer the expositions to be briefer. The size of the work is both its strength and its weakness. We are waiting for a short volume on the pericopes in which the genetic relations between the several cycles of the church year, between the gospels and epistles from Sunday to Sunday, and between the gospel and epistle of each Sunday are clearly and concisely presented. In addition to this a page or two of suggestive hints for the preacher would suffice. So much of the material in Nebe's work or in this book can be found in the current exegetical and homiletical commentaries. An exposition of the pericopal lessons should confine itself more directly to the relation of the specific season to the lesson and of the several lessons to one another.

The author confines himself more closely to Lutheran sources than the general reader may desire. This too is an element of strength and weakness. It will be lauded by the Lutherans; it may be regretted by American protestants generally. Of course no room is given to the critical and historical interpretation of the Scriptures. The modern note is lacking. The Lutheran con-

fessions are accepted as the standard of orthodoxy and all the expositions are colored by Lutheran dogma.

We commend this work to all pastors. It presents a new series of scripture lessons which have been carefully selected by German scholars and pastors. It contains valuable exegetical and homiletical material. For many a pastor it will be a new approach to the contents of the gospel.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE HUMANITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF THE FUTURE. By William Baxter Owen, Ph.D., Litt.D., Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in Lafayette College. Boston, Sherman, French and Company. Pp. 6 + 187. \$1.25 net.

This volume contains a series of addresses and talks given by the author on different occasions, and the treatment of the topics is sometimes in lighter sometimes in more serious vein. But it is easy to discern in all of them one dominant note which gives a certain unity to the series. The note is that of the scholar, the teacher, the educator, and in every case the topic is treated with literary skill and incisive clearness so as to present what is well said and what deserves to be said.

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JOHN S. STAHR.

WORLD EDUCATION. By the Rev. Walter Scott, D.D. Boston, Mass., W. B. Clarke and Co. Cloth. 125 pages. Price \$1.00 net.

The author of this interesting and instructive little book has for some years been the secretary of the New England Education League, and of the International Education Conference. These positions have afforded him rare opportunity for the study of the subject dealt with in these pages, and for gathering the vast array of facts by which his discussion of the favorable conditions now prevailing for a world campaign of education is illustrated and illuminated. The important additions to the sum of knowledge, the commercial activities, the discoveries and inventions, and the social changes incident to such progress during the nineteenth century, have greatly facilitated, he argues, the possibilities of placing at the disposal of multitudes in every land who have

hitherto been deprived of it, a chance to learn not everything, of course, but anything within the limits of their powers. International relations, the diffusion of literature, the recognition of the universal brotherhood of man, the enlargement of missionary efforts and their more intelligent direction, and the progress of civilization—all are at present united in making this a time extraordinarily opportune, he thinks, for undertaking the campaign of world education according to the plans here suggested, and for the promotion of which these papers have been written. The scheme proposed, the statistics given, and the opportunities so forcefully pointed out, should prove of great service to the cause which Dr. Scott has so closely at heart.

A. S. WEBER.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN EDUCATION. By William Seneca Sutton. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. 260 pages. Price \$1.35 net.

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A. S. WEBER.

AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA. By Herbert H. Gowen, D.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. 208 pages. Price \$1.20 net.

Owing to the political revolution which so recently has given birth to the youngest of republics, and to the new missionary interest which has been awakened in the people of that oriental nation, the appearance of this historical outline just now, is at once timely and welcome. The author, who is the lecturer on oriental history in the University of Washington, writes with competent historical knowledge and insight, and affords his readers, in brief yet comprehensive outline, an adequate narrative of the important historic events of China from the earliest times to the period of the Manchu Conquest in 1644 A. D. If a volume more satisfactory in its contents or better suited to the needs of ordinary students of Chinese annals than the present one is available in the English language, it has not been brought to the notice of the reviewer. It is cordially commended to preachers and Sunday-school teachers, to missionary societies and others, who desire authoritative information about China and its early history.

A. S. WEBER.

THE BOOK OF JOB. By Homer B. Sprague, Ph.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Flexible cloth. 243 pages. Price \$1.25 net.

The present study of the Book of Job is of a literary or poetic, rather than theological character. Its aim is to popularize it as a portion of the world's greatest literature, which, although its author is unknown, his nationality doubtful, his period undetermined, and even his purpose conjectural, is of perennial interest, as well to students of literature in general as to those of biblical documents in particular. In view of the fact that its versified portion constitutes more than nine tenths of the whole book, and of the fact that its introverting thoughts are expressed in poetic imagery, our author describes it in Dr. Genung's felicitous phrase as "The Epic of the Inner Life." His "explanatory notes" throw much light upon the language of the text, but are not submitted to sustain theological prepossessions or to supersede thought, but to create literary interest and to stimulate critical thought and inquiry. From this viewpoint of the author, this work carries and justifies the belief that the Book of Job is the greatest poem in the world's greatest literature, and supports Bates in saying that "no reader less dull than a clod can remain unreverent and unthrilled in its presence." This work of Dr. Sprague is entitled to a place in ministers' libraries side by side with the great Commentary by Dr. Barton on the same poem.

A. S. WEBER.

SONGS OF SEVEN YEARS. By Sydney Rowe. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Boards. 60 pages. Price \$1.00 net.

A collection of nearly fifty short pieces of poetry, many of which are as beautiful in sentiment as they are faultless in artistic construction, are gathered into these pages. The author evidently possesses many of the natural endowments and has cultivated many of the literary requisites needed for successful work in the field represented by these "Songs." The book is attractively gotten out by the publishers, and is suitable for presentation to younger and older lovers of verse.

A. S. WEBER.

SEEING THE INVISIBLE. The Swander Memorial Lectures, 1912. By the Rev. John P. Swander, D.D., Ph.D., F.S.Sc. Philadelphia, Reformed Church Publication Board. Cloth. Pages 258.

This volume is the latest as it is the ripest literary product of the venerable founder of the Swander Memorial Lectureship in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States at Lancaster, Pa. Theologian, philosopher, poet, scientist, Dr. Swander is one of the most remarkable men the church in America has produced. The Nestor of Reformed authors, his mental vigor is unabated, and so far from having fallen into the "sere and yellow leaf," he retains to a wonderful degree the bloom and freshness of his prime. If fruitful years have brought the "philosophic mind" and sunset clouds take on a "sober coloring" to his eye, the enthusiasm and fire of his youth, for all that, are with him yet. His long series of books are compact of wit and wisdom. His gift for copious expression is astounding. He has Johnsonian volubility, the sonorousness and splendor of Burke. The incisiveness and trenchancy of his criticism, the raciness and piquancy of his style, remind one now of De Quincey, anon of Swift or Lamb. During the twelve-month past, we have read all of his volumes comprised in the series bearing his distinguished name, and, while not always in perfect agreement with him, in all of them we have found entertainment, instruction, stimulus and permanent profit. Dr. Swander deserves well of the Reformed Church. He will take rank in our history as one of our most independent thinkers and foremost scholars. Above all, his name will always be revered and loved for his generous benefactions to the Church and her institutions, for whose sake he has given almost to the point of impoverishment and restricted himself to a Spartan simplicity of life. A savant of international reputation, a member of the London Society of Art, Science and Literature, whose gold medal crowned one of his meritorious works, the bearer of ecclesiastical honors and learned titles, he wears all these gathered laurels lightly and with simple dignity, a man to whom

may not inaptly be applied the ancient phrase: *Antiqua homo virtute et fide*.

"Seeing the Invisible," the significant and richly suggestive title of Dr. Swander's latest book of lectures delivered before the faculty and students of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, represents, perhaps, the best of its author's observation and reflection, the thought and experience of a lifetime come to its ripeness. It could have been written only by a sage and a seer. It is a more new and later version, more simple and free from the technicalities of science, of the author's earlier works, "The Substantial Philosophy" and "The Invisible World." Standing on the mystic borderland of the visible and the invisible worlds, of matter and force, nature and spirit, he asseverates in the twentieth century, and from the standpoint of his scientific conviction, what was asserted by an apostle of the first century, giving the old, old truth a new meaning and a new application: "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."

In his scientific, philosophic and religious inquiries after the various elements and phenomena in the comprehensive constitution of all finite being, the author starts with the assumption that all knowable substances are divisible into two classes, viz., material and immaterial entities. He holds that the immaterial elements in God's great creation, such as odor, gravity, magnetism, electricity, heat, sound, light and life, are not only just as real as the various forms of matter, but also the force elements by which matter is manipulated and made to serve its purpose under the divine plan of the ages and in the economy of the universe. It is claimed that to surrender the above mentioned position or postulate is to abandon the very Gibraltar of all sound reasoning by analogy in favor of the reality and immortality of the human soul as an organic entity distinct from and independent of the body. In other words, if the physical forces above mentioned are generated in the womb of matter and made to play the part of mere molecular motion, as advocated by the most popular of the world's leading physicists, there is no testimony from Nature's great book confirming the teachings of our direct revelation from Heaven that death does not end all that there is of man and for man. If, for example, electricity, heat, light, and sound have no existence distinct and separate from matter and motion, what unimpeachable evidence has reason to offer in support of our dearest hope that the soul of man will survive the throes of his physical dissolution?

Professor Swander has displayed much painstaking diligence in the development of his adopted principle and in the illustration of his somewhat unique position in science and philosophy. He acknowledges himself largely indebted to the incisive writings of

Dr. A. Wilford Hall in "The Problem of Human Life, Here and Hereafter." Yet he claims to have advanced in method and details beyond the position of that distinguished investigator. These lectures are now given to the public in the volume herein under review.

GEO. S. BUTZ.

THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM, Historical and Doctrinal Studies. The Swander Memorial Lectures, 1911. By George W. Richards, Professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States at Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia, Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States. 1913. Pages xiii + 363. Price \$1 net.

The celebration of the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the publication of the Heidelberg Catechism, during the current year, has furnished the fitting occasion for a new literary appreciation of this ancient symbol of the Reformed faith. This book was written "in response to a request from the Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States to prepare a pamphlet on the historical and doctrinal aspects of the Heidelberg Catechism for circulation during the anniversary year." But the work far outgrew the limits of a pamphlet and was put into book form, on the Swander Foundation, at the request of the Faculty of the Theological Seminary at Lancaster.

Readers of the book will rejoice that its rich contents were saved from submersion in the bottomless pit of pamphlets. They deserve the permanency, the dignity, and the wider publicity that are assured by their present form. This book easily takes the front rank among the contemporaneous contributions in English to the literature on the Heidelberg Catechism. It embodies, in its historical articles, the results of the scholarly researches of German and Dutch specialists. And it presents, in its doctrinal studies, the original and independent labors of the author.

The book consists of three parts, the first and second containing the historical and doctrinal studies suggested by its subtitle, and the third being a reprint of the first edition of the Heidelberg Catechism with the English translation of the Tercentenary Edition. The historical part covers five chapters, in which the author presents sketches of the Catechumenate before the Reformation, of the Evangelical Catechisms before the Heidelberg Catechism, of the Reformation in the Palatinate and the Conversion of Frederick III. to Calvinism, and of the Preparation, Publication, and Reception of the Heidelberg Catechism. These sketches cover wide areas of history. Many interesting facts, old and new, winnowed from many fields, are here woven into a lucid narrative. The sections devoted particularly to the history of the Heidelberg Catechism fully establish the claim of the author that this catechism "is not simply the work of a man, but the

ripe product of an historical process of two generations, yea, in a measure of fifteen centuries." They form a tribute to his painstaking historical scholarship. The reader will find in them a concise and an authoritative résumé of all the known facts concerning the genesis of the Heidelberg Catechism. In the main these facts have been known to scholars for ages, and they were incorporated in the articles of the Tercentenary Monument, published in 1863. But more recent investigations have thrown new light on a number of interesting details, and have compelled a revision of traditional opinions. Dr. Richards' work marches abreast with the age, and we know of no other book that presents the exact historical facts more concisely or more attractively. Simply for its historical merit this volume deserves a place in the library of every member of the wide household of Reformed Churches, and of those of that wider household who value great human documents that have helped to mould mankind.

Most readers, however, will find a deeper interest, if not a greater merit, attaching to the second part of the volume, entitled *Doctrinal Studies*. Here the author devotes four chapters to a discussion of the present significance and value of the catechism as a standard of Christian doctrine and as a text-book for the religious instruction of youth. In the first chapter he differentiates the distinctive doctrines of the Heidelberg Catechism from Catholicism, Radicalism, Lutheranism, and High Calvinism. The mild, but consistent, Calvinism of this Reformed symbol never appears to greater advantage than when thus contrasted with Catholicism and with the various forms of Protestantism. In the second chapter the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to contemporary theological thought is subjected to a searching analysis, and in the closing chapters we have an illuminating discussion of the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to religious education.

In this second part one finds a rare blending of intelligent appreciation with discerning criticism. The author is neither a medievalist nor a modernist. There is an obnoxious modernism to-day, deficient both in historical knowledge and in religious insight, that would consign all the theological standards dating from the age of the Reformation to the limbo of outgrown superstitions, even as there is a blind medievalism, equally deficient, that regards the symbols of the past with a veneration akin to superstition. These false extremes of iconoclasm and of bigotry are happily avoided in the book under review. It will appeal neither to those who condemn the Heidelberg Catechism as a speculative hallucination nor to those who adore it as a divine revelation, though both classes might profitably read and ponder it. But it will be welcomed by all who believe in progress without radicalism; who can discriminate between fact and form, religion and theology, life and letter; who receive the noble heri-

tage of the past not as a dead weight but as wings to stimulate higher and nobler flights in the present. It might have chosen for its motto Goethe's saying, "Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern, erwerb es um es zu besitzen."

The author does not, indeed, mince matters. He shows clearly that in its premises and conclusions, in its doctrines as well as in its practical teachings, the Heidelberg Catechism belongs to the age of the Reformation and reflects the medieval thought-world. He contends that in form and substance, as a catechetical manual and as a confessional standard, it is inadequate to the needs of the twentieth century. "It was the 'flower and fruit of the whole German and French Reformation,' but it was none the less a child of its age. It does not anticipate, directly or by implication, the theological thought of our day." But jointly with this critical note, the author constantly sounds the note of sincere appreciation. This catechism, like all the confessional symbols of the past, was the outgrowth of vital Christian experience. It was forged in the fiery furnace of life, not in the secluded haunts of scholars. Its questions and answers are not the idle speculations of philosophers, but the honest efforts of earnest men to give a reasoned and reasonable explanation of their vital experience of redemption from sin by the grace of God through Jesus Christ. In its religious essence the catechism is neither medieval nor modern, but simply Christian. Without addition, without subtraction, and without mutilation it presents the great facts of the universal Christian experience: Sin, Salvation through Christ, Gratitude expressed in Life. It is against the formulation and interpretation of these facts in the terms of Calvin, Augustine, and Paul, rather than after the mind of the Master, that the criticism of the book is directed.

This is frank and fearless criticism, but not radicalism. It is the sane verdict of a constructive thinker. It reflects the mood of many who, with the author, prize the Heidelberg Catechism as part of a precious ancestral heritage but who also discern its historical limitations and its theological defects. The author concludes his studies "with a problem rather than with a panegyric." The problem is how to be worthy sons of the men of the sixteenth century, who were great "because they had the courage to protest and to progress." "Loyalty to the fathers of the Church of the Heidelberg Catechism means far more than to repeat their formulas and to assent to their doctrines. It is to seek truth, to love righteousness, to obey the voice of the Spirit, and to devote one's life to the glory of God in the service of humanity." One can only add to this the expression of the fervent hope that the wide circulation and the unprejudiced perusal of this book will prove to be material aids in the solution of that pressing problem of modern Christendom.

THEODORE F. HERMAN.